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1Summary
Summary
This study was commissioned by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) to explore the
potential in using statistical profiling to allocate work-focused interventions within its three main
client groups: the sick and disabled, lone parents and JSA clients. Profiling entails the use of statistical
models to predict which new claimants are likely to benefit from early treatment, thus assisting in the
efficient allocation of resources. Models are run to estimate individuals’ probabilities of a relevant
outcome – in our case, being out-of-work in a year’s time, claiming out-of-work benefits a year after
claiming, and the percentage of time claiming out-of-work benefits over a period of 30 months. This
probability can be used to allocate treatments (such as intensive caseloading or a job search course) to
those thought most likely to benefit.
The focus of this study is to establish how accurately clients can be profiled and the data requirements
for accurate profiling. Whether a profiling tool meets acceptable standards of accuracy is a subjective
judgement, but we are able to show whether profiling improves on random allocation of treatment
– an admittedly low hurdle. We lack information on resource allocation by Personal Advisers which
would allow us to compare the performance of profiling with the performance of advisers operating
a system which is partly deterministic and partly driven by adviser discretion.
Accurately identifying what is likely to happen to clients in terms of their labour market and benefit
claiming prospects is one of two considerations in efficient resource allocation. The second is
knowledge of who is likely to benefit most from a particular treatment, and by how much, because
efficient resource allocation involves maximising the benefits to treatment net of costs. The
differential impact of programmes is beyond the scope of this study, so it is assumed throughout that
efficient resource allocation will be best achieved by focusing on those with predicted longer claims
which, in turn, assumes the net benefits of treating these claimants are at least as great as the net
benefits of focusing on those with predicted shorter spells.
Studies show profiling depends on the quality of data available to predict outcomes. We explore the
impact of data richness on profiling accuracy by running alternative model specifications using data
from the ONE evaluation. The ONE data and the pros and cons of using it for profiling are discussed in
Section 2.1. The most parsimonious models contain the sorts of data that might ordinarily be available
to the analyst, whereas fuller models capitalise on the richness of ONE, bringing in data on attitudes
and so on, which the Department may wish to collect from clients if it assists in profiling.
We have not sought to identify a ‘best’ profiling instrument containing only those variables that
discriminate across clients in terms of predicted outcomes. This is because the uniqueness of our data
and the sensitivity of profiling to business cycle, cohort and real time effects would mean further
research would be necessary to translate these models into profiling tools that could be used in the
2 Summary
field. Instead, we use a selection of models designed for each of the three client groups to illustrate the
sensitivity of profiling to model specification, permitting us to make some general observations about
the principles governing profiling.
We also examine how sensitive profiling is to the functional form of the estimator and to other
variations in the profiling procedure.
The accuracy of the profiling is determined with a validation sample that is randomly excluded from
the estimation sample used to run the profiling model. Diagnostic tests used to determine the
accuracy of the profiling model are described in Chapter 2.
Even if profiling is deemed sufficiently accurate it is only a viable option for the Department if it can be
implemented successfully in the field. Considerations influencing the practical viability of profiling are
discussed in Section 2.2.
Results for the sick and disabled were as follows:
• 70 per cent of the sick and disabled were out of work 12 months after making a claim, and 66
per cent were claiming out-of-work benefits. In the 30 months since claiming, 46 per cent had
spent all their time claiming and the mean time spent claiming was 70 per cent.
• Profiling outperforms random allocation of the treatment because the models are good at ranking
individuals according to profiled outcomes.
• ‘Full’ models tend to outperform other models, indicating that there is value to the collection of
additional data. However, profiling does not necessarily improve with the addition of further
variables.
• The functional form of the model does not make a great deal of difference to profiling accuracy.
In the case of out-of-work and benefit status 12 months after claiming, the logit is marginally
preferable to the OLS and probit while, in the case of percentage of time spent claiming, the OLS
estimator marginally outperforms the tobit.
• The success in targeting the treatment through profiling depends on the proportion of the eligible
group to be treated, relative to the proportion who actually go on to be out of work/claim.
• The inclusion of ward-level deprivation data did not improve the accuracy of profiling.
• The exclusion of benefit area dummies makes little difference to the predictive accuracy of the
models.
• Models perform differently across sub-groups of clients but all work reasonably well in terms of
the profiling diagnostics.
• Confining the analysis to claimants only does not make much difference.
• Altering the size of the estimation versus validation samples does not make much difference.
• The predictive power of profiling models for out-of-work benefit status and out-of-work labour
market status is similar.
• Determinants of benefit and out-of-work status 12 months after claiming are similar, but differ
in some respects, perhaps suggesting the need to develop alternative models for both outcomes.
The determinants of percentage of time claiming over 30 months differ in a number of ways
from benefit status at month 12.
3• There are no unambiguous advantages to using percentage of time spent claiming rather than
benefit status at month 12 as the profiling variable: the relative performance of profiling on
these two outcomes, using identical models, differs with the cut-off point chosen to allocate
treatment. With a 70 per cent cut-off, the correct prediction rate is higher when using percentage
of time spent claiming, but profiling based on wave two benefit status results in slightly better
profiling with 30 per cent and 50 per cent cut-offs.
Results for the lone parents were as follows:
• Just over 72 per cent of lone mothers (and 72.5 per cent of all lone parents) were out of work 12
months after approaching DWP to make a claim for out-of-work benefits; 66 per cent of lone
mothers (67 per cent of all lone parents) were claiming out-of-work benefits at the 12 month
point; 35 per cent of lone mothers spent all of the 30 months since making the claim on out-of-
work benefits, the mean percentage of time spent claiming being 67 per cent.
• Profiling outperforms random allocation of the treatment.
• The out-of-work benefit status models perform better than the out-of-work labour market status
models because the model generates fewer false negatives.
• Determinants of benefit and out-of-work status are similar but not identical. Determinants of
benefit status at the 12 month point and over the 30 month period differ in a number of respects.
• The ‘full’ models outperform other models when profiling on out-of-work labour market status
and benefit status 12 months after claiming but, in the case of the percentage of time claiming
over 30 months there are no gains to more extensive models.
• There is little to choose between functional forms but the logit estimator performs marginally
better than the OLS and probit estimators when estimating status at the 13 month point, while
the OLS outperforms the tobit in estimating time on benefits over the whole 30 months.
• Profiling lone parents with models devised for the sick and disabled produces poorer results than
profiling lone parents with models devised specifically for lone parents.
• Models for all lone parents perform a little better than those for lone mothers only.
• Sensitivity analyses made little difference to the results, although there were differences in
performance when separate models were estimated for younger and older lone mothers.
• Profiling models for the sick and disabled generally performed better than those for the lone
mothers.
Results for JSA clients were as follows:
• In contrast to the other two client groups, only 42.5 per cent of JSA clients were out of work 12
months after making their initial approach to DWP, and 32 per cent were claiming out-of-work
benefits at that point. Furthermore, only two per cent had spent all of their time claiming out-of-
work benefits over the 30 month period, the mean percentage of time spent claiming being 30
per cent.
• Profiling outperforms random allocation of the treatment.
• The ‘full’ model outperforms other models in predicting benefit and labour market status 12
months after claiming but, when profiling with the percentage of time claiming over the 30
month period, there are no improvements in correct prediction rates with the fullest models.
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4• The predictive power of profiling models for out-of-work benefit and labour market status at the
12 month point are similar, though the determinants of these two statuses differ in a number of
respects.
• There are no unambiguous advantages to using percentage of time spent claiming rather than
benefit status at month 12 as the profiling variable: the relative performance of profiling on
these two outcomes using identical models differs with the cut-off point chosen to allocate
treatment.
• Once again, the logit marginally outperforms other estimators in profiling status 12 months on,
while the OLS performs better than the tobit estimator in predicting percentage of time claiming
over the 30 month period.
• Profiling JSA clients with models devised for the sick and disabled produces poorer results than
profiling JSA clients with models devised specifically for them.
• In contrast to the sick and disabled, correct prediction rates rise as the target group for treatment
narrows. Again, in contrast to the sick and disabled, the correct prediction rate is not particularly
sensitive to the cut-off point chosen.
• Irrespective of the cut-off point, negative predictions are less likely to be wrong in the case of JSA
clients compared with the sick and disabled, but a higher percentage of those predicted to need
treatment actually find a job.
• Irrespective of the cut-off point, out-of-work correct treatment rates are higher for JSA clients
than they are for the sick and disabled.
• Sensitivity analyses made little difference to the results, except in the case of the split by gender
and age. How well a profiling instrument performs for any of the four sub-groups (men, women,
those aged under 35 years and those aged 35 or more) depends on the criterion used to measure
accuracy and the model specification.
Taking these results together, we conclude:
• Profiling outperforms the random allocation of treatments but wrong denial and wrong treatment
rates are not trivial.
• Whether statistical profiling performs accurately enough for policy purposes is a subjective
judgement.
• It would be useful to compare the accuracy rates of statistical profiling with those achieved
through PA discretion and the application of deterministic rules.
• The accuracy of profiling turns on the distribution of the outcome variable, the proportion of the
client group eligible for treatment, and the variables available to predict the outcome.
• Profiling accuracy rates are at least as good, if not better, for the sick and disabled client group as
they are for lone mothers and JSA clients.
Summary
51 Introduction
• Government is increasing the assistance offered to new claimants, most notably through work-
focused interviews at the beginning of a claim.
• Statistical profiling is one of a number of methods for allocating resources across claimants
where it is costly to treat all claimants.
• Under statistical profiling, the statistically assessed probability of a relevant outcome (eg. being a
long-term benefit claimant) is used to assign individuals to early treatment.
• The technique is mandatory under federal law in the U.S. for claimants of insurance-based U.I. It
is relatively untested in the U.S. and elsewhere and little is known about the accuracy of the
technique relative to other resource allocation methods such as adviser discretion and the
application of deterministic rules such as the use of benefit durations to determine eligibility for
treatment.
This study uses ONE data to profile the Department for Work and Pensions’ three main client groups:
the sick and disabled, lone parents, and JSA clients. The purpose is to establish how accurately clients
can be profiled and the data requirements for accurate profiling, thus informing the design of actual
profiling tools which DWP may choose to use in the future. It is not intended to provide a basis for
profiling in the field.
1.1 Context
With limited resources and a policy imperative to move claimants off benefits and into work, the
Government must determine which method is best suited to the allocation of those resources across
clients. In some instances, Governments offer assistance to all within a client group, so there is no
need to ration help. For instance, the New Deal for Lone Parents is available to all lone parents and
basic JSA job search help is available to all JSA clients from the beginning of a claim. However, the need
for a mechanism to allocate resources increases with the cost of the intervention. Traditionally, this
allocation has occurred through one of two mechanisms. Treatment has been either offered or
withheld on the basis of Personal Adviser1 discretion, or else treatment is offered in a deterministic
way according to client characteristics. In the latter case, a salient characteristic has been the time the
individual has remained on benefit. Knowing that many claimants will leave benefit of their own
accord, or with little assistance, in the early period of their claim, it may seem sensible to target
Introduction
1 Personal Adviser is the current job title for caseworkers in Jobcentre Plus.
6 Introduction
intensive intervention on those who have remained on benefit for a period – often six months. This can
help tackle the problem of deadweight wherein government unnecessarily devotes resources to
helping clients who, in fact, required little or no help. The difficulty with this approach is two-fold.
First, those who are perhaps in a seriously disadvantaged position at the outset, whose probability of
going onto longer-term benefit receipt was high at the outset, receive fewer resources than one
would ideally like to offer them. Second, longer-term benefit claiming has its own negative impact on
individuals’ subsequent probabilities of leaving benefit for work, a problem which is particularly acute
in Britain (Machin and Manning, 1999).
Recently, Government has increased the assistance offered to new claimants, most notably through
work-focused interviews at the beginning of a claim.2 This offers Personal Advisers the opportunity to
discuss job prospects with those entering the system, identifying barriers to work and individuals’
aspirations. It means Personal Advisers have the opportunity to assess individuals’ probabilities of
(re-)employment at an early stage. But these early interventions, offered to all, can be costly. This has
raised interest in the possibility of using statistical methods to best allocate resources. This method of
resource allocation, known as statistical profiling, has been pioneered in the United States, where it
has been used primarily to assess the probability that an individual will exhaust their six months’
entitlement to Unemployment Insurance. The statistically-assessed probability is used to determine
whether or not that individual will be assigned to early treatment on, for example, mandatory
training.
As part of the Incapacity Benefits Reform Pilots starting in October 2003 (proposed in the ‘Pathways
to Work’ Green Paper published in November 2002), the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)
will be increasing the early assistance given to those beginning a claim for Incapacity Benefits. In these
pilots, profiling will be used to help direct limited resources more effectively. The profiling will be
conducted by Personal Advisers  at the first work-focused interview (eight weeks after the start of the
claim) to all claimants (except those exempt from a Personal Capability Assessment, i.e. those with
severe disabilities). The Personal Advisers will input the data into a web-based tool that will put the
claimants into one of two groups. Those predicted to return to work quickly will be screened out and
not be required to attend more work-focused meetings (though they may choose to attend on a
voluntary basis). The group predicted not to return to work quickly will be screened in and required to
attend the additional work-focused meetings.
Profiling remains controversial (OECD, 1999) and earlier efforts in Britain have met with limited
success (Payne et al., 1996; Employment Service, 1996; Wells, 1998). Profiling depends critically on
the quality of data available to predict outcomes (see Section 2.2.3). Advances in the collection of
survey and administrative data, exemplified in the ONE evaluation that provides the data for this
profiling exercise, should offer good opportunities for improving on past efforts. However, this study
is more ambitious than previous studies since efforts have been made to profile all three major client
2 Work-focused interviews have been a feature of many welfare-to-work initiatives since ONE. ONE was a
pilot service launched in June 1999 that sought to help people claimants overcome obstacles to paid work.
It required all new clients to consider their capacity to work and their position with respect to the labour
market prior to receiving benefit. In October 2001, the Jobcentre Plus Pathfinder offices were introduced
ahead of a national roll-out programme. Jobcentre Plus aims to improve the delivery of the work-focused
interview (WFI) regime piloted in ONE. Since April 2001, lone parents already in receipt of Income Support
were invited to attend a mandatory Personal Adviser meeting on a phased basis, starting with lone parents
whose youngest child was between 13-15 years of age and gradually working down through the age
groups. From April 2003 the last extension was made to new and repeat claimants whose youngest child
is aged between 0 and 3 years.
7groups – the sick and disabled, lone parents and the unemployed. British research has focused largely
on the claimant unemployed and, as noted above, profiling in the United States has been used to
target resources among claimants to time-limited Unemployment Insurance, as opposed to the lone
parents who make up most U.S. welfare recipients. Thus, this study breaks new ground in profiling
lone parents and the sick and disabled in Britain.
1.2 Scope
This study was commissioned by the DWP to explore the potential in using statistical profiling to
allocate work-focused interventions within its three main client groups: the sick and disabled, lone
parents and JSA clients.
Profiling entails the use of statistical models to predict which new claimants are likely to benefit from
early treatment, thus assisting in the efficient allocation of resources. In this study, models are run to
estimate individuals’ probabilities of being out of work a year after claiming, claiming out-of-work
benefits a year after claiming, and the percentage of time claiming out-of-work benefits over a period
of 30 months. In the ‘real world’ these probabilities might be used to allocate treatments to those
thought most likely to benefit. However, this study is a theoretical exercise to establish how accurately
clients can be profiled and the data requirements for accurate profiling, thus informing the design of
actual profiling tools which DWP may choose to use in the future. It is not intended to provide a basis
for profiling in the field.
Whether a profiling tool meets acceptable standards of accuracy is a subjective judgement, but we are
able to show whether profiling improves on random allocation of treatment – an admittedly low
hurdle. We lack information on resource allocation by Personal Advisers which would allow us to
compare the performance of profiling with the performance of advisers operating a system which is
partly deterministic and partly driven by adviser discretion.
Government may seek to achieve various social goals through the allocation of resources across
benefit client groups. It may be that the primary goal is allocation of services equitably – serving those
most in need. Alternatively, the aim may be the efficient allocation of services, that is, serving those
with the largest net benefits from participation. Or else, the policy may be attempting to fulfil both
objectives at once. The broad policy aims are important since they determine which profiling variable
or variables are optimal (see Section 2.2.1).
If efficient resource allocation is a key aim, one faces an important difficulty. To know what constitutes
efficient resource allocation, one must know how individuals respond to treatment. In a world where
one assumes homogeneous treatment effects (such that all are likely to benefit equally from
treatment, or more intensive treatment), and marginal costs are homogeneous then there is no
efficiency gain from serving those with longer expected claims. For example, if half of the claims will
last 10 weeks and half 20, but all claims are reduced by two weeks at some constant cost if treated,
then there is no efficiency gain to concentrating treatment on those with expected durations of 20
weeks. However, where a treatment works equally well regardless of an individual’s characteristics,
substitution effects may be minimised where resources are targeted on those least able to compete
in the open market, offering a rationale for focusing on those with predicted longer-term benefit
spells. It is possible that treatment effects will be heterogeneous, in which case efficient resource
allocation dictates that treatment should be given to those with the largest net benefits from
participation. A priori, it is not possible to tell whether net benefits will be greater for those with
predicted longer benefit claims or those with predicted shorter benefit claims. (It is even plausible that,
if those with predicted shorter benefit spells benefit disproportionately from the sort of treatment
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represent a treatment effect rather than deadweight.)
Whether the caseloading approach or other treatments imply homogeneous or heterogeneous
effects is beyond the scope of this study.3 We simply assume that efficient resource allocation will be
best achieved by devoting resources to those with predicted longer-term claiming. This implies that
the net benefits of treating these clients will be at least as great as the net benefits of focusing on those
with predicted shorter spells.4 In future, research needs to be undertaken to establish the nature of
treatment effects since targeting those with the potential for longer claims is only efficient if these
types of client respond to treatment.5
A related issue is the need to distinguish between the effectiveness of profiling, on the one hand, and
the effectiveness of the treatment being profiled, on the other. As Black, Berger and Smith (2001: 3-
4) put it: ‘A profiling system (or any other system of assignment to services) might do a good job of
allocating an ineffective service or it might do a bad job of allocating an effective service’. In this study,
we are concerned solely with the performance of profiling in ranking clients according to subsequent
benefit outcomes. The study does not address the effectiveness of the caseloading approach to
servicing new clients.
1.3 The experience of profiling
Statistical profiling was pioneered in the United States. Since the mid-1990s statistical profiling has
been mandatory under federal law for all U.S. states allocating resources to claimants of time-limited
Unemployment Insurance under the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS). UI
recipients are entitled to up to six months’ benefit, depending on their contributions record, after
which time all benefits cease, unless they qualify for means-tested assistance under Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Profiling identifies which claimants will be likely to exhaust UI
and targets available job search assistance according to the ranking of their probability of exhaustion.
The literature evaluating the performance of UI profiling identifies important lessons for profiling in
Britain:
• In the U.S., profiling generally performs poorly in ranking UI recipients according to their subsequent
benefit experiences. Successful profiling depends critically on the quality of data available to
predict outcomes (see Section 2.2.3). Profiling in Kentucky is more successful than elsewhere
due to the rich set of covariates entering the model (Black, Berger and Smith, 2001; Black et al.,
2003).6
3 ONE was an important development of the caseloading approach in Britain. However, ONE has been
superseded by Jobcentre Plus which adopts a similar caseloading approach to servicing clients.
4 In turn, this assumes that welfare losses are at least as great among individuals experiencing longer claiming
spells, a contention that needs empirical validation since, in theory, it is not necessarily the case (Black,
Berger and Smith, 2001).
5 The feasibility of such research relies on impact and cost data being available.
6 The Kentucky model contains over 140 covariates, whereas the original Worker Profiling and Reemployment
Services model consisted of five covariates. Elsewhere, Pennsylvania uses only eight covariates and
Washington State uses 26 (Black et al., 2003). Black et al. (2003) take data for Kentucky and identify a
‘best specification’ that balances predictive performance and simplicity. It contains 17 variables: education,
single digit occupation, tenure with last employer and tenure squared, type of shift working patterns, UI
benefit exhaustion in the previous year, an indicator of previous UI benefit claims, welfare transfer payments
made, food stamp receipt, public transport for getting to work, eligibility for the JTPA programme, quarterly
wages in the last year, whether enrolled in school at the time of claiming, and whether employed at the
time of claim.
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• There is no evidence from the profiling of UI claimants in Kentucky that those claimants with
longer expected unemployment durations have larger treatment effects (Black et al., 2003).
Indeed, in spite of good profiling relative to most states, it seems the efficiency goal is not being
obtained (Black, Berger and Smith, 2001).
• Profiling models should be regularly updated to take account of changes in their predictive power
arising from changes such as business cycle effects.
In interpreting the profiling evidence for the U.S., it is important to recall the differences between the
U.S. and British contexts. First, whereas in the U.S. case, attention is focused on predicting exhaustion
of short-term benefit entitlements, in the British case benefits are not generally time-limited. Second,
services available to UI recipients are typically short term and inexpensive compared with longer-term
training programmes offered to welfare recipients, and individuals can often enrol in most services
without referral. Thus ‘the predictive power of the model is not as critical as it would be if the statistical
model were used to refer individuals to longer-term and more expensive services, and if the model
precluded individuals with lower assigned probabilities from using services’ (Eberts and O’Leary,
1997). This may explain why there is no profiling for the majority of welfare recipients in the U.S., who
tend to be lone mothers with longer-term benefit entitlements and eligibility for more expensive
welfare-to-work programmes.7 Just how profiling might be used to allocate which type of resources
is yet to be seen in Britain.
Canada and Australia also use statistical methods for the early identification of those most likely to
have long unemployment spells but, unlike in the U.S. where Personal Adviser discretion is explicitly
prohibited in the allocation of reemployment services to UI recipients, these countries allow Personal
Advisers discretion to override the formal model to refer clients. Some other countries, like the
Netherlands, rely solely on Personal Adviser judgement to identify those at risk of long-term claiming
(see Eberts and O’Leary, 1997 for a review).
Profiling remains controversial (OECD, 1999), especially in Britain where earlier efforts at profiling
have met with limited success (Payne et al., 1996; Employment Service, 1996; Wells, 1998). Payne et
al. (1996) used the National Child Development Survey to predict unemployment at age 33 years.
Their job was made difficult by the fairly small sample sizes available and the low incidence of
unemployment (nine per cent). The authors express concern at the error rate in their ability to predict
unemployment accurately, and suggest further research on larger data sets covering the full age
range and a wider set of covariates. The Early Identification Pilot, run in seven Employment Service
Jobcentres in 1994, came to similar conclusions in trying to predict claim durations and the probability
of unemployment 12 months in to a claim.
As noted above, successful profiling depends critically on the quality of data available to predict
outcomes. This study uses data from the ONE evaluation, which exemplifies advances in the collection
of survey and administrative data. This offers good opportunities for improving on past efforts.
However, this study is a little more ambitious than previous studies since, for the first time, it profiles
the sick and disabled, and lone parents, as well as the unemployed who have been the exclusive focus
in previous studies.
7 The first field experiment assessing the value of profiling for welfare recipients was conducted in Michigan
in 1998/1999 (Eberts, 2002).
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The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Chapter 2 explains the methods used in this study: it
introduces the data and discusses data issues when profiling; explains the rationale behind model
building and the choice of outcome variables; and describes the procedures adopted in profiling
clients and diagnosing the effectiveness of profiling. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 present analysis and results
for the sick and disabled clients, lone parents and the unemployed respectively. Chapter 6 concludes
by summarising the results and identifying practical implications of the study and further issues that
could be addressed in establishing what value there might be in profiling DWP clients.
Introduction
11
2 Method
• The study uses data generated by the evaluation of ONE in 24 areas of Britain. Individuals
approached DWP about claiming out-of-work benefits in the spring and summer of 2000.
• Three profiling outcomes were chosen, namely whether out of work 12 months after approaching
DWP about a claim, whether claiming an out-of-work benefit 12 months after the claim, and the
percentage of time spent claiming out-of-work benefits between the initial approach to DWP
and 31 December 2002.
• The accuracy of the profiling is determined with a validation sample that is randomly excluded
from the estimation sample used to run the profiling model.
• Two methods are used to estimate the accuracy of profiling. First, the validation sample is ranked
according to predicted outcomes, and differences in the means of these outcomes are calculated
for quintiles of the predicted outcomes. Second, cut-off points are chosen to simulate a resource
allocation rule, determining who receives treatment and who does not. Using the cut-off to
determine the ‘correct’ observed state of the individual, we calculate the percentage of claimants
who had their outcomes correctly predicted; the percentage who were falsely predicted to be in
need of assistance (‘false positives’); and the percentage falsely predicted as not needing assistance
(‘false negatives’). Models are compared using these criteria.
• We test the sensitivity of profiling accuracy to model specification, the profiling outcome variable
used, the functional form of the equation, the adoption of different cut-off points, the inclusion
of individuals who failed to make a successful initial claim, and to sub-groups within each client
group.
The technical feasibility of statistical profiling depends on the production of a predictive tool that
meets acceptable standards of accuracy. The great danger with profiling is that it fails to identify with
sufficient accuracy the people who go on to be long-term claimants, who may have merited more
assistance at the outset, producing a high proportion of what are often termed ‘false negatives’, or
that it predicts longer-term claiming for people who, in the event, move off benefit relatively quickly
(the ‘false positives’ which generate deadweight). This chapter addresses the methodological, data
and analytical issues arising through statistical profiling with ONE data. There is no single definition of
‘accuracy’ in the literature: section 2.3 outlines the criteria we use to measure accuracy in this study.
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2.1 The ONE data
The data used in this study are taken from the ONE database originally produced to evaluate the
impact of The ONE pilots (see Green et al., 2003). The full data set consists of 14,572 individuals who
approached DWP to make claims for out-of-work benefits in June/July 2000. The data cover three
client groups – the sick and disabled, lone parents and the unemployed. Individuals are eligible for
ONE when making a new claim for one of the following benefits: Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA);
Income Support (IS); Incapacity Benefit (IB); Invalid Care Allowance (ICA); Severe Disablement
Allowance (SDA); Widows Benefit (WB); and Bereavement Benefit (BB). Eligibility for ONE is triggered
by new claims for these benefits, including transfers across benefits and approaches about claiming
which might not, in the event, result in a successful claim.
The evaluation was conducted in 24 areas – 12 pilot areas running three variants on the ONE
treatment (namely the ‘basic’ model, the ‘call centre’ model, and the private/voluntary sector model)
and 12 comparison areas, each pilot variant being matched to four comparison areas. Individuals
were sampled for the survey using the Labour Market System (LMS), with the exception of lone
parents and the sick and disabled in the comparison areas, who were sampled from the GMS benefit
system. Unlike the LMS, one is supposed to have made a successful claim for benefit to enter GMS.
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with survey participants in autumn 2000 – four to five
months after ONE entry  – and again in April – June 2001, that is, nearly a year after ONE entry. We
have matched in data on all benefit spells for the period 1 July 1999 – 31 December 2002.
The ONE evaluation is confined to those survey respondents who said they had successfully
established a claim for benefit (Green, Connolly, Marsh and Payne, 2003). However, there are three
reasons why it seems appropriate to profile the whole sample, regardless of whether they went on to
claim:
• First, in the real world, when an individual approaches DWP staff about a new claim, the Personal
Adviser does not know who will go on to establish a claim successfully and will need to assess the
priority attached to serving that individual at the earliest opportunity.
• Second, respondent recall regarding their claimant status may be unreliable.8
• Third, failure to establish a claim may be a ONE treatment effect where staff ‘divert’ individuals
before claiming, in which case it seems wrong to ignore this group of clients. Therefore, we
profile the whole sample, but we test the sensitivity of results to the exclusion of those who said
they did not claim.
Method
8 Although anyone approaching DWP to claim benefit was eligible for ONE in the ONE areas, the control
group samples of sick and disabled and lone parents were drawn from the GMS, a claimants-only data
base. (Coverage of the unemployed in the Labour Market System (LMS), which does identify people making
an approach for a claim, means the unemployed control sample should include some who were non-
claimants at the time of ONE entry.) Despite this, many of the control group members said in the survey
that they had not made claims around the time they would have been eligible for ONE, indicating some
inaccuracy in self-reported claiming. In the case of the sick and disabled, for example, 147 control group
clients said they had not claimed.
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There are four advantages in using the ONE data for profiling:
• First, the data are very rich in covariates, increasing the chances of accurately profiling individuals.
• Second, the sample sizes are quite large, offering the prospect of reasonable precision in estimation
and offering the opportunity to consider sub-group analysis.
• Third, as noted above, we are able to match the data to administrative information on benefit
records. This is valuable because:
– these data do not suffer from recall error or sample attrition;
– there is greater variance in the outcomes derived from the benefit data than there is in the
outcomes derived from the survey data, a factor which, as the U.S. literature indicates,
contributes to more accurate prediction.
• Fourth, these are the only recent data available for all three client groups in Britain.
However, there are some limitations in relying exclusively on ONE data that should be noted when
interpreting the results and in considering extensions of this research:
• First, there is the difficulty in replicating the models elsewhere since data will be absent for other
cohorts who have not been surveyed in this way.
• Second, profiling is concerned with the prediction of benefit and labour market outcomes. It
would be an error to load variables into a profiling model with a view to maximising the model’s
statistical power if the set of variables included those which are merely associated with the
outcome of interest, rather than predictive of it. In the case of the ONE data, this raises questions
about the use of attitudinal data, which was collected at the first wave interview – some four to
five months after ONE eligibility – since these attitudes may themselves be the outcome of the
early experience of benefit claiming. Unless one can identify good theoretical grounds for arguing
that attitudes are persistent over time, and thus not subject to change as a result of the experience
of claiming, they ought not to be used to predict outcomes. We have chosen to test the sensitivity
of prediction to the inclusion and exclusion of attitudinal data to illustrate what might be gained
by the early collection of attitudinal data from DWP clients.9
• Third, following on from this point, if one adopts a purist approach and wishes to exclude wave
one data as predictors, there is comparatively little in the survey to estimate early exits from
benefit.
• Fourth, the ONE data are time-specific. In any subsequent research, it might be worthwhile
considering the use of data sets from different time periods to get at real time and business cycle
effects, and cohort effects arising from changes in the eligible population over time. These might
include Restart data, matched to data on the subsequent 12 years or so on benefit claiming.
9 This problem of causation regarding attitudinal data collected post-claim is familiar to most evaluators. It
is the reason why NDLP evaluators sought to obtain attitude data prior to treatment from lone parents. See
White and Kileen (2000) for sensitivity of their results on adult career advice to the inclusion and exclusion
of attitude data, and their discussion of theoretical reasons for the persistence or otherwise of attitudes.
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• This might help overcome a fifth problem: the recency of the ONE data means one cannot profile
to identify longer-term benefit outcomes. We have addressed this issue in so far as we can by
matching in administrative benefit data for the period through to December 2002, the latest
date for which full data are available.
• Sixth, the ONE data span the period during which ONE changed from a voluntary to a compulsory
programme, and there is the possibility that the ONE pilot created exceptional circumstances
which might not hold for subsequent entry cohorts.
• Seventh, the data are drawn from pilot and treatment areas – they are not nationally representative
– so it is difficult to extrapolate from these results to the population as a whole. Finally, the data
are subject to sample attrition and survey non-response. In an effort to overcome this, all analyses
are weighted with weights that are the inverse of the probability of sample selection multiplied
by the probability of survey response (see Green et al., 2003, Appendix A for details of the
weighting schema).
2.2 Considerations in model building for profiling
This section considers the issues informing the construction of models which try to predict accurately
the benefit and labour market outcomes of sick and disabled clients eligible for ONE.
2.2.1 Selection of outcome variables
The choice of variable whose predicted value will determine the allocation of services is key to
determining the effectiveness of profiling. As noted by Black, Berger and Smith (2001:9) ‘the optimal
profiling variable is the one that maximises the attainment of the goals of the allocation mechanism’.
If we assume the goal is efficiency, the optimal profiling variable is the one whose allocation of the
programme maximises the total net impact of the programme. This is not clear a priori. Time to job
entry may be optimal, but only if those leaving for jobs do not return to benefit after short periods of
time (that is, ‘churning’ must be relatively low). Time spent claiming may prove the optimal profiling
variable, but only if claimants do not leave to claim other benefits beyond the social security system,
or create other costs (eg. through crime).
We have chosen three outcomes:
• whether out-of-work at the wave two interview, roughly four to five months after claiming;
• whether in receipt of any ONE out-of-work benefits at wave two, roughly a year after claiming;
• the percentage of time spent claiming any out-of-work benefits between the date of ONE eligibility
and 31 December 2002, which is the last date for which we have complete benefit data.
The first two outcomes are measured about a year after ONE eligibility. The key distinction in terms of
labour market status is that between those doing some paid work and those who do not. Although
highly correlated with whether claiming an out-of-work benefit, the correlation is not perfect and the
determinants of benefit status are likely to differ in some ways from those of labour market status.
Consequently we profile for both outcomes. Although the same outcomes are available at wave one,
that is, four to five months after ONE eligibility, we have not profiled on those outcomes because
many of the independent variables used in the profiling are collected at the same point in time,
making causal inference difficult. The advantage of using the status measures one year on is that it
permits clearer interpretation of the causal relationship between independent variables, most of
which are collected at wave one, and outcomes. By counting time spent on all the major out-of-work
benefits it overcomes measurement error associated with receipt of only one benefit.
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There is one overriding technical consideration that must inform the choice of outcome variables,
namely the ability to predict accurately the outcome with available data. Profiling is often dogged by
bunching in the distribution of the dependent variable. If there is little variation in the variable to be
predicted, then successful prediction is easy for the modal outcome, but not particularly useful. In
these circumstances, statistical profiling can often produce many false negatives because even those
with estimated lower probabilities of longer-term claiming are found on benefit. Bunching is a feature
of the U.S. literature for the profiling of UI recipients since, typically, around four-in-ten claimants
exhaust their six month entitlement. In our case, the bunching is similar in the case of the unemployed,
with roughly five-in-ten remaining jobless 12 months later and four-in-ten remaining on out-of-work
benefits. But it is even more severe in the case of the sick and disabled and lone parents where, in both
cases, around seven-in-ten remain jobless and seven-in-ten remain on out-of-work benefits. Our third
outcome – the percentage of time spent claiming out-of-work benefits between ONE entitlement
and the end of December 2002 – helps overcome this problem by increasing the variance in
outcomes. It has five further advantages. First, it is not subject to recall error and so avoids
measurement error that might affect survey responses. Second, the data are not subject to sample
attrition, a potential source of bias for the survey measures collected at wave two. Third, by counting
time spent on all the major out-of-work benefits it overcomes measurement error associated with
movement between different out-of-work benefits. Fourth, the measure effectively adds together
the effects of exits from and re-entry to benefit, thus overcoming any false inferences that might be
made on the basis of first exits from benefit. (In fact, we know churning is a feature of the data, with
many respondents having a number of benefit spells). Finally, the outcome is more long-term than
status one year on, thus giving a more reliable picture of what the long-term prognosis is for the
individual.
2.2.2 Functional form of the regression equation
The precise regression techniques required depend on the nature of the dependent variables chosen
as the basis for profiling. Whether out of work 12 months after their claim for benefit, and whether
in receipt of any out-of-work benefits 12 months after their claim for benefit are both (0,1) outcomes
amenable to modelling using logit or probit models. However, research in the U.S. suggests that the
predictive performance of profiling models with (0,1) outcomes is best when using a linear estimation
model (Black, Smith, Plesca and Shannon, 2003). Where the outcome is continuous, but there is
severe bunching in the upper or lower part of the distribution, the standard regression procedure is
the tobit. But, again, U.S. research indicates that the OLS performs at least as well as the tobit, if not
better, with such outcomes (Black et al, 2003; Black, Berger and Smith, 2001). This does not mean
that the OLS will suffice in the case of ONE clients. We therefore follow Black et al. (2003) and Berger
et al. (2000) in testing the sensitivity of our results to alternative functional forms – specifically logit,
probit and OLS in the case of our first two outcomes, and OLS and tobit for our third outcome.
2.2.3 Independent variables used to predict outcomes
Evidence from the United States indicates that data quality and the set of covariates used to predict
benefit duration is critical in determining the effectiveness of profiling (Black, Berger and Smith,
2001). In particular, the Kentucky profiling approach more accurately predicts UI exhaustion because
the model contains more relevant covariates than the models used in most other states in the United
States. In many modelling situations there are good grounds for parsimonious specifications – for
example, when model construction is grounded in sound theory and geared to the testing of clear
alternative theoretical propositions. However, in the case of profiling, omitted variables can lead to
seriously biased estimates of individuals’ subsequent benefit experiences. Fuller models can also
discriminate more across individuals since, where models contain only a small number of variables,
Method
16
there are fewer potential values of the fitted probability. Furthermore, non-significant variables in this
case may prove significant predictors for other client groups, or in changed circumstances (see below
for further discussion). At the same time, as noted earlier, it is vital that the model serves the purpose
of predicting benefit outcomes, rather than simply accounting for variance in a descriptive sense.
With this in mind, we have devised three model specifications: a parsimonious model containing
variables which are likely to be exogenous; a ‘middling’ model containing an additional set of
covariates likely to be exogenous; and a ‘full’ specification which contains some variables which may
be endogenous with respect to labour market and benefit outcomes. These three models differ across
client groups, so they are presented in the sections on analysis and results.
We have not sought to identify a ‘best’ profiling instrument containing only those variables that
discriminate across clients in terms of predicted outcomes. Even if we had wanted to do this, the
uniqueness of the ONE data and the sensitivity of profiling to business cycle, cohort and real time
effects would mean further research would be necessary to translate our ONE models into profiling
tools that could be used in the field (see Section 2.2.4 for further discussion). Rather, we use the
parsimonious, middling and full models to illustrate the sensitivity of profiling to model specification,
permitting us to make some general observations about the principles governing profiling. An
understanding of the way profiling operates also benefits from the presentation of similar models
across client groups and outcomes. Although our models differ across client groups to enhance their
predictive power for each group – often resulting in the exclusion of variables that do not enhance
predictive power –  where a variable adds to a model’s predictive power the variable is usually entered
in a similar way across models to permit comparisons of the variable’s impact across client groups and,
within client groups, across outcomes. This is so even if a variable could be configured more
parsimoniously in some cases, while retaining its predictive power. This is not the procedure one
would adopt in constructing the ‘best’ profiling instrument for a particular outcome or particular
client group.
The work done in the preliminary phase of this project (Cockerham, 2002), coupled with the work
undertaken by Joan Payne (reported in Chapter 5 of Green et al., 2003) gave clear indications as to the
variables that predict benefit durations and benefit exits for the three client groups in this data set. The
literature on the unemployed emphasises the importance of pre-claim work histories (time in paid
work, time since last paid work, pre-claim earnings, patterns of benefit claiming). In the absence of
administrative information on the pre-claim period, we rely on retrospective data taken at the wave
one interview to construct a two-year work and benefit history.10
It is also conceivable that the area a client lives in will affect individuals’ ability to leave benefit for paid
work. Administrative data on benefit stocks and flows in the Travel-to-Work Areas (TTWAs) covered
in the survey help identify local labour market conditions in the period prior to individuals’ eligibility for
10 Although, as we show later, these variables perform well in the profiling, future profiling might benefit
from administrative data on benefit claiming prior to the current claim going back some way. Respondent
recall, particularly regarding the distinction between claimant and non-claimant spells of non-work, can
be prone to error. If this error is systematic with respect to variables also associated with post-claim benefit
durations, predictions of benefit claiming may be biased. The administrative data would provide a check
on the recall data taken from the respondent. If it goes back further than two years, it might provide more
information on benefit histories which would be useful in predicting benefit outcomes post-claim.
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ONE. We have also mapped in ward-level information on seven dimensions of deprivation, namely:
• income deprivation;
• employment deprivation;
• health deprivation and disability;
• education, skills and training deprivation;
• housing deprivation;
• geographical access to services;
• child poverty.
In addition, we use a multiple deprivation index based on the first six items listed above. The
motivation for this is the possibility that individuals’ prospects are determined not only by their own
attributes and local labour market conditions, but the constraints imposed on individuals by their
physical and environmental surroundings. Local deprivation is likely to determine, at least in part,
individuals’ local opportunities for employment and training, the degree of social exclusion individuals
experience, and the problems individuals face in other spheres of their life. These ward-level indices
are only available for England, so when we test the sensitivity of results to the inclusion of ward-level
deprivation we lose from the analysis cases in the two Scottish benefit areas (Clyde and Tayside) and
the Welsh pilot area (South East Gwent). The indices are for 2000, but the measures on which they are
based relate to 1998 – 1999. We identified the ward the clients lived in when they became eligible for
ONE and matched in the deprivation indices for that ward.11 The degree of client clustering within
wards is quite low because the 24 benefit areas used in the ONE evaluation are large: there are usually
only one or two clients per ward.
One also needs to bear in mind that the ONE data are pilot data testing the impact of ONE, with some
claimants entering the treatment, others not. If the treatment has an independent effect on claimant
outcomes, this needs to be accounted for in predicting individual outcomes. We do this in two ways.
First, we incorporate six dummy variables distinguishing pilot and comparison areas for each of the
three ONE models (basic, call centre, and private/voluntary). Then we replace this six-way categorisation
with 24 dummies identifying each of the 12 pilot and 12 comparison areas. Although, in our case,
these benefit area dummies also account for any ONE effects associated with the evaluation, these 24
area dummies are the closest variables we have to benefit office sites which are often used in profiling
U.I. clients in the U.S.. A profiling scheme treating an equal percentage at each site could not make use
of this variation in predictive power associated with site variables in determining which clients to treat,
so we consider how well the models perform when benefit area dummies are excluded.
All the other variables are taken from the wave one interview. Those in our most parsimonious and
‘middling’ models such as age, gender, qualifications, marital status, number of children, and
characteristics of the pre-ONE job, will not be affected by the experience of benefit claiming and so
can be used in predicting benefit outcomes post eligibility for ONE. However, our fullest models
include variables that may well have been affected by benefit claiming. They include attitudes
towards paid work, discussed earlier, subjective measures of health (general health, mental disability,
long-standing illness), the perceived impact of care responsibilities on opportunities for paid work,
11 See Indices of Deprivation 2000, DETR Regeneration Research Summary Number 31 for full information on
these indices and their derivation.
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access to a car and telephone, and possession of a driving licence. The number of other household
workers is also included in this category, since household labour supply is often the result of decisions
made jointly by household members. The purpose of including them in the analysis is to test the
sensitivity of results to their inclusion. If we assume, for the sake of argument, that these variables are
unaffected by the experience of benefit claiming, these models indicate what might be achievable if
this sort of information was collected at the beginning of a claim.
One can, of course, think of variables that might be highly predictive of benefit outcomes that are not
contained in the data. For instance, the Personal Adviser’s assessment of the individual’s likely time on
benefit, assessed at the beginning of the claim, can be a very powerful predictor of subsequent
outcomes, as research conducted in Switzerland indicates (Gerfin, Lechner and Steiger, 2001).12
Nevertheless, the models presented below contain many of the variables one would expect to see in
analyses of labour market outcomes for these groups of DWP clients.
2.2.4 The utility of models produced
This research is assessing models that are accurate at predicting benefit outcomes. But the utility of
the models to the DWP and to Jobcentre Plus depend on two critical factors: the use to which they will
be put in the field and the need to replicate the models.
The predictive tool may be passed to Personal Advisers in the front line who, having collected the
relevant data, will be expected to convert it into statistical predictions of benefit outcomes, thus
informing resource allocation. If so, the data must be easily collected or available through
administrative data. Alternatively, statistical predictions may be undertaken by staff in central offices
– either at regional, district or even national level – or else by academics contracting with the
Department, as often happens in the WPRS in the United States. ‘Remote’ profilers may have access
to administratively held data, but information from the Personal Adviser initial interview might have
to be transmitted to them in a readily-analysable way. If insufficient investments are made in
developing accurate and timely methods of data collection on a wide range of variables, the profiling
system may be compromised by predictions based on insufficient or inaccurate data. The replicability
of the predictive tool is also important because what predicts accurately for one group, or in one
location, or at a particular time in the business cycle, may prove less effective as a predictor in another
context. Thus, Black et al. (2003) find the predictive performance of their profiling models varied
substantially with unemployment levels and suggest occasional re-estimation may improve the
performance of profiling models. Models based on ONE data may produce accurate predictions but,
if these data are not available for most clients most of the time, it is questionable just how valuable
these predictive tools will be. The challenge for the Department is to generate the necessary data so
that all clients can be profiled over time. This has proved very demanding in the United States, which
explains why so many statistical profiling systems rely on a small set of covariates, producing
inefficient resource allocation. The assumption in this study is that the data used in these models could
be obtained through the administrative system (LMS and/or GMS) combined with information
collected at the first new claim interview using a form akin to that originally devised for Restart
interviews.
Although there are many practical advantages to parsimonious models, one potential disadvantage
12 Bell and Orr (2002) also provide evidence that caseworkers are good at predicting outcome levels (even
conditional on clients’ characteristics) but very bad at predicting impacts.
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might be the ability of Personal Advisers and claimants to seek to manipulate results to produce
predictions which serve the purposes of the adviser or claimant, potentially undermining efforts to
achieve the best allocation of resources.
Another consideration in model building is the extent to which policy makers and Personal Advisers
must be able to make intuitive sense of the predictive model. This might suggest a model that is, in
large part, driven by theoretical considerations. That is to say, models might focus on those individual
and local features which, in theory, one would expect to predict outcomes. However, in the course of
exploration, the analyst may uncover variables that, despite playing a minor or insignificant role
theoretically, actually have empirical power in the predictive model. These factors may not be directly
interpretable, but they may, nevertheless, enhance the predictive capacity of the model. Similarly, a
model with a number of interaction terms may also prove more accurate in making individual
predictions. This might occur if, for instance, the impact of certain covariates differed systematically
by others. Thus, from the perspective of being a better predictor, models may incorporate interactions
that make them more difficult to interpret readily. In this study, we present separate analyses for
younger and older age groups and by gender to indicate how profiling with the same instrument
performs across groups within the same client group.
2.3 The procedure adopted in profiling clients and
diagnosing predictive accuracy
This section explains how one moves from the construction of models predicting employment and
benefit outcomes to the evaluation of the effectiveness of those models in correctly predicting
outcomes:
1 Develop a set of alternative statistical models for the probability of being out of work/in receipt
of out-of-work benefits/percentage of time on out-of-work benefits.
2 Run these models on a random sub-set of the sample (the ‘estimation sample’).
3 Generate predicted values for the validation sample using the estimated model.
4 Choose models which statistical tests indicate give the most accurate predictions for the validation
sample who were randomly excluded from the estimation sample.
5 Adopt a ‘decision rule’ – that is, a level of probability which is used as the cut-off point for taking
action in determining treatment.
6 Evaluate the predictive power of the profiling model by computing the number of correct and
incorrect predictions that it yields.
Step 1 has already been discussed in Chapter 4. Usually one uses within-sample statistics to establish
how well a model fits the data. However, profiling entails forecasting individuals’ benefit outcomes so
within-sample measures of goodness-of-fit are not appropriate. What matters is the model’s ability to
rank clients accurately according to future benefit outcomes. Steps 2-4 describe the technique we
adopt to do this, sometimes referred to as cross-validation. It entails testing the validity of the
estimation model beyond the estimation sample by making out-of-sample predictions. Predictions
are made for each client based on estimates for a random sub-set of the client group. The estimation
sample – which in our case comprises 70 per cent of the whole sample – is used to estimate the
coefficients for the prediction model. This model is then validated using the 30 per cent validation
sample, the choice between models being made by selecting the model that fits the validation sample
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best. There are various ways in which one might use individuals’ predicted outcomes to compare
models’ predictive power. We follow Black, Smith, Plesca and Shannon (2002) by doing the following:
• Take the validation sample and rank individuals into quintiles (i) randomly (ii) according to their
rank in the distribution of predicted outcomes. Having done this, we compare differences in the
means of actual outcomes (whether out of work 12 months after their claim for benefit, whether
claiming out-of-work benefits 12 months after their claim for benefit, or percentage of time
spent claiming out-of-work benefits through to end December 2002) by quintiles of the randomly
assigned and predicted outcome distributions. This comparison establishes how well profiling
might target resources relative to random allocation. Clearly, profiling is of no value if it does no
better than random allocation in identifying those with the highest probabilities of long-term
benefit receipt.
• Compare differences in mean predicted outcomes throughout the distribution of predicted
outcomes, measuring differences in mean predicted outcomes in the following parts of the
predicted distribution:
– top 80 per cent versus bottom 20 per cent;
– top 60 per cent versus bottom 40 per cent;
– top 40 per cent versus bottom 60 per cent;
– top 20 per cent versus bottom 80 per cent.
If a model has good predictive power then the percentage of clients out of work/on out-of-work
benefits/percentage of time on out-of-work benefits will be large for the top predicted quintiles and
small for the bottom predicted quintiles. Ideally, a model will perform well at all points of the
distribution of the predicted outcome, in which case, all four comparisons above should show sizeable
differences. We also report an average of the four differences in predicted outcomes which is a
summary measure of the model’s predictive performance throughout the distribution.
In practice, DWP may want to use profiling to screen individuals in or out of treatment. Step 5 above
is needed to convert probabilities into decisions about whether to take action or not. Thus a ‘decision
rule’ is adopted. This entails fixing a threshold or cut-off point – for instance, a predicted probability
of 50 per cent or more. Having chosen the decision rule, step 6 involves the prediction method being
evaluated by comparing predicted outcomes with observed outcomes in the validation sample, and
calculating the proportion of correct and incorrect predictions. Payne et al. (1996) show that the cut-
off level in step 5 is very important in determining the relative proportion of false positives and false
negatives. If the cut-off point is set high, so that only those with a high probability of remaining on
benefit for a long time are treated, the proportion of false positives is reduced (reducing resource
wastage) but at the cost of failing to pick up many who would benefit from early help. Conversely, if
the cut-off point is set low, models succeed in identifying more of those who become long-term
unemployed but at the cost of an increase in wasted resources. The relationship between the chosen
cut-off point and the actual distribution on the outcome variable go some way to determining the
accuracy of the profiling model. We illustrate these points in detail later using three different cut-off
points (30 per cent, 50 per cent, and 70 per cent). To illustrate the point in broad terms, in an extreme
case where only five per cent of claimants move into employment, a model which says ‘nobody ever
gets a job’ will be accurate in 95 per cent of cases, which seems ‘good’ but the model is, nevertheless,
unable to identify those who do not need help. Imagine another scenario where 80 per cent would
have obtained a job without help, but the cut-off is set at 50 per cent so that half the eligible group are
to be treated in any event. In this case, the maximum percentage who could have been helped into
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work without treatment is 20 per cent so that, even if this 20 per cent are all correctly included in the
treated group, deadweight will still be 60 per cent. The cut-off approach to assessing accuracy is
helpful in comparing the practical impact of allocating resources under different profiling models, but
it can tell us nothing about the performance of profiling relative to Personal Adviser discretion or
deterministic rules in allocating resources.13
13 For Switzerland, Lechner and Smith (2003) find caseworkers do not do a very good job of allocating
resources across claimants to maximise their subsequent employment prospects.
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3 Analysis and results for the
sick and disabled
• 70 per cent of the sick and disabled were out of work 12 months after making a claim, and 66
per cent were claiming out-of-work benefits. In the 30 months since claiming, 46 per cent had
spent all their time claiming and the mean time spent claiming was 70 per cent.
• Profiling outperforms random allocation of the treatment because the models are good at ranking
individuals according to profiled outcomes.
• ‘Full’ models tend to outperform other models, indicating that there is value to the collection of
additional data. However, profiling does not necessarily improve with the addition of further
variables as indicated, for instance, by the similarity between the diagnostic tests for the
parsimonious and ‘middling’ models.
• The functional form of the model does not make a great deal of difference to profiling accuracy.
In the case of out-of-work and benefit status 12 months after claiming, the logit is marginally
preferable to the OLS and probit while, in the case of percentage of time spent claiming, the OLS
estimator marginally outperforms the tobit.
• The success in targeting the treatment through profiling depends on the proportion of the eligible
group to be treated relative to the proportion who actually go on to be out of work/claim.
• The inclusion of ward-level deprivation data did not improve the accuracy of profiling.
• The exclusion of benefit area dummies makes little difference to the predictive accuracy of the
models.
• Models perform differently across sub-groups of clients but all work reasonably well in terms of
the profiling diagnostics.
• Confining the analysis to claimants only does not make much difference.
• Altering the size of the estimation versus validation samples does not make much difference.
• The predictive power of profiling models for out-of-work benefit status and out-of-work labour
market status is similar.
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• Determinants of benefit and out-of-work status 12 months after claiming are similar, but differ
in some respects, perhaps suggesting the need to develop alternative models for both outcomes.
The determinants of percentage of time claiming over 30 months differ in a number of ways
from benefit status at month 12.
• There are no unambiguous advantages to using percentage of time spent claiming rather than
benefit status at month 12 as the profiling variable: the relative performance of profiling on
these two outcomes using identical models differs with the cut-off point chosen to allocate
treatment. With a 70 per cent cut-off the correct prediction rate is higher when using percentage
of time spent claiming, but profiling based on wave two benefit status results in slightly better
profiling with 30 per cent and 50 per cent cut-offs.
This section reports analysis and results for the sick and disabled clients in the ONE database. In the
ONE data, a respondent is classified as sick or disabled if they initially asked about a sickness or
disability benefit, whether or not they went on to claim the benefit. 4,785 were interviewed at the first
interview and 3,048 were interviewed at the second interview.
3.1 Outcomes for the sick and disabled
Table 3.1 shows the labour market status of sick and disabled respondents 12 months after their claim
for benefit: only 30 per cent were doing any paid work at that point, the remaining 70 per cent were
distributed across the categories emboldened in the table.
Table 3.1 Labour Market Status 12 months after their claim for
benefit
Weighted column percentage
30+ hours paid work 20.7
16-29 hours paid work 6.0
<16 hours paid work 3.1
Full-time education 1.3
Government scheme 0.8
Unemployed 9.6
Looking after home 6.0
Temporarily sick or injured 21.0
Permanently sick or disabled 28.8
Not working, other reasons 2.8
Note: unweighted N=3,048
Table 3.2 Out-of-work benefits received 12 months after their
claim for benefit
Weighted cell percentage
Income Support 31.8
Jobseeker’s Allowance 8.8
Widow’s Benefit 0.8
Incapacity Benefit 36.1
Invalid Care Allowance 2.1
Severe Disablement Allowance 26.9
Any of the above 66.4
Note: unweighted N=3,040. There were eight cases whose benefit status could not be accurately determined
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Table 3.2 identifies what out-of-work benefits sick and disabled respondents said they were receiving
12 months after their claim for benefit. Sixty-six per cent of respondents received at least one of the
six out-of-work benefits identified. Fifty-three per cent of respondents were in receipt of a single out-
of-work benefit, with 13 per cent receiving two or more.
We were able to match 96.8 per cent (4,631 out of 4,785) of the sick and disabled clients who
responded at wave one to administrative benefit records.14 Almost half (46 per cent) of wave one
respondents had spent all of their time on one or more of the out-of-work benefits qualifying clients
for ONE (JSA, IS, IB, ICA, SDA, WB or BB), with the remainder spread fairly evenly across the rest of the
distribution (Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1 Percentage of time spent on out-of-work benefits between
ONE eligibility and 31 December 2002
3.2 Models used in profiling the sick and disabled
Figure 3.2 shows the variables used in the parsimonious (column 1), middling (column 2) and full
models (column 3) for the sick and disabled. In each case, there are two versions of the model, with
Models (1), (3) and (5) using the six dummy variables to distinguish the three types of pilot area and
their respective control areas, and Models (2), (4) and (6) replacing these with 24 benefit area
dummies.
3.3 The analyses undertaken and sensitivity testing
Analyses for the three outcomes described in Section 3.1 are presented in turn below. The sensitivity
of profiling results to model specification is explored with the six ‘baseline’ models containing the
independent variables listed in Figure 3.2. This allows us to compare results for a parsimonious model
with those for a ‘middling’ and ‘full’ model, as well as allowing us to account for any ONE evaluation
effects in two ways, that is, through a set of six pilot/comparison area controls and the 24 area
dummies.
14 The 154 cases with no match may have never claimed out-of-work benefits, or else there is a problem with
their National Insurance Number. They are excluded from the analysis of this dependent variable.
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Figure 3.2 Variables used in models profiling the sick and disabled
Models (3)-(4) – as (1) Models (5) and (6) – as (3)
Models (1)-(2) and (2) plus: and (4) plus:
Demographics
Gender
8 age dummies
White7 education dummies
If numeracy problems
If literacy problems
6 housing tenure dummies
Benefit history in 2 yrs
pre-ONE
If ever received out-of-work
benefits only
If received in-work
benefits only
If received both out-of-work
and in-work benefits
If received no benefits
Work history in 2 yrs
pre-ONE
6 dummies for % time
working 16+ hours per week
3 dummies for % time
working 1-15 hours per week
If ever unemployed
Area
TTWA benefit stocks/flows
for unemployment,
lone parents, sick and
disabled
6 dummies for
ONE/comparison areas, OR
24 benefit area dummies
We test the sensitivity of the profiling results to variations in the functional form of the model. In the
case of outcomes 12 months after their claim for benefit, we compare OLS, probit and logit estimators
and, in the case of the percentage of time spent claiming between ONE eligibility and end December
2002, we compare OLS and tobit specifications. Our models are run on estimation samples that are a
70 per cent random sample, with the remaining 30 per cent making up the validation sample. We
choose this split, rather than the 90:10 split common in the U.S. UI literature, because our sample sizes
are not as large as those common in the U.S. and we are concerned to ensure robust validation, even
at the expense of some greater imprecision in our estimation. We test the sensitivity of our results to
an 80:20 split.
Demographics
6 marital status dummies
4 dummies for number
of children
Work history in 2 yrs
pre – ONE
6 net pay in pre-ONE job
dummies
6 social class in last pre-
ONE job dummies
Date of ONE entry
5 dummies identifying
any time in the following
states:
– temporarily sick
– permanently sick/
disabled
– full-time education
– training
– other (eg. looking
after home)
Demographics
3 dummies for general
health in last year
3 dummies for long-
standing illness
Mental disability dummy
3 care responsibility
dummies
If possess telephone
3 dummies for vehicle
access and licence
3 dummies for number of
household workers
5 dummies for work
attitudes
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Analyses are based on the whole sample, regardless of whether they said they went on to claim an
out-of-work benefit on becoming eligible for ONE. However, we test the sensitivity of results to the
exclusion of the relatively small number of clients who did not go on to claim.
We test the sensitivity of results to inclusion of ward-level data on deprivation. Finally, we test the
performance of the profiling model on four sub-groups within the sick and disabled sample, namely
men, women, those aged under 45 years, and those aged 45 or more. These results are based on
separate profiling models for these client groups using identical sets of covariates.
3.4 Results
We present results for each of our three dependent variables in turn, adopting a similar format in each
case.
3.4.1 Without a job twelve months after their claim for benefit
Table 3.3 Comparison of proportions out of work 12 months after
their claim for benefit, by quintiles of predicted out-of-work
status for logit, probit and OLS
Logit Probit OLS
M(2) M(6) M(2) M(6) M(2) M(6)
Q5 .94 .97 .94 .96 .95 .95
Q4 .77 .83 .77 .82 .76 .83
Q3 .72 .70 .72 .71 .71 .68
Q2 .58 .63 .56 .62 .59 .67
Q1 .42 .29 .45 .30 .42 .28
Note: all models run on 70 per cent sample and results based on 30 per cent validation sample
Table 3.3 shows the mean proportion of the sick and disabled who were without paid work at the
wave two survey interview in each quintile of the predicted distribution of out-of-work probabilities.
It does so for the logit, probit and OLS specifications of Models (2) and (6), namely the most
parsimonious and fullest models containing the 24 area dummies. Recall that, in the raw data, 70 per
cent of the sample was out of work at that stage, roughly one year after ONE eligibility. If ranked
according to actual outcomes, the proportions in Q5-Q3 would be 1, the proportion in Q2 would be
.5 and the proportion in Q1 would be zero. Ranking claimants according to their predicted probability
of being out of work twelve months after their claim for benefit, depending on the model, 94-97 per
cent of the highest quintile actually go on to be out of work, compared with 29 – 45 per cent of those
in the lowest quintile of predicted probabilities. Three points emerge from the table:
• First, all models do a reasonable job at ranking individuals according to their future out of work
status, as indicated by the sizeable differences in mean actual outcomes across the predicted
outcome distribution.
• Second, the full models do a better job than the parsimonious models at identifying those with
the lowest out-of-work probabilities, as indicated by the lower proportions out of work in the
lowest predicted quintiles derived from full models relative to parsimonious models.
• Third, there is little to choose between the performance of the different functional forms.
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It is clear from Table 3.3 that allocation through profiling is preferable to random allocation of
treatment. If one ranks clients randomly, the mean proportion out of work in each quintile fluctuates
around .7, whereas, using the predictions from any of the estimation methods, profiling does a much
better job at identifying which clients are likely to remain out of work a year later.15
Table 3.4 compares the predictive performance of the logit, probit and OLS using Models (2), (4) and
(6). It presents differences in the proportion predicted out of work between the top and the bottom
of the distribution of predicted probabilities. For example, the .41 in column 1 row 1 means that, using
predicted probabilities generated by Model (2) with a logit functional form, the mean predicted
probability of being out of work was 41 percentage points higher for the top 80 per cent of the
predicted probability distribution in the validation sample than the mean for the bottom 20 per cent.
The average difference at the bottom of column 1 is simply the average of the four differences above
it.
Table 3.4 Differences in proportion predicted out-of-work, by quintiles
of the predicted probability distribution
Logit Probit OLS
M(2) M(4) M(6) M(2) M(4) M(6) M(2) M(4) M(6)
T80%-B20% .41 .43 .54 .40 .42 .53 .35 .36 .44
T60%-B40% .39 .39 .48 .38 .39 .47 .34 .35 .41
T40%-B60% .37 .37 .42 .37 .37 .42 .36 .36 .42
T20%-B80% .34 .34 .36 .34 .35 .37 .39 .39 .45
Average dif. .38 .38 .45 .37 .38 .45 .36 .36 .43
Note: models with 24 area dummies; T=top, B=bottom; estimation sample = 2134; validation sample = 914
Comparing the average differences in predicted outcomes across functional forms, the logit
outperforms the probit and OLS models, though the differences are not great. The predictive power
of the models is not driven by ‘success’ in any particular part of the distribution, though there is
evidence that the OLS is better at predicting throughout the distribution. For the logit and probit
models, mean differences decline as one moves from row 1 to row 4, something that does not happen
in the case of the OLS. Comparing the average differences in predicted outcomes across Models (2),
(4) and (6), even the most parsimonious model performs reasonably well. There is no gain moving
from (2) to (4), but there are clear gains in profiling with Model (6), as indicated by an average
difference of seven percentage points over the other models.
Table A.2 presents Models (1) – (6) using the logit estimator to illustrate which variables in the models
are statistically significant (Table A.1 gives the meaning of variable labels used in the sick and disabled
models). In the most parsimonious models (1) and (2), probabilities of being out of work 12 months
after their claim for benefit rise with age, being a woman, a lack of qualifications, numeracy problems
and living in rented accommodation (whether privately or from the local authority). They also rise in
two of the three area control-types (basic and PVS). Work history in the two years before ONE
eligibility is important, with out-of-work probabilities falling with time spent in full-time paid work,
substantial part-time work, any time unemployed, and receipt of in-work benefits over that period.
These results generally apply to Models (3) and (4) too. However, additional work history variables,
such as social class and earnings in the last pre-ONE job, and other labour market statuses in the two
years prior to ONE, were not significant. Nor was the date of eligibility for ONE. Marital status and
15 We confirmed this in analysis by simulating randomly allocation of individuals to treatment.
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number of dependent children are included for the first time in Models (3) and (4). Widows had a
lower probability of being out of work than single people, and those with two children had a lower
probability of being out of work than those with one child, but these variables add little to the model.
These two sets of variables have stronger effects in the fullest models, (5) and (6), where single people
have a higher probability of being out of work than widows and divorcees, while those with one child
have higher probabilities of being out of work than those with no child and those with two children.
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, these ‘full’ models contain variables that may well have been affected
by benefit claiming, so their effects must be interpreted with caution. Most prove significant.
Probabilities of being out of work rise with perceived poor health (general health, long-standing
illness, mental illness) and care responsibilities. Probabilities of working are enhanced where the sick
and disabled have a driving licence and access to a vehicle, where others in the household are
working, and where their attitudes towards working are very positive.
In Table 3.5, we turn our attention to the issue of how good these profiling models are at targeting
treatment on the right clients, by which we mean those who go on to be longer-term claimants.
Taking the logit Models (2) and (6) discussed above, the table identifies the percentages in the
validation sample who are correctly predicted (column 1), those who are correctly treated (column 2),
those who are wrongly treated (column 3), and those who are wrongly denied access to treatment
(column 4) at three different cut-off points for treatment. Columns 1, 3 and 4 add to 100 since each
person must be in one of these three mutually exclusive categories.16 The 30 per cent cut-off simulates
a treatment offered to the majority (70 per cent) of eligible clients while, at the other extreme, the 70
per cent cut-off simulates a tightly targeted treatment only received by 30 per cent of the eligible
population.
Three points emerge clearly from the table:
• First, with a large target group, nearly three-quarters of the sample are correctly predicted. The
correct prediction rate falls as the treatment becomes more targeted, but remains at 58 per cent
for the treatment targeted at 30 per cent of the eligible group. It is not surprising that the models
are best able to predict accurately where 70 per cent are to be treated, since around 70 per cent
actually go on to be out of work 12 months after their claim for benefit. As Waddell, Burton and
Main (2003: 10) note: ‘the practical consequences of applying a screening tool (as summarized
by the predictive values) depend crucially on the prevalence of the outcome in the particular
population’.
• Second, model specification makes some difference, though the differences are not large. With
a 30 per cent or 50 per cent cut-off point the full model makes correct predictions in 3 – 4 per
cent more cases than the most parsimonious model. There is no difference with a 70 per cent
cut-off.
• Third, as the target group for treatment rises, so the percentage of the eligible group who are
wrongly treated rises, while the percentage who are wrongly denied falls. Of course, if everyone
was treated, no-one would be wrongly denied. In our case, 14 – 15 per cent of the validation
sample are wrongly treated at the 30 per cent cut-off point. That is, 14 – 15 per cent were in the
top 70 per cent of out-of-work predictions but went on to get a job by wave two. This figure falls
to under one-in-ten with a 50 per cent cut-off and a mere 2-3 per cent with a 70 per cent cut-
off. Conversely, with a 30 per cent cut-off, 12 – 14 per cent of cases are wrongly denied treatment,
but this rises to 39 – 41 per cent when the cut-off is lifted to 70 per cent.
16 Where they do not add to 100 this is due to rounding.
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Table 3.5 Success in targeting treatment at different cut-offs for
treatment allocation using out-of-work probabilities twelve
months after their claim for benefit
Correctly Correctly Wrongly Wrongly
predicted treated denied treated
30% cut
M(2) 71 55 15 14
M(6) 74 57 14 12
50% cut
M(2) 65 43 9 26
M(6) 69 45 7 24
70% cut
M(2) 58 29 3 41
M(6) 58 30 2 39
Note: treatment allocation in validation sample. 30 per cent cut = OOW prediction at 30th percentile (so 70 per cent
treated); 50 per cent cut = OOW prediction at 50th percentile (so 50 per cent treated); 70 per cent cut = OOW predic-
tion at 70th percentile (so 30 per cent treated). Wrongly treated means false positive. Wrongly denied means false
negative. Predictions based on logit model.
The figures in Table 3.5 are percentages of the whole validation sample. In Table 3.6 we express the
same information in a different fashion to shed further light on the success of the models in targeting
treatment. The first row simply reports the percentage of wrong predictions at different cut-off
points. The wrong prediction rates are not trivial, and rise with more targeted treatment. The second
row shows the wrong prediction rate is particularly high among those predicted not to need
treatment. With a 50 per cent cut-off, half those predicted not to need treatment are actually out of
work 12 months after their claim for benefit. This rises to 57 per cent with a 70 per cent cut-off. On the
other hand, row three shows a relatively small percentage of those who are predicted to need
treatment actually find a job – 20 per cent in the case of the 30 per cent cut-off, falling to six per cent
with a 70 per cent cut-off. The last two rows use actual out-of-work status 12 months after their claim
for benefit as their base. Row 4 shows close to half (45 per cent) of those in work 12 months after their
claim for benefit would have been wrongly treated as a result of their profiling prediction where 70
per cent of the sample is treated. This falls to six per cent where only 30 per cent of the sample are
treated. Finally, row 5 shows over four-fifths of those who actually went on to be out of work 12
months after their claim for benefit would have been treated following profiling with a treatment
aimed at 70 per cent of the sample. This falls to 43 per cent in a smaller programme where only 30 per
cent are treated.
Table 3.6 Prediction rates at different cut-offs for treatment allocation
using out-of-work probabilities twelve months after their
claim for benefit
30% cut 50% cut 70% cut
Percentage all predictions wrong 26 31 42
Percentage all negative predictions wrong 41 50 57
Percentage all positive predictions wrong 20 13 6
Percentage in work wrongly treated 45 23 6
Percentage out of work correctly treated 83 65 43
Notes: prediction rates in validation sample based on M(6) results presented in Table 3.5
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It is difficult to judge whether the prediction rates reported in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are sufficiently
accurate to merit profiling as a resource allocation tool because we need to be able to compare
success rates under profiling with those achieved through Personal Adviser discretion or the
application of deterministic rules relating to current length of claim spell. Success rates for these
alternative resource allocation mechanisms are not available. Of course, we can compare them to a
system based on the simplest deterministic rules, namely the treatment of all and the treatment of
none. Where all are treated, irrespective of future job prospects, 70 per cent will be correctly treated,
30 per cent wrongly treated and 0 per cent wrongly denied. Conversely, where none are treated, 0
per cent are correctly treated, 0 per cent are wrongly treated, and 70 per cent are wrongly denied.
Having presented our basic results for this outcome we turn to our sensitivity tests. Throughout,
Models (1) and (5) are used to present results for these sub-sample analyses because these avoid use
of the 24-category benefit area variable which, when sample sizes fall, results in the rejection of some
cases due to perfect prediction of the outcome in benefit areas with small cell sizes.
First, we consider whether the results alter with the inclusion of variables picking up ward-level
deprivation. Analyses were rerun for the English sub-sample with valid ward identifiers.17 Because the
deprivation indices are highly correlated, they were entered separately into models. We tested the
impact of the multiple deprivation, employment deprivation and health deprivation indices first as
linear terms, and then by breaking the indices into quartiles. Although some of these deprivation
indices were statistically significant in some models, their inclusion had no effect on the profiling
diagnostics. This is not to say that ward deprivation is unimportant: the deprivation measures relate to
data for the period 1998 – 99, whereas we are trying to predict outcomes for clients approaching
DWP about benefit claims in 2000. Recent research indicates substantial change in deprivation at
ward level between 1998 – 2000, implying some measurement error in applying the 2000 indices to
the ONE data. New ward-level measures of deprivation will be available shortly and may be worth
investigating for their profiling potential.18 It may also be worth investigating small area Census data
on measures such as car ownership rates.
17 Of the 4,785 sick and disabled in the ONE data, 153 had no identifiable claimant administrative records. A
further 597 were linked to administrative data but had no ward identifier that could be matched to the
deprivation data. In 586 cases this was because the client lived in Scotland or Wales. Thus, 4,035 of the
4,785 sick and disabled had ward identifiers linking to the deprivation data. The use of ward-level deprivation
data reduced the sample for analysis of wave two out-of-work status from 3,048 to 2,539 cases.
18 We thank Mike Noble, University of Oxford, for this information.
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Table 3.7 Comparison of whole sample versus claimant only models
Whole sample Claimants only
M(1) M(5) M(1) M(5)
T80%-B20% .38 .52 .40 .53
T60%-B40% .37 .46 .38 .47
T40%-B60% .36 .41 .37 .42
T20%-B80% .33 .36 .34 .37
Average difference .36 .44 .37 .45
30% cut
Correctly predicted 71 75 75 77
Correctly treated 56 58 58 59
Wrongly treated 15 14 13 12
Wrongly denied 14 12 12 11
70% cut
Correctly predicted 57 59 57 58
Correctly treated 29 30 29 30
Wrongly treated 3 2 2 2
Wrongly denied 40 39 40 40
Note: logits for sick and disabled OOW status at wave 2. T=top, B=bottom. For whole sample, estimation sample =
2134, validation sample = 914. For claimant only sample, estimation sample = 1924 and validation sample = 825
Second, we re-estimated our models excluding the benefit area variables to see what impact their
exclusion had on the predictive power of the profiling. Their exclusion makes very little difference to
the accuracy of profiling. The average differences for logit Models (2), (4) and (6) were .36, .35 and .44
respectively, compared with .38, .38 and .45 in the models presented in the first three columns of
Table 5 that contained benefit area dummies. Correct prediction rates are virtually identical: 71 per
cent and 75 per cent for Model (2) and (6) with a 30 per cent cut-off and 58 per cent and 59 per cent
for the same models with a 70 per cent cut-off. These compare with figures of 71 per cent, 74 per
cent, 58 per cent and 58 per cent for the identical models including benefit area dummies (see Table
6).
Our third sensitivity analysis entailed varying the 70:30 estimation versus validation sample split used
above, this time running models on a random 80 per cent of the sample (N=2,438 instead of 2,134),
thus reducing the validation sample to 610. Inspection of the models run on the 80 per cent random
sample showed the signs on all variables were the same as models run on the 70 per cent random
sample, but coefficients and the pattern of significant results differed in some cases. Identical
diagnostic tests were performed to those reported for the 70:30 split. Differences in out-of-work
predictions across quintiles of the predicted probabilities were very similar, as were the percentage of
correct predictions. We therefore prefer the 70:30 split to ensure a robust validation sample.
Our fourth sensitivity test involved confining the sample to those respondents who said at the wave
one interview that they had made a claim for benefits. This meant dropping 210 cases from the
analysis. Table 3.7 compares the profiling diagnostics for this claimant-only sample with the whole
sample analysis, using logit models (1) and (5). The models are similar in terms of the differences in
mean predicted probabilities across quintiles, with the claimant-only models performing slightly
better. The claimant-only model also performs a little better than the whole sample model in terms of
correct predictions, though only when using the 30 per cent cut-off.
Finally, we present some sub-group analyses by gender and by age. These results are based on
separate profiling models for each sub-group, using identical covariates. There are differences in the
impact of variables between men and women. For example, numeracy problems only raised the
probability of being out of work for men, whereas the positive effect of literacy problems was
confined to women. The most notable difference in the models, however, was the non-significance
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of many effects for women. Table 5.8 presents diagnostics for separate models run for men and
women. Using the average difference criterion, the models for women do not perform as well as
those for men, but they still perform well. Correct prediction rates are also fairly similar, particularly
when using the 70 per cent cut-off. It seems there is little to distinguish the performance of the
profiling models across men and women, despite the significance of more variables in the models for
men.
Table 3.8 Diagnostics for out-of-work status twelve months after their
claim for benefit, men and women
Men Women
M(1) M(5) M(1) M(5)
Average difference .40 .49 .38 .44
Percentage correct predictions (30 per cent cut-off) 70 77 72 74
Percentage correct predictions (70 per cent cut-off) 57 56 57 57
Note: Logits, with 70 per cent estimation sample, 30 per cent validation sample
Testing age effects, we split the sample into those aged 45 and over and those aged under 45 and ran
separate profiling models for both groups. Inspection of coefficients showed the main difference in
the models was the non-significance of some effects for under-45s. Diagnostics are presented in
Table 3.9. Average differences in predicted outcomes were, nevertheless, higher for the under-45s in
Model (1), but there was no difference for Model (5). With a 30 per cent cut-off, correct prediction
rates were better for under-45s than they were for those aged 45+ with Model (1), but were better for
the older age group than the younger age group in Model (5). Correct prediction rates were nearly
identical by age with the 70 per cent cut-off. Taken together, these results suggest the models used
worked equally well for under-45s and those aged 45 and over.
Table 3.9 Diagnostics for out-of-work status 12 months after their
claim for benefit, by age
Less than 45 years 45+ years
M(1) M(5) M(1) M(5)
Average difference .40 .46 .35 .46
Percentage correct predictions (30 per cent cut-off) 73 75 71 78
Percentage correct predictions (70 per cent cut-off) 54 56 54 57
Logits, with 70 per cent estimation sample, 30 per cent validation sample
We can draw the following inferences from the analysis presented above:
• Profiling outperforms random allocation of the treatment because the models are good at ranking
individuals according to their probabilities of being out of work.
• The ‘full’ model outperforms the other models, indicating that there is value to the collection of
these additional data. However, profiling does not necessarily improve with the addition of further
variables, as indicated by the similarity between the diagnostic tests for the parsimonious and
middling models.
• Functional form of the model does not make a great deal of difference, although the logit is
marginally preferable to the OLS and probit.
• The success in targeting the treatment through profiling depends on the proportion of the eligible
group to be treated relative to the proportion who actually go on to be out of work.
• The inclusion of ward-level deprivation data did not improve the accuracy of profiling.
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• The exclusion of benefit area dummies makes little difference to the predictive accuracy of the
models.
• Models perform differently across sub-groups of clients but all work reasonably well in terms of
the profiling diagnostics.
• Confining the analysis to claimants only does not make much difference.
• Altering the size of the estimation versus validation samples does not make much difference.
3.4.2 Claiming out-of-work benefit 12 months after their claim for
benefit
Identical analyses were undertaken to predict the probability of claiming at least one of six out-of-
work benefits (IS, JSA, IB, ICA, SDA, WB) at the second wave interview. As shown in Table 3.2, around
two-thirds of wave two respondents said they were in receipt of these out-of-work benefits. In fact,
6.5 per cent of those saying they were in receipt of out-of-work benefits also said they were doing
some paid work, including 4.7 per cent who said they were doing paid work of 16 hours or more per
week. We test the sensitivity of results to the exclusion of this group since, in most instances, working
these hours would debar them from these out-of-work benefits.
Table 3.10 compares proportions of sick and disabled clients in receipt of out-of-work benefits 12
months after their claim for benefit when a) ranked according to their predicted probability of benefit
receipt (columns 1 and 2) b) randomly allocated to quintiles. Recall that, in the raw data, 66 per cent
of the sample were in receipt of out-of-work benefits at that point. If ranked according to actual
outcomes, the proportions in Q5-Q3 would be 1, the proportion in Q2 would be 0.3, and the
proportion in Q1 would be zero. If one ranks clients randomly the mean proportion on out-of-work
benefit in each quintile fluctuates around .66 (column 3), as expected, whereas using the predictions
from Models (2) and (6) of the logit specification to illustrate, profiling does a much better job at
identifying which clients are likely to be benefit claimants a year after ONE entry. Model (6) does a
better job at this than Model (2), especially for the lowest quartile of the predicted outcome
distribution. Mean benefit receipt rates by predicted quintile in Table 3.10 are very similar to mean
out-of-work rates for the equivalent logit models in the first two columns of Table 3.3.19
Table 3.10 Comparison of profiling and random allocation on actual
receipt of out-of-work benefits twelve months after their
claim for benefit
Quintiles of predicted Quintiles of predicted Randomly
probability distribution assigned
distribution from M(2) distribution from M(2) quintiles
Q5 .92 .92 .64
Q4 .79 .84 .66
Q3 .67 .70 .71
Q2 .48 .57 .67
Q1 .44 .26 .66
Note: logit models run on 70 per cent sample, results based on 30 per cent validation sample. Outcome is any out-of-
work benefit received at wave 2.
19 Remember raw means for the out-of-work rate and receipt of out-of-work benefits are similar (70 per cent
and 66 per cent respectively).
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Table 3.11 compares the predictive performance of the logit, probit and OLS using Models (2), (4) and
(6). Comparing across functional forms, the average differences in predicted outcomes are small. In
each case, the most parsimonious model, M(2), performs reasonably well, but there are clear gains in
moving from M(2) to M(4), and further gains moving to the fullest model, M(6).
Table A.3 presents Models (1) – (6) using the logit estimator to illustrate which variables in the models
have a significant impact predicting out-of-work benefit status 12 months after their claim for
benefit. In many ways, their effects are similar to those presented in Table A.2 for out-of-work labour
market status. However, there are some notable differences. For example, being female is no longer
significant; age effects disappear in the fullest models; education effects are quite different, notably
the significant negative effect of having a foreign qualification in the benefit model; in contrast to the
out-of-work labour market models, having claimed in-work benefits in the two years prior to ONE
eligibility is not significant, whereas claiming out-of-work benefits in that period increases the
probability of doing so again after ONE entry; there are strong negative effects of cohabitation and
time spent in education pre-ONE; care effects are stronger; and work attitude effects are weaker. It
seems the determinants of benefit status differ somewhat from the determinants of labour market
status.
Table 3.11 Differences in the proportion predicted to be receiving out-
of-work benefits, by quintiles of the predicted probability
distribution
Logit Probit OLS
M(2) M(4) M(6) M(2) M(4) M(6) M(2) M(4) M(6)
T80%-B20% .34 .39 .51 .33 .38 .50 .30 .34 .45
T60%-B40% .32 .37 .45 .32 .36 .44 .30 .33 .41
T40%-B60% .32 .35 .40 .32 .35 .41 .31 .34 .41
T20%-B80% .33 .33 .36 .32 .34 .37 .35 .38 .45
Average dif. .32 .36 .43 .32 .36 .43 .32 .34 .43
Note: models with 6 ONE dummies; T=top, B=bottom; estimation sample = 2128; validation sample = 912
A comparison of average differences in predicted outcomes from benefit receipt models in Table 3.11
and labour market status models in Table 3.4 indicates that the benefit receipt models are not so good
at ranking clients as the labour market status models. However, the exclusion of the five per cent or
so of sick and disabled clients working 16 hours or more per week, yet said they were in receipt of out-
of-work benefits, improved the predictive power of the model. For example, the average difference
in predicted benefit status 12 months after their claim for benefit was .47 with M(6) having excluded
the workers. Estimation for this sub-group also altered the size, and sometimes the statistical
significance, of coefficients in the model. For instance, the exclusion of these ‘odd’ cases resulted in
stronger effects for age and out-of-work benefit receipt pre-ONE.
Table 3.12 shows how good the profiling models are at targeting treatment on those who go on to
claim out-of-work benefits 12 months after their claim for benefit. The results are based on logit
Models (2) and (6) and are thus comparable to those presented for out-of-work labour market status
in Table 3.5. The correct prediction rate (column 1) for benefit receipt is at least as good, and
sometimes better, than that for labour market status. This is the case, even though – as reported
above  –  the average differences in predicted outcomes are not so good. The proportions wrongly
denied treatment are a little lower than in the case of the out-of-work labour market predictions,
whereas the proportions wrongly treated are similar or higher. However, these differences are very
small – always one or two percentage points – so, in essence, the models perform equally well in
predicting labour market and benefit status 12 months after their claim for benefit.
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Table 3.13 shows, again, how closely the predictive power of the benefit receipt models resemble that
for the out-of-work labour market status. A comparison with Table 3.6 shows the only big difference
between the models is the lower percentage of all negative predictions that are incorrect in the
benefit receipt model.
Table 3.12 Success in targeting treatment at different cut-offs for
treatment allocation using out-of-work benefit receipt
probabilities twelve months after their claim for benefit
Correctly Correctly Wrongly Wrongly
predicted treated predicted treated
30% cut
M(2) 71 54 17 12
M(6) 76 57 14 10
50% cut
M(2) 67 42 9 24
M(6) 70 44 8 23
70% cut
M(2) 58 28 4 39
M(6) 59 29 3 38
Note: treatment allocation in validation sample. 30 per cent cut = OOW benefit prediction at 30th percentile (so 70 per
cent treated); 50 per cent cut = OOW benefit prediction at 50th percentile (so 50 per cent treated); 70 per cent cut =
OOW benefit prediction at 70th percentile (so 30 per cent treated). Wrongly treated means false positive. Wrongly
denied means false negative. Predictions based on logit model.
Table 3.13 Prediction rates at different cut-offs for treatment allocation
using out-of-work benefit receipt probabilities twelve
months after their claim for benefit
30% cut 50% cut 70% cut
Percentage all predictions wrong 24 30 41
Percentage all negative predictions wrong 34 48 56
Percentage all positive predictions wrong 20 15 9
Percentage in work wrongly treated 42 24 9
Percentage out-of-work correctly treated 85 66 43
Notes: prediction rates in validation sample based on M(6) results presented in Table 3.11
Sensitivity tests revealed the following:
• The addition of ward-level deprivation indices has no effect on the predictive accuracy of the
models.
• The exclusion of benefit area dummies has little effect on the predictive accuracy of the models.
• Average difference and correct prediction rate diagnostics indicated models run on claimants
only (that is, those saying they were in receipt of one or more out-of-work benefits at wave one)
performed similarly to, or better than, those run on the whole sample.
• Running the analysis on a random 80 per cent of the sample and validating it on a 20 per cent
random sample had little effect on the profiling diagnostics.
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• In sub-group analyses, the profiling models predicted out-of-work benefit status twelve months
after their claim for benefit a little better for men than for women. For instance, the correct
prediction rate using Model (5) was 76 per cent for men and 70 per cent for women. By age, the
models performed a little better for under-45s than they did for those aged 45 or more.
We can infer the following from the analysis presented above:
• The predictive power of profiling models for out-of-work benefit status twelve months after
their claim for benefit is similar to that for out-of-work labour market status twelve months after
their claim for benefit in terms of correct prediction rates, even though average differences for
the benefit models are lower.
• Determinants of benefit and out-of-work status are similar, but differ in some respects, perhaps
suggesting the need to develop alternative models for both outcomes.
• Profiling out-of-work benefit status improves when one excludes those who said they were in
receipt of out-of-work benefits but were also working at least 16 hours per week.
• Results were broadly similar when performing other sensitivity tests.
3.4.3 Time claiming out-of-work benefits after ONE
In this section, we turn to our third dependent variable, namely the percentage of time sick and
disabled clients spent on out-of-work benefits between ONE eligibility and 31 December 2002.
Table 3.14 Percentage of time spent claiming out-of-work benefits
between ONE eligibility and 31 December 2002, by
quintiles of predicted time claiming benefits OLS and tobit
Distribution OLS Tobit
in the data M(2) M(4) M(6) M(2) M(4) M(6)
Q5 1.0 .89 .91 .92 .90 .92 .93
Q4 1.0 .80 .80 .82 .78 .79 .82
Q3 .89 .67 .67 .75 .68 .67 .74
Q2 .45 .64 .62 .61 .62 .61 .60
Q1 .13 .50 .50 .39 .51 .51 .40
Note: all models run on 70 per cent sample (N=3,242) and results based on 30 per cent validation sample (N=1,390)
All but ten of the sick and disabled clients became eligible for ONE in June or July of 2000, so the
percentage is calculated over a period of around two and a half years. This analysis differs in two
respects from the profiling for outcomes twelve months after their claim for benefit. First, as discussed
in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, this dependent variable is continuous, running from 0 through to 100.
However, there is bunching at the top end, with 1,911 of the 4,632 clients successfully matched to the
benefit data spending all of their time since ONE eligibility on out-of-work benefits. This is reminiscent
of the bunching in the US data on U.I. benefit exhaustion. Following that literature, and for reasons
discussed earlier, we utilise this variance in our outcome by modelling the data with OLS and tobit
functions, the latter taking account of the bunching of observations at the upper bound of the
dependent variable. Second, the analysis does not rely on wave two outcome information, so the
analysis is run on the larger sample who provided information at wave one for whom we found
matches in the benefit administrative data. Thus, the analysis is not prone to potential bias arising
from sample attrition between waves one and two. In other respects, the analysis mirrors that for the
previous two dependent variables: it uses the same model specifications, and presents the same
diagnostic tests.
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Table 3.14 shows the percentage of time spent claiming out-of-work benefits between ONE eligibility
and 31 December 2002. The overall mean time spent on out-of-work benefits in the data is 70 per
cent. If ranked according to the actual time spent claiming in the raw data, all those in the top two
quintiles have been claiming out-of-work benefits throughout, while in the third quintile, the mean
percentage of time spent claiming is 89 per cent (column 1). This confirms the difficulties the sick and
disabled have in leaving benefits. However, with a mean of only 13 per cent in the lowest quintile,
there is a sizeable proportion spending only a minority of their time on out-of-work benefits.
Ranking clients according to their predicted percentage of time on out-of-work benefits since ONE
eligibility, the mean percentage of time on benefit among the highest quintile is 94-98 per cent
(depending on the model), compared with 41-48 per cent among those in the lowest quintile. All
models do a reasonable job at ranking individuals according to future time on benefits, as indicated by
the sizeable differences in mean actual outcomes across the predicted outcome distribution. The full
models do a better job than the parsimonious models in identifying those with lowest percentage of
time on benefit. This is indicated by lower percentages of time on benefit in the lowest predicted
quintile, derived from full models relative to parsimonious models. Comparing functional forms, there
is little to choose between the performance of the tobit and the OLS. Where clients are randomly
assigned to quintiles, the mean percentage of time on benefits fluctuates around 70 per cent, so
profiling is clearly preferable to random allocation of treatment.
Table 3.15 Differences in percentage of time spent claiming out-of-work
benefits between ONE eligibility and 31 December 2002, by
quintiles of predicted distribution
OLS Tobit
M(2) M(4) M(6) M(2) M(4) M(6)
T80%-B20% 27.1 28.4 36.2 26.4 27.9 35.8
T60%-B40% 27.4 28.6 33.8 25.5 27.2 32.0
T40%-B60% 28.6 29.9 34.0 25.5 27.1 30.1
T20%-B80% 31.0 32.9 35.9 25.5 27.3 28.6
Average dif. 28.5 29.9 35.0 25.7 27.4 31.6
Note: all models run on 70 per cent sample (N=3,242) and results based on 30 per cent validation sample (N=1,390);
T=top; B=bottom
Table 3.15 compares the predictive performance of the OLS and tobit using Models (2), (4) and (6). It
presents differences in the average predicted time on out-of-work benefits between the top and the
bottom of the distribution of predicted percentage of time claiming. For example, the 27.1 in column
1 row 1 means that, using predictions generated by Model (2) with an OLS functional form, the mean
predicted percentage of time on out-of-work benefits was 27.1 percentage points higher for the top
80 per cent of the predicted distribution in the validation sample than the mean for the bottom 20 per
cent. The average difference at the bottom of column 1 is simply the average of the four differences
above it.
Comparing the average differences in predicted outcomes across functional forms, the OLS
outperforms the tobit, and it does so for all three models. The predictive power of the models is not
driven by ‘success’ in any particular part of the distribution. Comparing the average differences in
predicted outcomes across OLS Models (2), (4) and (6), even the most parsimonious model performs
reasonably well. There is some gain moving from (2) to (4), but there are clear gains in profiling with
Model (6), as indicated by an average difference that is five percentage points higher than Model (4).
The models appear less discriminating than those estimating whether on benefits twelve months
after their claim for benefit since, with similar mean scores for both variables, the average differences
presented in Table 3.11 are larger than those presented in Table 3.15.
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Table A.4 presents Models (1) – (6) using the OLS estimator to illustrate which variables in the models
are statistically significant. The bullet points below comment on these results, comparing them to
identical OLS models (not shown) estimating the probability of being in receipt of out-of-work
benefits twelve months after their claim for benefit. The commentary focuses on results that differ
from those discussed in the analysis of wave two benefit receipt.
• Age: time on benefit increases with age, as does the probability of benefit receipt twelve months
after their claim for benefit, but the age effects are stronger when estimating time on benefit.
• Qualifications: higher education below degree level and foreign qualifications were associated
with lower probability of benefit receipt twelve months after their claim for benefit, whereas all
qualifications below degree level, excluding foreign qualifications, were associated with a lower
percentage of time claiming out-of-work benefits in Models (1) to (4) while, in the fullest models,
degree-level qualifications lowered percentage of time claiming, with weaker effects for mid-
level qualifications.
• Housing tenure: renters spend more time on benefits than home owners; the effects are stronger
than they were for wave two benefit status. Also, being housed in an institution was significant
throughout, whereas it was only significant in the parsimonious models for benefit receipt twelve
months after their claim for benefit.
• Benefit history: the positive association between benefit receipt post-ONE and benefit history
before ONE is stronger here than when estimating benefit status twelve months after their claim
for benefit.
• Work history: the effects of time spent in full-time and part-time jobs are strong in estimating
percentage of time on out-of-work benefits and wave two benefit status, but they are strongest
for wave two benefit receipt. Having no job, pre-ONE, had a particularly strong effect in raising
the time spent on benefit. However, unemployment effects are weaker here, while the effects of
sickness/illness, pre-ONE, are stronger. Pay in the pre-ONE job was not significant in predicting
wave two status, but here higher pay in that job is associated with reduced time claiming post-
ONE.
• ONE: there are strong effects associated with ONE that were less apparent in the wave two
benefit status models. However, there are fewer benefit area effects here.
• Date of entry to ONE: this was not significant in estimating wave two benefit receipt, but later
entry is associated with a lower percentage of time on benefit in these models.
• Household effects: marriage and divorce are both associated with lower percentages of time on
benefits in the fullest models, whereas they were not significant for wave two benefit status. The
significant effects of children on benefit receipt twelve months after their claim for benefit are
largely absent here.
• Long-standing illness: whereas long-standing illness was associated with higher probabilities of
out-of-work benefit receipt twelve months after their claim for benefit only where the respondent
said the illness affected their work, here long-standing illness raises the time on benefits, regardless
of the individual’s assessment of its impact on their work prospects.
• Attitudes to work: very positive attitudes significantly lower percentage of time on benefit, but
they are not significant for benefit status twelve months after their claim for benefit.
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Table 3.16 indicates the significance of variables, and the direction of effects, across all three
outcomes for the sick and disabled, summarising the models in Appendix A. There are some
differences in the impact of variables across the three outcomes, but the similarity is quite striking,
particularly for the wave two outcomes. However, it is also evident from the discussion above and
Table 3.16 that influences on early and later benefit outcomes differ, and this needs to be borne in
mind in constructing profiling models. We reiterate the point made earlier that, just because a variable
is statistically significant does not mean it is required for profiling purposes because what matters is
the variable’s ability to discriminate across individuals in ranking them according to their predicted
work and benefit outcomes.
Table 3.17 shows how good the OLS models are at targeting treatment on the right clients, by which
we mean those who go on to spend a higher percentage of their time on benefits. In the case of the
30 per cent cut-off, individuals are identified as ‘correctly treated’ if they are in the top 70 per cent of
clients in terms of the percentage of time they spend claiming out-of-work benefits, and their
predicted time on out-of-work benefits is also among the top 70 per cent of clients. They are wrongly
treated if their predicted time on out-of-work benefits is in the highest 70 per cent of clients but, in
fact, they are among the 30 per cent with the lowest percentage of time spent on out-of-work
benefits. They are wrongly denied if their predicted time on out-of-work benefits is within the lowest
30 per cent of clients, but their actual time claiming is in the highest 70 per cent of clients. Similar
calculations are made for the 50 per cent and 70 per cent cut-offs.
Table 3.16 Guide to significance of variables in sick and disabled models
Percentage time
Without a job On OOW benefit claiming,
at wave 2 at wave 2 ONE-31/12/02
Female + ns ns
Age (ref: <25 yrs) + + +
Qualifications (ref: none) - - -
Numeracy problems + + +
Housing tenure
(ref: owner occupation) + if renting from local authority, + if renting, all types, + if renting, living in
privately, or if ‘other’ tenure or if ‘other’ tenure institution or
‘other’ tenure
Marital status (ref: single) - widowed or divorced - married or cohabiting - married, cohabiting
or divorced
Number of children (ref: one) - 2 children - no children or 2 children - two children
Benefit history in 2 yrs pre-ONE - if in-work benefit + if OOW benefit + OOW benefit
or combination of OOW
and in-work benefit
% time working 16+ hrs in
2 yrs pre-ONE - - -
% time working <16 hrs in + if <50% time,
2 yrs pre-ONE - - if 50% or more -
Unemployed in 2 yrs pre-ONE - - -
Any illness in 2 yrs pre-ONE ns - -
Any education in 2 yrs pre-ONE ns - -
Any sickness in 2 yrs pre-ONE ns ns +
Any ‘other’ activity in 2 yrs pre-ONE - - ns
Occupational class in pre-ONE job
(ref: professional/intermediary) ns ns + if no previous job
Net pay in pre-ONE job (ref: <£100 pw) u-shaped ns - if higher wage
Date of ONE eligibility ns ns -
Continued
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Table 3.16 Continued
Percentage time
Without a job On OOW benefit claiming,
at wave 2 at wave 2 ONE-31/12/02
TTWA benefit stocks and flows - with higher % - with higher %
disabled claimants; disabled claimants;
+ with higher % + with higher %
lone parents lone parents ns
General health (ref: poor) - - -
Long-standing illness (ref: none) + whether says
+ if says affects work + if says affects work affects work or not
Mental disability + + +
Care responsibilities - if caring but does - if no care or caring - if no care or caring
(ref: yes, affects work) not affect work does not affect work does not affect work
Licence (ref: no licence,
no vehicle access) - if licence and access - if licence, whether
access or not - if licence and access
Number of household workers
(ref: none) - - -
Attitudes to working
(ref: very negative) - - -
Notes: (1) +/- denote positive and negative significant effects at 95 per cent confidence level or above in at least one of
the parsimonious, middling or full models. ns denotes non-significance (2) Variables that are never significant are
excluded from this table (3) Area dummies and ONE pilot dummies both had significant effects but are not shown in the
table (4) Full tables are appended in Appendix A
Correct prediction rates (column 1) for the 30 per cent and 50 per cent cut-off are similar to those for
the wave two benefit status models reported in Table 3.12, though at the 50 per cent cut-off, the
wrong treatment rate is higher using this model, and the wrong denial rate lower. However, what is
most striking about the comparison with Table 13 is the much better correct prediction rate at the 70
per cent cut-off, that is, for carefully targeted treatment on offer to only 30 per cent of the population.
The correct prediction rate is roughly 10 percentage points higher that the model estimating
percentage of time on benefit than it is for the model estimating benefit status twelve months after
their claim for benefit. This gain is made through a substantial reduction in the wrong denial rate,
which falls by around 17 percentage points. This is offset, however, by an increase in the wrong
treatment rate of around seven percentage points. In other words, the time on benefit models reduce
the number of false negatives but increase the number of false positives. The percentage of time on
benefits model performs better than the status twelve months after their claim for benefit model for
the 70 per cent cut-off, in part because the continuous dependent variable allows the model to
discriminate better across claimants than probabilities based on a binary outcome. This finding
mirrors that in the U.I. literature for the U.S., where using the information on the fraction of benefits
exhausted allows better predictions than just a binary indicator for benefit exhaustion.
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Table 3.17 Success in targeting treatment at different cut-offs for
treatment allocation using predicted percentage of time
claiming out-of-work benefits between ONE eligibility and
31 December 2002
Correctly Correctly Wrongly Wrongly
predicted treated predicted treated
30% cut
M(2) 68 54 16 16
M(6) 76 58 12 12
50% cut
M(2) 65 32 18 17
M(6) 70 34 15 14
70% cut
M(2) 68 19 10 22
M(6) 69 19 10 21
Note: treatment allocation in validation sample. 30 per cent cut = time on OOW benefit prediction at 30th percentile (so
70 per cent treated); 50 per cent cut = time on OOW benefit prediction at 50th percentile (so 50 per cent treated); 70
per cent cut = time on OOW benefit prediction at 70th percentile (so 30 per cent treated). Wrongly treated means false
positive. Wrongly denied means false negative. Predictions based on OLS model.
Table 3.18 presents the information in Table 3.17 in a different way. Row 1 shows the wrong
prediction rate rises with more targeted treatment, but not so steeply as in the case of the wave two
benefit status models (see Table 3.13). However, as we move to a more targeted treatment offered to
50 per cent, the wrong prediction rate among those predicted not to need treatment declines,
whereas it rises among those predicted to need treatment. These findings contrast with those for
wave two benefit status. Row 4 uses as its base the clients whose actual time on benefits is below the
rate entitling them to treatment. In 40 per cent of these cases, their predicted time on benefit is higher
than the 30 per cent cut-off, resulting in unnecessary treatment. This figure falls progressively with
more targeted treatment. Row 5 uses as its base the clients whose actual time on benefits is above the
rate entitling them to treatment. With a 30 per cent cut-off, over four-fifths of these clients are
actually treated, but this falls to a half with a 70 per cent cut-off.
Table 3.18 Prediction rates at different cut-offs for treatment allocation
using predicted percentage of time on out-of-work benefits,
ONE eligibility – 31 December 2002
30% cut 50% cut 70% cut
Percentage all predictions wrong 24 30 31
Percentage all negative predictions wrong 40 28 30
Percentage all positive predictions wrong 17 29 34
Percentage those with time on benefits below cut-off
who are wrongly treated 40 30 17
Percentage those with time on benefits above cut-off
who are correctly treated 82 71 48
Notes: prediction rates in validation sample based on M(6) results presented in Table 3.17
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We can draw the following inferences from the analysis presented above:
• Profiling outperforms random allocation of the treatment because the models are good at ranking
individuals according to the percentage of time they spend claiming out-of-work benefits.
• The ‘full’ model outperforms the other models, indicating that there is value to the collection of
these additional data. Some gains are also made by moving from the most parsimonious to the
‘middling’ models.
• The OLS estimator marginally outperforms the tobit estimator.
• Influences on early and later benefit outcomes differ, and this needs to be borne in mind in
constructing profiling models.
• There are no unambiguous advantages to using percentage of time spent claiming rather than
wave two benefit status as the profiling variable: the relative performance of profiling on these
two outcomes using identical models differs with the cut-off point chosen to allocate treatment.
With a 70 per cent cut-off, the correct prediction rate is higher when using percentage of time
spent claiming, but profiling based on wave two benefit status results in slightly better profiling
with 30 per cent and 50 per cent cut-offs.
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4 Analysis and results for
lone parents
• Just over 72 per cent of lone mothers (and 72.5 per cent of all lone parents) were out-of-work 12
months after approaching DWP to make a claim for out-of-work benefits; 66 per cent of lone
mothers (67 per cent of all lone parents) were claiming out-of-work benefits at the 12 month
point; 35 per cent of lone mothers spent all of the 30 months since making the claim on out-of-
work benefits, the mean percentage of time spent claiming being 67 per cent.
• Profiling outperforms random allocation of the treatment.
• The out-of-work benefit status models perform better than the out-of-work labour market status
models because the model generates fewer false negatives.
• Determinants of benefit and out-of-work status are similar but not identical. Determinants of
benefit status at the 12 month point and over the 30 month period differ in a number of respects.
• The ‘full’ models outperform other models when profiling on out-of-work labour market status
and benefit status 12 months after claiming but, in the case of the percentage of time claiming
over 30 months, there are no gains to more extensive models.
• There is little to choose between functional forms but the logit estimator performs marginally
better than the OLS and probit estimators when estimating status at the 13 month point, while
the OLS outperforms the tobit in estimating time on benefits over the whole 30 months.
• Profiling lone parents with models devised for the sick and disabled produces poorer results than
profiling lone parents with models devised specifically for lone parents.
• Models for all lone parents perform a little better than those for lone mothers only.
• Sensitivity analyses made little difference to the results, although there were differences in
performance when separate models were estimated for younger and older lone mothers.
• Profiling models for the sick and disabled generally performed better than those for the lone
mothers.
This section reports analysis and results for lone parent clients in the ONE database. For the purposes
of the ONE evaluation, a client is classified as a lone parent if they initially approached the Department
about a lone parent benefit – whether or not they went on to claim that benefit, and regardless of
their marital status by the time of the first survey interview. 4,854 were interviewed at the first
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interview and 3,578 were interviewed at the second interview. Although we report some headline
results for all lone parents, the bulk of the analysis focuses exclusively on lone mothers, who made up
93 per cent of ONE’s lone parents. There were 4,503 lone mothers in the database, including 3,334
who were interviewed at the second interview.
4.1 Outcomes for lone parents
Table 4.1 shows the labour market status of lone parent respondents twelve months after their claim
for benefit: 27.5 per cent were doing some paid work at that point – an employment rate slightly
lower than that for the sick and disabled (at 30 per cent). The remaining 72.5 per cent were distributed
across the categories emboldened in the table. The rate is similar for all lone parents (column 1) and
lone mothers (column 2). A little over half were looking after the home.
Table 4.1 Labour Market Status twelve months after their claim for
benefit
Weighted column Weighted column
percentage, percentage,
all lone parents lone mothers
30+ hours paid work 8.0 7.3
16-29 hours paid work 13.4 14.1
<16 hours paid work 6.1 6.3
Full-time education 5.6 5.8
Government scheme 0.3 0.3
Unemployed 8.6 7.8
Looking after home 51.8 52.5
Temporarily sick or injured 2.6 2.3
Permanently sick or disabled 2.5 2.4
Not working, other reasons 1.1 1.1
Base unweighted: =3,577 for all lone parents and 3,333 for lone mothers. There was one case where labour market
status could not be accurately determined
Table 4.2 identifies what out-of-work benefits lone parents said they were receiving twelve months
after their claim for benefit. Sixty-seven per cent of respondents received at least one of the six out-of-
work benefits identified, as did 66 per cent of lone mothers. This percentage is almost identical to that
for the sick and disabled (Table 3.2) but, in contrast to the sick and disabled where one-third received
Income Support, Income Support accounts for nearly all claims among lone parents. Sixty-one per
cent of respondents were in receipt of a single out-of-work benefit, with six per cent receiving two or
three.
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Table 4.2 Out-of-work benefits received twelve months after their
claim for benefit
Weighted cell Weighted cell
percentage, percentage,
all lone parents lone mothers
Income Support 63.0 62.9
Jobseekers’ Allowance 2.8 2.4
Widow’s Benefit 1.0 1.0
Incapacity Benefit 3.0 2.7
Invalid Care Allowance 2.9 2.9
Severe Disablement Allowance 0.3 0.4
Any of the above 66.7 66.1
Note: unweighted N=3,576 for all lone parents and N=3,332 for lone mothers. There were 2 cases whose benefit status
could not be accurately determined
Figure 4.1 Percentage of time spent on out-of-work benefits between
ONE eligibility and 31 December 2002, all lone parents
We were able to match 94.7 per cent (4,595 out of 4,854) of the lone parent clients who responded
at wave one to administrative benefit records. Over one-third (35 per cent) of wave one respondents
had spent all of their time on one or more of the out-of-work benefits qualifying clients for ONE (JSA,
IS, IB, ICA, SDA, WB or BB), with the remainder spread fairly evenly across the rest of the distribution
(Figure 4.1). The pattern is identical for lone mothers only. Forty-six per cent of the sick and disabled
had spent all of their time on out-of-work benefits. Thus, although a similar percentage of lone
parents and sick and disabled clients were on out-of-work benefits twelve months after their claim for
benefit, there is more movement off benefit among lone mothers than there is among the sick and
disabled.
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4.2 Models used in profiling lone parents
For the bulk of our analysis of lone mothers we used the model specifications described in Figure 4.2:
it shows the variables used in the parsimonious (column 1), middling (column 2) and full models
(column 3). The models used for all lone parents, which are not shown, differ in some respects from
the lone mother models because variables differ in their impact on lone mothers and lone fathers.
Figure 4.2 Variables used in models profiling lone mothers20
Models (3)-(4) – as (1) Models (5) and (6) – as (3)
Models (1)-(2) and (2) plus: and (4) plus:
Demographics
7 education dummies
6 actual marital status
dummies
5 dummies for number
of children
5 housing tenure dummies
5 dummies for age of
youngest child
Work history in 2 years
pre-ONE
6 dummies for % time
working
16+ hours per week
3 dummies for % time
working 1-15 hours per week
If ever worked before
5 dummies identifying
any time in 2 year before
claim in the following states:
– temporarily or permanently
sick/disabled
– unemployed
– full-time education
– training
– other (eg. looking
after home)
Area
6 dummies for ONE/control
areas, OR 24 benefit
area dummies
Demographics
8 lone parent’s age
dummies
Ethnicity – White
If numeracy problems
If literacy problems
If vocational education
Work history in 2 yrs
pre-ONE
6 net pay in pre-ONE job
dummies
6 social class in last pre-
ONE job dummies
Benefit history in 2 yrs
pre-ONE
If ever received out-of-
work benefits only
If received in-work
benefits only
If received both out-of-
work and in-work
benefits
If received no benefits
Area
TTWA benefit stocks/
flows for unemployment,
lone parents, sick and
disabled
Demographics
3 dummies for general
health in last year
3 dummies for long-
standing illness
Mental disability dummy
3 care responsibility
dummies
If possess telephone
3 dummies for vehicle
access and licence
3 dummies for number of
household workers
5 dummies for work
attitudes
3 dummies for a regular
income (other than
earnings and benefits)
4 dummies for who lives
with
20 The models used to profile out-of-work benefit status models at wave two and time spent claiming between
ONE eligibility and 31 December 2002 were identical, except they split the ‘temporarily or permanently
sick/disabled’ dummy into two dummies identifying sickness and disability and illness.
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In addition, to allow comparisons with the analysis for the sick and disabled, we ran some analyses
using specifications that are identical to those for the sick and disabled, as described in Figure 3.1.
Analyses for the three outcomes described in Section 4.1 are presented in turn below. The sensitivity
analyses undertaken are identical to those undertaken for the sick and disabled, except:
• we do not present separate models for men;
• separate analyses by age distinguish between lone mothers aged below 35 years and those aged
35 or more, a cut-off more appropriate to lone mothers’ age distribution than the 45-year threshold
used for the sick and disabled;
• exploration of the impact of ward-level deprivation includes consideration of the child poverty
and access to services indices which, a priori, one might expect to be important in the case of
lone mothers.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Without a job twelve months after their claim for benefit
Table 4.3 shows the mean proportion of lone mothers who were without paid work at the wave two
survey interview in each quintile of the predicted distribution of out-of-work probabilities. It does so
for the logit, probit and OLS specifications of Models (2) and (6), namely the most parsimonious and
fullest models containing the 24 area dummies. Recall that, in the raw data, 72 per cent of the sample
were out of work at that stage, roughly one year after ONE eligibility. If ranked according to actual
outcomes, the proportions in Q5-Q3 would be 1, the proportion in Q2 would be .6 and the proportion
in Q1 would be zero – as was the case for the sick and disabled. Ranking claimants according to their
predicted probability of being out-of-work twelve months after their claim for benefit, depending on
the model, 88 – 92 per cent of the highest quintile actually go on to be out of work, compared with
46 – 49 per cent of those in the lowest quintile of predicted probabilities. Thus, despite a very similar
distribution on the outcome variable, these dedicated lone mother models do not seem to perform as
well the models for the sick and disabled, reported in Table 3.3. The proportions predicted to be out
of work in the lowest quintile are substantially higher in the case of the lone mothers, especially in the
case of Model (6).
Table 4.3 Comparison of proportions out of work twelve months after
their claim for benefit for lone mothers, by quintiles of
predicted out-of-work status for logit, probit and OLS
Logit Probit OLS
M(2) M(6) M(2) M(6) M(2) M(6)
Q5 0.88 0.92 0.88 0.92 0.89 0.91
Q4 0.83 0.84 0.82 0.84 0.80 0.86
Q3 0.79 0.77 0.79 0.76 0.82 0.74
Q2 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.69 0.69
Q1 0.48 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.49 0.47
Note: all models run on 70 per cent sample and results based on 30 per cent validation sample
As in the case of the sick and disabled:
• allocation through profiling is preferable to random allocation of treatment since, using the
predictions from any of the estimation methods, profiling does a much better job at identifying
which clients are likely to remain out of work a year later;
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• the full models do a better job than the parsimonious models at identifying those with the lowest
out-of-work probabilities, as indicated by the lower proportions out of work in the lowest predicted
quintiles derived from full models relative to parsimonious models;
• there is little to choose between the performance of the different functional forms.
Table 4.4 compares the predictive performance of the logit, probit and OLS using Models (2), (4) and
(6). It presents differences in the proportion predicted out of work between the top and the bottom
of the distribution of predicted probabilities.
Table 4.4 Differences in proportion predicted out of work, by quintiles
of the predicted probability distribution for lone mothers
Logit Probit OLS
M(2) M(4) M(6) M(2) M(4) M(6) M(2) M(4) M(6)
T80%-B20% 0.35 0.37 0.44 0.34 0.36 0.43 0.31 0.32 0.37
T60%-B40% 0.30 0.31 0.36 0.30 0.31 0.35 0.28 0.29 0.33
T40%-B60% 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.28 0.31
T20%-B80% 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.33
Average dif. 0.29 0.31 0.35 0.29 0.30 0.34 0.29 0.30 0.34
Note: models with 24 area dummies; T=top, B=bottom; estimation sample=2333; validation sample = 1000
As in the case of the sick and disabled, the logit outperforms the probit and OLS models, though the
differences are not great. Again, as in the case of the sick and disabled, there is evidence that the OLS
is better at predicting throughout the distribution: in the logit and probit models mean differences
decline as one moves from row 1 to row 4, something that does not happen in the case of the OLS.
Comparing the average differences in predicted outcomes across Models (2), (4) and (6), there is
almost no gain moving from (2) to (4), but there are clear gains in profiling with Model (6), as indicated
by an average difference of four to six percentage points over the other models.
Table 4.5 Comparison of average differences in predicted out-of-work
probabilities
Logit Probit OLS
M(2) M(6) M(2) M(6) M(2) M(6)
Av. dif. For preferred lone mother models .29 .35 .29 .34 .29 .34
Av. dif. For preferred lone parent models .30 .36 .30 .36 .30 .35
Av. dif. for all lone parents with sick and
disabled model specification .29 .34 .29 .34 .28 .33
Av. dif. For sick and disabled .38 .45 .37 .45 .36 .43
Using the average difference criterion, Table 4.5 compares the performance of the parsimonious and
full models for lone mothers, all lone parents and the sick and disabled. The first row is taken from the
last row of Table 4.4. Row 2 shows the performance of models designed for, and run on, all lone
parents perform slightly better. As one might expect, row 3 shows profiling all lone parents with
models designed for the sick and disabled reduces performance, confirming the value in devising
profiling instruments dedicated to different client groups. Row 4 replicates the average differences
from the sick and disabled models presented in Table 3.4, and shows that, for the out-of-work
outcome that is similarly distributed for the two client groups, the profiling models for the sick and
disabled perform better than those for lone parents and lone mothers.
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Table B.2 presents Models (1) – (6) using the logit estimator to illustrate which variables in the models
are statistically significant (Table B.1 gives the meaning of variable labels used in the lone mother
models). In the most parsimonious models (1) and (2), probabilities of being out of work twelve
months after their claim for benefit fall with better qualifications, owner occupation, the ageing of
the youngest child to school leaving age, and time spent in full-time and part-time employment in the
two years prior to ONE, and even before that. The number of dependent children and marital status
are not significant. These results hold with the addition of further variables in Models (3) – (4),
although the qualification effects weaken and some marital status effects emerge with the
probabilities of being out of work falling among married and separated lone mothers relative to single
lone mothers. Most of the additional variables included in Models (3) and (4) relating to age, ethnicity,
numeracy, literacy, social class and pay in last job before ONE, and area-based benefit stock and flow
information are not statistically significant. The exception is claiming out of work benefits in the two
years before ONE: this raises the probability of being out of work twelve months after their claim for
benefit. The out-of-work benefit effects and the marriage effect disappear in Models (5) and (6) with
the addition of variables that may (or may not) be endogenous. Probabilities of being out-of-work fall
with other household workers, positive work attitudes, having a licence and access to a vehicle, and
having a telephone. Having a long-standing illness affecting one’s ability to work and sources of
income other than child support or a pension, both raise the probabilities of being out-of-work by
wave two.
Table 4.6 takes the logit Models (2) and (6) discussed above and identifies the percentages in the
validation sample who are correctly predicted (column 1), those who are correctly treated (column 2),
those who are wrongly treated (column 3), and those who are wrongly denied access to treatment
(column 4) at three different cut-off points for treatment. As was the case for the sick and disabled
(Table 3.5), the correct prediction rate is highest with a 30 per cent cut-off, as one would expect since
the 70 per cent treatment group coincides with the percentage of lone mothers who were actually
out of work twelve months after their claim for benefit. The correct prediction rate is poorest with the
70 per cent cut-off, that is, with careful targeting. This was also the case for the sick and disabled.
However, the correct prediction rate is appreciably lower for the lone mothers than it is for the
equivalent profiling model for the sick and disabled (10 percentage points lower in the case of Model
(2) and seven percentage points lower in the case of Model (6)).Model specification makes some
difference, with the full model outperforming the parsimonious model at all cut-off points, though
the differences are not large. Again, as in the case of the sick and disabled, as the target group for
treatment rises, so the percentage of the eligible group who are wrongly treated rises, while the
percentage who are wrongly denied falls.
Table 4.6 Success in targeting treatment at different cut-offs for
treatment allocation using out-of-work probabilities twelve
months after their claim for benefit
Correctly Correctly Wrongly Wrongly
predicted treated treated denied
30% cut
M(2) 70 57 13 16
M(6) 73 59 12 15
50% cut
M(2) 60 42 8 32
M(6) 64 44 6 30
70% cut
M(2) 48 26 4 48
M(6) 51 28 3 46
Note: treatment allocation in validation sample. 30 per cent cut = OOW prediction at 30th percentile (so 70 per cent
treated); 50 per cent cut = OOW prediction at 50th percentile (so 50 per cent treated); 70 per cent cut = OOW prediction at
70th percentile (so 30 per cent treated). Wrongly treated means false positive. Wrongly denied means false negative.
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Predictions based on logit model.
The figures in Table 4.6 are percentages of the whole validation sample. In Table 4.7 we express the
same information in a different fashion to shed further light on the success of the models in targeting
treatment. The first row shows wrong prediction rates rise with more targeted treatment. The second
row shows the wrong prediction rate is particularly high among those predicted not to need
treatment. With a 30 per cent cut-off, over half those predicted not to need treatment are actually out
of work twelve months after their claim for benefit. This rises to 67 per cent with a 70 per cent cut-off.
These figures are around 10 percentage points higher than in the case of the sick and disabled models
(see Table 7). On the other hand, few of those predicted to need treatment actually find a job – 17 per
cent in the case of the 30 per cent cut-off, falling to 10 per cent with a 70 per cent cut-off (row 3).
These figures compare favourably to those for the sick and disabled.
Table 4.7 Prediction rates at different cut-offs for treatment allocation
using out-of-work probabilities twelve months after their
claim for benefit
30% cut 50% cut 70% cut
Percentage all predictions wrong 27 36 49
Percentage all negative predictions wrong 52 61 67
Percentage all positive predictions wrong 17 12 10
Percentage in work wrongly treated 46 23 12
Percentage out of work correctly treated 80 59 38
Notes: prediction rates in validation sample based on M(6) results presented in Table 4.7
Using actual out-of-work status twelve months after their claim for benefit as its base, row 4 shows
nearly half (46 per cent) of those in work twelve months after their claim for benefit would have been
wrongly treated as a result of their profiling prediction where 70 per cent of the sample is treated. This
falls to 12 per cent where only 30 per cent of the sample are treated. Finally, row 5 shows four-fifths
of those who actually went on to be out of work twelve months after their claim for benefit would
have been treated following profiling with a treatment aimed at 70 per cent of the sample. This falls
to 38 per cent in a smaller programme where only 30 per cent are treated. This final set of figures show
an accuracy rate that is not quite as good as the sick and disabled models.
Having presented our basic results for this outcome we turn to our sensitivity tests, which are virtually
identical to those reported for the sick and disabled. As noted in the analysis of the sick and disabled,
Models (1) and (5) are used to present results for these sub-sample analyses because these avoid use
of the 24-category benefit area variable which, when sample sizes fall, results in the rejection of some
cases due to perfect prediction of the outcome in benefit areas with small cell sizes. Results were as
follows:
• Running profiling for the English sub-sample with and without deprivation indices made very
21 Of the 4,854 lone parents in the ONE data, 259 had no identifiable claimant administrative records. A
further 494 were linked to administrative data but had no ward identifier that could be matched to the
deprivation data. In 484 cases this was because the client lived in Scotland or Wales. Thus, 4,101 of the
4,854 lone parents had ward identifiers linking to the deprivation data. The use of ward-level deprivation
data reduced the sample for analysis of wave two out-of-work status by 1,107 cases to 2,994. The analysis
here is confined to the 2,784 who were lone mothers. We tested the impact of multiple deprivation,
employment deprivation, income deprivation and child poverty.
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little difference to the profiling diagnostics, even though some of the deprivation measures were
statistically significant in the models.21
• Re-estimating models excluding benefit area variables resulted in a small decline in average
differences of two percentage points in logit parsimonious and full models. However, correct
prediction rates at the 30 per cent, 50 per cent and 70 per cent cut-offs are virtually identical
with and without area variables included.
• Switching to an 80:20 split between the estimation and validation samples makes very little
difference to differences in out-of-work predictions across quintiles of the predicted probabilities
and the percentage of correct predictions.
• Confining the sample to those respondents who said at the wave one interview that they had
made a claim for benefits (dropping 246 non-claimants) resulted in a one percentage point
decline in average differences in the parsimonious and full models. Correct prediction rates with
a 30 per cent cut-off dropped by one percentage point in the case of the parsimonious model
and two percentage points with the full model. However, correct prediction rates were one to
two percentage points higher for the claimant-only sample than the whole sample at the 70 per
cent cut-off. Overall, then, there is little to choose between the samples in terms of profiling
performance.
• Running separate profiling models by age produced marked differences in the predictive power
of the profiling models. Average differences were 11 percentage points higher for lone mothers
aged 35 or more than they were for lone mothers aged under 35. Correct prediction rates were
similar at the 30 per cent cut-off but, where treatment was confined to 30 per cent of the
sample, the model for the older age group performed much better (Table 4.8). The reason for
the difference is clear. The employment rate for older lone mothers is considerably higher (33 per
cent compared to 25 per cent), the chief reason being the high incidence of younger lone mothers
with a child aged under three (50 per cent among mothers aged under 35 compared with 11 per
cent among mothers aged 35+). The greater variance in the older lone mothers sample makes it
easier for the profiling model to differentiate across lone mothers when predicting outcomes. In
addition, the employment rate happens to coincide with the entitlement level when treatment is
allocated with a 70 per cent cut-off.
Table 4.8 Diagnostics for out-of-work status twelve months after their
claim for benefit, by age
Less than 35 years 35+ years
M(1) M(5) M(1) M(5)
Average difference .25 .32 .36 .43
Percentage correct predictions (30% cut-off) 68 70 70 70
Percentage correct predictions (70% cut-off) 46 48 57 58
Logits, with 70% estimation sample, 30% validation sample
The inferences we draw from the analysis for lone mothers are as follows:
• Profiling outperforms random allocation of the treatment.
• The ‘full’ model outperforms the other models.
• There is little to choose between functional forms but the logit estimator performs marginally
better than the OLS and probit estimators.
• Profiling lone parents with models devised for the sick and disabled produces poorer results than
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profiling lone parents with models devised specifically for lone parents.
• Models for all lone parents perform a little better than those for lone mothers only.
• Sensitivity analyses made little difference to the results, except in the case of the split by age
where profiling for those aged 35+ performed better than profiling for younger lone mothers.
• These conclusions are very similar to those for the sick and disabled, although the profiling
models for the sick and disabled generally performed better than those for the lone mothers.
4.3.2 Claiming out-of-work benefit twelve months after their claim for
benefit
Identical analyses were undertaken to predict the probability of claiming one or more out-of-work
benefits at the second wave interview. As shown in Table 4.2, around two-thirds of wave two
respondents said they were in receipt of these out-of-work benefits. In fact, 34 lone mothers said they
were in receipt of out-of-work benefits and in paid work of 16 hours or more, so we tested the
sensitivity of results to the exclusion of this group.
Recall that in the raw data 66 per cent of lone mothers were claiming out-of-work benefit at that
stage. If ranked by quintile according to actual wave two status, the proportions in Q5 – Q3 would be
1, the proportion in Q2 would be .3, and the proportion in Q1 would be zero.
Table 4.9 compares the proportion of lone mothers claiming out-of-work benefits twelve months
after their claim for benefit ranked according to their predicted probability of benefit receipt using
logit, probit and OLS Models (2) and (6). Depending on the model, 86 – 88 per cent of the highest
quintile actually go on to claim out-of-work benefit, compared with 31 – 36 per cent of those in the
lowest quintile of predicted probabilities. All models perform better than random allocation, where
the proportion claiming in each quintile would fluctuate around .66. It is notable, however, that the
parsimonious Model (2) does a poor job in correctly allocating individuals between Q3 and Q4, as
indicated by the similar claimant rates for those two quartiles, regardless of functional form. The full
models do a much better job at ranking individuals according to their future benefit status. There is
little to choose between the performance of the different functional forms.
Table 4.9 Comparison of proportions claiming out-of-work benefits
twelve months after their claim for benefit for lone mothers,
by quintiles of predicted out-of-work status for logit, probit
and OLS
Logit Probit OLS
M(2) M(6) M(2) M(6) M(2) M(6)
Q5 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.86
Q4 0.72 0.82 0.73 0.80 0.75 0.81
Q3 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.75 0.77
Q2 0.57 0.53 0.56 0.54 0.57 0.54
Q1 0.36 0.32 0.36 0.32 0.36 0.31
Note: all models run on 70 per cent sample and results based on 30 per cent validation sample
Table 4.10 compares the predictive performance of the logit, probit and OLS using Models (2), (4) and
(6). Comparing across functional forms, the average differences in predicted outcomes are very small,
and there is nothing to choose between the logit and probit estimators. In each case, the most
parsimonious model, M(2), performs reasonably well, there are small gains in moving from M(2) to
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M(4), and further gains moving to the fullest model, M(6). These average differences are better than
those for the equivalent out-of-work labour market status models reported in Table 4.4.
Table 4.10 Differences in proportion predicted to receive out-of-work
benefits, by quintiles of the predicted probability distribution
Logit Probit OLS
M(2) M(4) M(6) M(2) M(4) M(6) M(2) M(4) M(6)
T80%-B20% 0.37 0.39 0.49 0.37 0.38 0.48 0.34 0.35 0.44
T60%-B40% 0.31 0.34 0.42 0.31 0.33 0.41 0.29 0.31 0.38
T40%-B60% 0.29 0.30 0.36 0.29 0.30 0.36 0.28 0.30 0.35
T20%-B80% 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.34 0.30 0.31 0.36
Average dif. 0.31 0.33 0.40 0.31 0.33 0.40 0.30 0.32 0.38
Note: models with 24 area dummies; T=top, B=bottom; estimation sample=2331; validation sample = 1000
Using the average difference criterion, Table 4.11 compares the performance of the parsimonious
and full models for lone mothers, all lone parents and the sick and disabled. The first row is taken from
the last row of Table 4.10. Row 2 shows models designed for, and run on, all lone parents perform very
similarly to those run on lone mothers only. Row 3 shows profiling all lone parents with models
designed for the sick and disabled reduces performance, again confirming the value in devising
profiling instruments dedicated to different client groups. Row 4 replicates the average differences
from the sick and disabled models presented in Table 3.11. It shows that, for this out-of-work benefit
outcome, which is similarly distributed for the two client groups, the profiling models for the sick and
disabled perform better than those for lone parents and lone mothers.
Table 4.11 Comparison of average differences in predicted out-of-work
probabilities
Logit Probit OLS
M(2) M(6) M(2) M(6) M(2) M(6)
Av. Dif. for preferred lone mother models .31 .40 .31 .40 .30 .38
Av. Dif. for preferred lone parent models .30 .40 .30 .39 .29 .38
Av. dif. for all lone parents with sick and
disabled model specification .26 .38 .26 .38 .25 .37
Av. Dif. for sick and disabled .32 .43 .32 .43 .32 .43
Table B.3 presents Models (1) – (6) using the logit estimator to illustrate which variables in the models
have a significant impact predicting out-of-work benefit status twelve months after their claim for
benefit. Effects are very similar to those presented in Table B.2 for out-of-work labour market status,
with some differences. For example, part-time working in the two years before ONE is no longer
significant, whereas periods of sickness or education in that period become significant. Having a
telephone is no longer significant. On the other hand, having no child becomes significant, as does
general health, and carer responsibilities. Marital status becomes more pronounced in its effects,
while the effects of education and age of youngest child differ somewhat from their significant effects
in the job status models. As was the case with the sick and disabled, the determinants of benefit status
differ somewhat from the determinants of labour market status.
Table 4.12 shows how good the profiling models are at targeting treatment on those who go on to
claim out-of-work benefits twelve months after their claim for benefit. The results are based on logit
Models (2) and (6) and are thus comparable to those presented for out-of-work labour market status
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in Table 4.6. The correct prediction rates (column 1) for benefit receipt are better than those for labour
market status, especially at the 70 per cent cut-off. This is because the proportions wrongly denied
treatment are a little lower than in the case of the out-of-work labour market predictions, and this
difference is only partly off set by higher proportions wrongly treated. Nevertheless, the correct
prediction rates remain below those for the equivalent sick and disabled models reported in Table
3.12.
Table 4.12 Success in targeting treatment at different cut-offs for
treatment allocation using out-of-work benefit receipt
probabilities twelve months after their claim for benefit
Correctly Correctly Wrongly Wrongly
predicted treated treated denied
30% cut M(2) M(6) 7174 5455 1715 1211
50% cut M(2) M(6) 6567 4142 109 2524
70% cut M(2) M(6) 5456 2526 54 4140
Note: treatment allocation in validation sample. 30 per cent cut = OOW benefit receipt prediction at 30th percentile (so
70 per cent treated); 50 per cent cut = OOW benefit receipt prediction at 50th percentile (so 50 per cent treated); 70 per
cent cut = OOW benefit receipt prediction at 70th percentile (so 30 per cent treated). Wrongly treated means false
positive. Wrongly denied means false negative. Predictions based on logit model.
Table 4.13 Prediction rates at different cut-offs for treatment allocation
using out-of-work benefit receipt probabilities twelve
months after their claim for benefit
30% cut 50% cut 70% cut
Percentage all predictions wrong 26 35 44
Percentage all negative predictions wrong 37 48 57
Percentage all positive predictions wrong 21 18 13
Percentage in work wrongly treated 44 26 12
Percentage out of work correctly treated 83 64 39
Notes: prediction rates in validation sample based on M(6) results presented in Table 32
Table 4.13 row 1, which presents the information in Table 4.12 in a slightly different way, confirms the
superiority of the model in profiling using the out-of-work benefit outcome as opposed to labour
market status, at least when treatment is confined to 30 per cent of the sample (compare the last
column in row 1 with the same cell in Table 4.7. The difference is driven by a lower rate of wrong
predictions among the negative predictions, as a comparison of row 2 in the two tables indicates).
Sensitivity tests revealed the following:
• The exclusion of the small number of lone mothers claiming out-of-work benefits and working
16 or more hours per week made virtually no difference to the predictive accuracy of the models
as measured in average differences and correct prediction rates.
• The addition of ward-level deprivation indices has no effect on the predictive accuracy of the
models.
• Average difference and correct prediction rate diagnostics indicated models run on claimants
only (that is, those saying they were in receipt of one or more out-of-work benefits at wave one)
performed similarly to those run on the whole sample.
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• Running the analysis on a random 80 per cent of the sample and validating it on a 20 per cent
random sample had little effect on the profiling diagnostics.
• Splitting the lone mother sample by age, correct prediction rates were higher for the under-35s
sample, whether using a parsimonious model (where the difference was three percentage points)
or the full model (where the difference was two percentage points). At the 70 per cent cut-off,
the parsimonious model produced a better correct prediction rate for under-35s than for those
aged 35+ (by two percentage points), but the full model was better at correctly predicting for
the older age group (by four percentage points).
We can infer the following from the analysis presented above:
• The predictive power of profiling models for out-of-work benefit status twelve months after
their claim for benefit was better than that for out-of-work labour market status twelve months
after their claim for benefit in terms of correct prediction rates and average differences because
the benefit claiming model generated fewer false negatives.
• Determinants of benefit and out-of-work status are similar, but differ in some respects, and the
lone mothers’ models predict better for the lone mothers than the sick and disabled models,
confirming the need to develop dedicated profiling tools for different client groups and across
outcomes.
• Results were broadly similar when performing sensitivity tests, although there were differences
in performance when separate models were run by age of lone mother.
4.3.3 Time claiming out-of-work benefits after ONE
In this section, we turn to our third dependent variable, namely the percentage of time lone mothers
spent on out-of-work benefits between ONE eligibility and 31 December 2002. All but two of the lone
parent clients became eligible for ONE in June or July of 2000, so the percentage is calculated over a
period of around two and a half years.
Table 4.14 Percentage of time spent claiming out-of-work benefits
between ONE eligibility and 31 December 2002, by
quintiles of predicted time claiming benefits OLS and tobit
OLS Tobit
Distribution in the data M(2) M(4) M(6) M(2) M(4) M(6)
Q5 1.0 .86 .85 .85 .86 .86 .85
Q4 .98 .77 .78 .78 .76 .76 .79
Q3 .78 .69 .67 .71 .69 .68 .68
Q2 .45 .56 .60 .57 .58 .60 .58
Q1 .16 .47 .45 .44 .46 .46 .45
Note: all models run on 70 per cent sample (N=2,979) and results based on 30 per cent validation sample (N=1,277)
There is bunching at the top end of this continuous variable, with 1,503 of the 4,256 lone mothers
successfully matched to the benefit data spending all of their time since ONE eligibility on out-of-work
benefits. Thus, as in the case of the sick and disabled clients, we test the sensitivity of our profiling on
this outcome to the OLS and tobit functions, the latter taking account of the bunching of observations
at the upper bound of the dependent variable.
Table 4.14 shows the percentage of time lone mothers spent claiming out-of-work benefits between
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ONE eligibility and 31 December 2002. The overall mean time spent on out-of-work benefits in the
data is 67 per cent (72 per cent for lone fathers). If ranked according to the actual time spent claiming
in the raw data, all those in the top quintile and virtually all those in the second quintile have been
claiming out-of-work benefits throughout, while in the third quintile, the mean percentage of time
spent claiming is 78 per cent (column 1). Although high, these figures are lower than those for the sick
and disabled. However, the mean is only 16 per cent in the lowest quintile, showing that there are
some who spend very little time claiming.
Ranking clients according to their predicted percentage of time on out-of-work benefits since ONE
eligibility, the mean percentage of time on benefit among the highest quintile is 85 – 86 per cent
(depending on the model), compared with 44 – 47 per cent among those in the lowest quintile. The
models do a reasonable job at ranking individuals according to future time on benefits, as indicated by
the sizeable differences in mean actual outcomes across the predicted outcome distribution. Where
clients are randomly assigned to quintiles, the mean percentage of time on benefits fluctuates around
70 per cent, so profiling is clearly preferable to random allocation of treatment. Comparing functional
forms, there is little to choose between the performance of the tobit and the OLS. What is striking
about the table is that, in contrast to all the analyses presented so far for the sick and disabled and lone
parents, the full models perform no better than the middling and parsimonious models in ranking lone
mothers by their future benefit outcomes.
Table 4.15 Differences in percentage of time spent claiming out-of-work
benefits between ONE eligibility and 31 December 2002, by
quintiles of predicted distribution
OLS Tobit
M(2) M(4) M(6) M(2) M(4) M(6)
T80%-B20% 27.5 29.1 32.0 26.6 28.3 31.4
T60%-B40% 23.7 24.7 28.0 22.3 23.5 26.7
T40%-B60% 22.5 23.5 27.1 20.7 21.8 24.9
T20%-B80% 23.7 24.9 29.1 21.2 22.2 25.2
Average dif. 24.4 25.6 29.1 22.7 23.9 27.0
Note: all models run on 70% sample (N=2,979) and results based on 30% validation sample (N=1,277); T=top;
B=bottom
Table 4.15 compares the predictive performance of the OLS and tobit using Models (2), (4) and (6). It
presents differences in the average predicted time on out-of-work benefits between the top and the
bottom of the distribution of predicted percentage of time claiming.
Comparing the average differences in predicted outcomes across functional forms, the OLS estimator
outperforms the tobit estimator for all three models. The predictive power of the models is not driven
by ‘success’ in any particular part of the distribution. Comparing the average differences in predicted
outcomes across OLS Models (2), (4) and (6), the most parsimonious model performs reasonably well,
but there is some gain moving from (2) to (4), and further gains in profiling with Model (6), the average
difference rising by 4.5 percentage points as we go from Model (2) to (6). As was the case for the sick
and disabled, the models appear less discriminating than those estimating whether on benefits twelve
months after their claim for benefit since, with similar mean scores for both variables, the average
differences presented in Table 4.10 are larger than those presented in Table 4.15.
Table B.4 presents Models (1) – (6) using the OLS estimator to illustrate which variables in the models
are statistically significant. The bullet points below comment on these results, comparing them to
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identical OLS models (not shown) estimating the probability of being in receipt of out-of-work
benefits twelve months after their claim for benefit. The commentary focuses on results that differ
from those discussed in the analysis of wave two benefit receipt:
• Age: in Models (3) and (4), those aged 20 – 34 spent less time claiming out-of-work benefits
than lone mothers aged under 20, whereas age was only significant for wave two benefit status
in Model (4) where those aged 20 – 24 had a lower probability of being on benefit than those
aged under 20.
• Qualifications: degree-level and A-level qualifications reduce time on benefits in Models (1) to
(6), and any qualifications reduce time on benefits relative to no qualifications in the parsimonious
models. Qualifications at A-level or above were associated with lower probabilities of claiming
out-of-work benefits twelve months after their claim for benefit, although the only effect that
remained significant in Models (5) and (6) was the impact of A-levels.
• Numeracy problems: numeracy problems increased time on benefits in Models (3) and (4) but
they are not significant in estimating wave two benefit receipt.
• Housing tenure: renters spend more time on benefits than home owners, but only the effect of
private renting remains significant throughout, whereas all types of renting increased the
probability of claiming benefits twelve months after their claim for benefit.
• Children: time spent on benefits declined with the age of the youngest child but number of
children was not significant. Similar effects were apparent twelve months after their claim for
benefit, although having no children was negatively associated with wave two benefit receipt in
Models (1) – (4).
• Area benefit stocks and flows: some of these were significant in estimating time on benefit but
they were never significant in estimating wave two benefit status.
• Pre-ONE job: higher pay in this job was associated with reduced time on benefits after ONE,
especially where earnings were in the highest bracket, but they were not significantly associated
with wave two benefit status. Being a partly – skilled manual worker in the pre-ONE job increased
time spent claiming relative to professionals, an effect that was not apparent for wave two
benefit receipt.
• General health: mothers with poor or fair health spent more time claiming than those with good
health, whereas only those with poor health were more likely to claim out-of-work benefit twelve
months after their claim for benefit.
• ONE: being in a PVS control area increases the time on benefit relative to being in a PVS ONE
pilot, but ONE does not affect wave two benefit status.
Table 4.16 indicates the significance of variables, and the direction of effects, across all three
outcomes for lone mothers, summarising the models in Appendix B. Although the similarities are
notable, there are clear differences that need to be borne in mind in constructing profiling models.
Table 4.17 shows the accuracy of profiling based on the OLS for a treatment targeted at a minority,
half and nearly three-quarters of the lone mother sample. Correct prediction rates (column 1) for the
30 per cent and 50 per cent cut-off are similar to those for the wave two benefit status models
reported in Table 4.12. However, the correct prediction rate is much higher at the 70 per cent cut-off,
that is, for carefully targeted treatment on offer to only 30 per cent of the population. For the
parsimonious model, the correct prediction rate is 14 percentage points higher when estimating
percentage of time on benefit than it is for the model estimating benefit status twelve months after
their claim for benefit. The difference is 10 percentage points for the full model. These gains are made
through a substantial reduction in the wrong denial rate, which falls by around 20 percentage points,
offset by a rise of roughly 10 percentage points in the wrong treatment rate. Thus, as in the case of the
Analysis and results for lone parents
60
sick and disabled, the time on benefit models reduce the number of false negatives but increase the
number of false positives.
There is one important respect in which these results differ from those for the sick and disabled: in
contrast to the sick and disabled, there are no real gains to be made in using the full model relative to
the parsimonious model when profiling for a treatment aimed at 50 per cent or 70 per cent of the
sample.
Table 4.16 Guide to significance of variables in lone mother models
Percentage time
Without a job On OOW benefit claiming,
at wave 2 at wave 2 ONE-31/12/02
Age (ref: <20 yrs) ns - if 20-24 yrs - if 20-34 yrs
Qualifications (ref: none) - - -
Numeracy problems ns ns +
Housing tenure
(ref: owner occupation) + if renting + if renting or if ‘other’ tenure + if renting
Marital status (ref: single) - married, separated - married or cohabiting; + widow - married, cohabiting; +
widow
Number of children (ref: one) ns - no children ns
Age of youngest child (ref: < 3 yrs) - until 16-18 yrs - until 16-18 yrs - until 16-18 yrs
Benefit history in 2 yrs pre-ONE + if OOW benefit ns ns
% time working 16+ hrs in
2 yrs pre-ONE - if >66% - if > 66% - if >66%
% time working <16 hrs in
2 yrs pre-ONE - if >50% ns ns
Net wage in pre-ONE job ns ns - (u-shaped)
Social class in pre-ONE job
(ref: professional, intermediate) ns ns + if partly skilled manual worker
If ever had job - - -
Any sickness in 2 yrs pre-ONE ns + +
Any education in 2 yrs pre-ONE ns - -
TTWA benefit stocks and flows ns ns - with higher %
disabled claimants;
+ with increasing
% disabled
General health (ref: good) ns + if poor + if fair or poor
Long-standing illness (ref: none) + if says affects work + if says affects work + if says affects work
Care responsibilities (ref: none) ns + if affects work + if affects work
Telephone - ns ns
Licence (ref: no licence,
no vehicle access) - if licence and access - if licence and access - if licence and access
Number of household workers
(ref: none) - if one household worker - if one household worker - if one household worker
Other regular income except
benefits/wages (ref: none) + - ns
Attitudes to working
(ref: very negative) - - -
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Notes: (1) +/- denote positive and negative significant effects at 95 per cent confidence level or above in at least one of
the parsimonious, middling or full models. ns denotes non-significance (2) Variables that are never significant are
excluded from this table (3) Area dummies and ONE pilot dummies both had significant effects but are not shown in the
table (4) Full tables are appended in Appendix B
Table 4.17 Success in targeting treatment at different cut-offs for
treatment allocation using predicted percentage of time
claiming out-of-work benefits between ONE eligibility and
31 December 2002
Correctly Correctly Wrongly Wrongly
predicted treated treated denied
30% cut
M(2) 70 55 15 15
M(6) 70 55 15 15
50% cut
M(2) 67 33 17 17
M(6) 68 34 16 16
70% cut
M(2) 68 17 13 19
M(6) 66 16 14 20
Note: treatment allocation in validation sample. 30 per cent cut = time on OOW benefit prediction at 30th percentile (so
70 per cent treated); 50 per cent cut = time on OOW benefit prediction at 50th percentile (so 50 per cent treated); 70
per cent cut = time on OOW benefit prediction at 70th percentile (so 30 per cent treated). Wrongly treated means false
positive. Wrongly denied means false negative. Predictions based on OLS model.
Table 4.18 presents the information in Table 4.17 in a different way. Row 1 shows the wrong
prediction rate rises slightly with more targeted treatment, whereas there is a steep rise in the case of
the wave two benefit status models (see Table 4.13), a difference which was also apparent for the sick
and disabled. Again reflecting findings for the sick and disabled, as we move to a more targeted
treatment, the wrong prediction rate among those predicted not to need treatment declines (row 2)
whereas it rises among those predicted to need treatment (row 3). Row 4 uses as its base the clients
whose actual time on benefits is below the rate entitling them to treatment. In 50 per cent of these
cases, their predicted time on benefit is higher than the 30 per cent cut-off, resulting in unnecessary
treatment. This figure falls progressively with more targeted treatment, as in the case of the sick and
disabled. Row 5 uses as its base the clients whose actual time on benefits is above the rate entitling
them to treatment. With a 30 per cent cut-off, four-fifths of these clients are actually treated, but this
falls to 44 per cent with a 70 per cent cut-off.
Table 4.18 Prediction rates at different cut-offs for treatment allocation
using predicted percentage of time on out-of-work benefits,
ONE eligibility – 31 December 2002
30% cut 50% cut 70% cut
Percentage all predictions wrong 30 32 34
Percentage all negative predictions wrong 50 32 29
Percentage all positive predictions wrong 21 32 47
Percentage those with time on benefits below cut-off
who are wrongly treated 50 32 22
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Percentage those with time on benefits above cut-off
who are correctly treated 79 68 44
Notes: prediction rates in validation sample based on M(6) results presented in Table 4.17
We can draw the following inferences from the analysis presented above:
• Profiling outperforms random allocation of the treatment because the models are good at ranking
individuals according to the percentage of time they spend claiming out-of-work benefits.
• Whereas average differences in predicted outcomes indicate the ‘full’ model outperforms the
other models, there are no gains to more extensive models using the correct prediction criteria,
whichever of our three cut-off points is used to target treatment.
• The OLS estimator marginally outperforms the tobit estimator.
• Influences on early and later benefit outcomes differ, and this needs to be borne in mind in
constructing profiling models.
• There are no unambiguous advantages to using percentage of time spent claiming rather than
wave two benefit status as the profiling variable: the relative performance of profiling on these
two outcomes using identical models differs with the cut-off point chosen to allocate treatment.
With a 70 per cent cut-off the correct prediction rate is higher when using percentage of time
spent claiming, but profiling based on wave two benefit status results in slightly better profiling
with 30 per cent and 50 per cent cut-offs.
• With the exception of point 2, these findings reflect the conclusions drawn from the analysis of
the sick and disabled.
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5 Analysis and results for JSA
clients
• In contrast to the other two client groups, only 42.5 per cent of JSA clients were out of work 12
months after making their initial approach to DWP, and 32 per cent were claiming out-of-work
benefits at that point. Furthermore, only two per cent had spent all of their time claiming out-of-
work benefits over the 30 month period, the mean percentage of time spent claiming being 30
per cent.
• Profiling outperforms random allocation of the treatment.
• The ‘full’ model outperforms other models in predicting benefit and labour market status 12
months after claiming but, when profiling with the percentage of time claiming over the 30
month period, there are no improvements in correct prediction rates with the fullest models.
• The predictive power of profiling models for out-of-work benefit and labour market status at the
12 month point are similar, though the determinants of these two statuses differ in a number of
respects.
• There are no unambiguous advantages to using percentage of time spent claiming rather than
benefit status at month 12 as the profiling variable: the relative performance of profiling on
these two outcomes using identical models differs with the cut-off point chosen to allocate
treatment.
• Once again, the logit marginally outperforms other estimators in profiling status 12 months on,
while the OLS performs better than the tobit estimator in predicting percentage of time claiming
over the 30 month period.
• Profiling JSA clients with models devised for the sick and disabled produces poorer results than
profiling JSA clients with models devised specifically for them.
• In contrast to the sick and disabled, correct prediction rates rise as the target group for treatment
narrows. Again, in contrast to the sick and disabled, the correct prediction rate is not particularly
sensitive to the cut-off point chosen.
• Irrespective of the cut-off point, negative predictions are less likely to be wrong in the case of JSA
clients compared with the sick and disabled, but a higher percentage of those predicted to need
treatment actually find a job.
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• Irrespective of the cut-off point, out-of-work correct treatment rates are higher for JSA clients
than they are for the sick and disabled.
• Sensitivity analyses made little difference to the results, except in the case of the split by gender
and age. How well a profiling instrument performs for any of the four sub-groups (men, women,
those aged under 35 years and those aged 35 or more) depends on the criterion used to measure
accuracy and the model specification.
Finally we turn to analysis and results for JSA clients in the ONE database. For the purposes of the ONE
evaluation, a client is classified as a JSA client if they initially approached the Department about
claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) – whether or not they went on to claim that benefit, and
regardless of their benefit status by the time of the first survey interview. 4,933 were interviewed at
the first interview and 3,189 were interviewed at the second interview.
5.1 Outcomes for JSA clients
Table 5.1 shows the labour market status of JSA clients twelve months after their claim for benefit:
57.5 per cent were doing some paid work at that point – around double the rate for the sick and
disabled and lone parents. The unemployed make up a further 25.5 per cent, and those on
Government schemes another 2.7 per cent. Thus, this client group differs markedly from both the sick
and disabled and lone parents in that over four-fifths were economically active by the time of the wave
two interview. This may, in part, reflect the intervention regime in place for JSA clients that includes
a number of mandatory job search components, plus mandatory involvement in the New Deals for
longer-term claimants.
Table 5.1 Labour market status twelve months after their claim for
benefit
Weighted column percentage
30+ hours paid work 45.3
16-29 hours paid work 8.9
<16 hours paid work 3.3
Full-time education 3.9
Government scheme 2.7
Unemployed 25.5
Looking after home 3.3
Temporarily sick or injured 3.9
Permanently sick or disabled 1.3
Not working, other reasons 2.0
Base unweighted N=3,189.
Table 5.2 Out-of-work benefits received twelve months after their
claim for benefit
Weighted cell percentage
Income Support 6.2
Jobseeker’s Allowance 23.3
Widow’s Benefit 0.2
Incapacity Benefit 2.8
Invalid Care Allowance 0.7
Severe Disablement Allowance 0.2
Any of the above 31.8
Note: unweighted N=3,188. There was 1 case where benefit status could not be accurately determined.
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Reflecting this labour market status, the percentage of JSA clients in receipt of out-of-work benefits
twelve months after their claim for benefit was around half that for the other two client groups at 32
per cent (Table 5.2). Of those claiming a benefit, around three-quarters were in receipt of JSA and a
fifth were in receipt of Income Support. There were 39 JSA clients receiving out-of-work benefits who
also said they were working at least 16 hours per week. Only 1.9 per cent were in receipt of more than
one out-of-work benefit.
Comparison of Tables 5.1 and 5.2 reveals the percentage in receipt of out-of-work benefits is
substantially lower than the percentage without paid work. In fact, 406 JSA clients who had no paid
employment did not receive any out-of-work benefits. Of these 406, 357 had partners who were in
paid work.
Figure 5.1 Percentage of time spent on out-of-work benefits between
ONE eligibility and 31 December 2002, JSA clients
We were able to match 90.4 per cent (4,458 out of 4,933) of the JSA clients who responded at wave
one to administrative benefit records. Few (96 cases, or 2.2 per cent) spent all of their time on one or
more of the out-of-work benefits qualifying clients for ONE (JSA, IS, IB, ICA, SDA, WB or BB).
Furthermore, a substantial percentage of JSA clients (431, or 9.7 per cent) had spent no time at all
claiming out-of-work benefits over the period (Figure 5.1). These figures contrast starkly with those
for the sick and disabled and lone parents where there were many claiming over the whole period and
few with no experience of claiming. This is for two reasons. First, JSA clients were sampled
predominantly from the Labour Market System (LMS) recording all people approaching the
Department to enquire about a claim. The sick and disabled and lone parents were drawn
predominantly from the GMS system that contains claimants only. Clearly, many JSA clients did not go
on to register a claim. Secondly, even where JSA clients registered a claim after their ONE entry date,
they tended to flow off benefit more quickly than the sick and disabled and lone parents.
Analysis and results for JSA clients
66
5.2 Models used in profiling JSA clients
Figure 5.2 Variables used in models profiling JSA clients
Models (3)-(4) – as (1) Models (5) and (6) – as (3)
Models (1)-(2) and (2) plus: and (4) plus:
Demographics
Gender
9 JSA claimants age dummies
Ethnicity - White
7 education dummies
If numeracy problems
If literacy problems
6 housing tenure dummies
5 dummies for age of
youngest child
6 actual marital status
dummies
Benefit history in two years
pre-ONE
If ever received out-of-work
benefits only
If received in-work
benefits only
If received both out-of-work
and in-work benefits
If received no benefits
Work history in two years
pre-ONE
6 dummies for % time
working 16+ hours per week
3 dummies for % time
working 1-15 hours per week
If ever worked before
If spent any time in two years
before claim in the
unemployed state
6 net pay in pre-ONE
job dummies
6 social class in last pre-ONE
job dummies
Area
6 dummies for ONE/control
areas, OR 24 benefit
area dummies
Demographics
5 dummies identifying
any time in two years
before claim spent in the
following states:
- temporarily sick
- permanently sick/
disabled
- full-time education
- training
- other (eg. looking after
home)
Demographics
3 dummies for general
health in last year
3 dummies for long-
standing illness
Mental disability dummy
3 care responsibility
dummies
If possess telephone
3 dummies for driving
licence and vehicle access
3 dummies for number of
household workers
5 dummies for work
attitudes
3 dummies for regular
income other than
earnings/benefits
Area
TTWA benefit stocks/flows
for unemployment, lone
parents, sick and disabled
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The models used for the JSA client analysis are in Figure 5.2: it shows the variables used in the
parsimonious (column 1), middling (column 2) and full models (column 3). The breaks used to define
dummy variables on covariates such as age and wage differ from those used in the sick and disabled
models, reflecting differences in the distribution of the client groups on these variables. Differences in
the sets of variables entering the parsimonious, middling and full models reflect differences in the
performance of alternative profiling models. As in the case of lone mothers, we also ran analyses using
specifications developed for the sick and disabled (presented in Figure 3.2) to allow comparison of
results across the two client groups.
Analyses for the three outcomes described in Section 5.1 are presented in turn below. The sensitivity
analyses undertaken are identical to those undertaken for the sick and disabled except, as in the case
of the lone mothers, we use 35 years as the age cut-off rather than 45 years used for the sick and
disabled, reflecting JSA clients’ younger age profile.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Without a job twelve months after their claim for benefit
Table 5.3 shows the mean proportion of JSA clients who were without paid work at the wave two survey
interview in each quintile of the predicted distribution of out-of-work probabilities. It does so for the
logit, probit and OLS specifications of Models (2) and (6). In the raw data 42.5 per cent of the sample
were out of work at that stage, roughly one year after ONE eligibility. If ranked according to actual
outcomes, the proportions in Q5 – Q4 would be 1, the proportion in Q3 would be .13, and the
proportions in Q2 and Q1 would be zero. Ranking claimants according to their predicted probability of
being out of work twelve months after their claim for benefit, depending on the model, 66 – 70 per cent
of the highest quintile actually go on to be out of work, compared with 19 – 22 per cent of those in the
lowest quintile of predicted probabilities. Differences in the mean proportions out of work by predicted
quintile confirm profiling with any of these models is preferable to random allocation where figures vary
around .43. The full models differentiate a little better than the parsimonious models, as indicated by the
gap between the means in the bottom and top quintiles. The different functional forms perform almost
identically.
Table 5.3 Comparison of proportions out of work twelve months after
their claim for benefit for JSA clients, by quintiles of
predicted out-of-work status for logit, probit and OLS
Logit Probit OLS
M(2) M(6) M(2) M(6) M(2) M(6)
Q5 0.67 0.69 0.66 0.70 0.67 0.69
Q4 0.52 0.54 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.54
Q3 0.39 0.42 0.40 0.43 0.38 0.41
Q2 0.30 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.29 0.27
Q1 0.22 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.22 0.19
Note: all models run on 70 per cent sample and results based on 30 per cent validation sample
Table 5.4 compares the predictive performance of the logit, probit and OLS estimators using Models
(2), (4) and (6). It presents differences in the proportion predicted out of work between the top and the
bottom of the distribution of predicted probabilities.
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Table 5.4 Differences in proportion predicted out of work, by quintiles
of the predicted probability distribution for JSA clients
Logit Probit OLS
M(2) M(4) M(6) M(2) M(4) M(6) M(2) M(4) M(6)
T80%-B20% 0.31 0.32 0.36 0.32 0.32 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.38
T60%-B40% 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.33 0.33 0.38
T40%-B60% 0.36 0.36 0.41 0.35 0.35 0.41 0.34 0.34 0.39
T20%-B80% 0.38 0.39 0.46 0.38 0.38 0.45 0.37 0.37 0.44
Average dif. 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.34 0.34 0.40
Note: models with 24 area dummies; T=top, B=bottom; estimation sample=2232; validation sample = 957
The logit and probit perform equally well across all three models, while the OLS performs slightly
worse with the parsimonious and middling models, but identically in the case of the full model.
Comparing the average differences in predicted outcomes across Models (2), (4) and (6), there is no
gain moving from (2) to (4), but there are clear gains in profiling with Model (6), as indicated by an
increase in average differences of five percentage points over the other models. This was true for the
sick and disabled too.
Table 5.5 Comparison of average differences in predicted out-of-work
probabilities
Logit Probit OLS
M(2) M(6) M(2) M(6) M(2) M(6)
Av. dif. for preferred JSA models .35 .40 .35 .40 .34 .40
Av. dif. for JSA clients with sick and
disabled model specification .32 .39 .32 .39 .31 .39
Av. dif. for sick and disabled .38 .45 .37 .45 .36 .43
Using the average difference criterion, Table 5.5 compares the performance of the parsimonious and
full models for JSA clients and the sick and disabled. The first row is taken from the last row of Table
5.4. The average differences in row one are larger than those in row two where we use the profiling
models designed for the sick and disabled. This shows there are gains in profiling JSA clients using a
profiling tool dedicated to the client group, rather than a profiling tool designed for the sick and
disabled, although the differences for the full model are small.
Table C.2 presents Models (1) – (6) using the logit estimator to illustrate which variables in the models
are statistically significant (Table C.1 gives the meaning of variable labels used in the JSA models). In
the most parsimonious models (1) and (2), probabilities of being out-of-work twelve months after
their claim for benefit fall with qualifications – especially having a degree – being a woman, being
white, being married, time spent in paid work (full-time and part-time) in the two years before ONE,
and mid-level earnings in the pre-ONE job. They rise where the client rents from the local authority and
among those with time spent claiming out of work benefits in the two years before ONE. The non-
linear effects of the client’s age and age of youngest child are difficult to interpret (perhaps because
the two interact), as is the negative effect of having no job in the two years pre-ONE relative to being
a professional in one’s last job. Results change little with the addition of the variables in Models (3) and
(4), except the effects of qualifications and being a woman strengthen, and time spent unemployed
in the two years prior to ONE increases out-of-work probabilities. The new work history variables
added are not significant. A number of the variables added in the full models ((5) and (6)) replicate
effects common in analyses of labour market behaviour of the unemployed, with probabilities of
Analysis and results for JSA clients
69
being out of work falling where the client has a telephone, access to a vehicle and a licence to use it,
other household workers, positive work attitudes, no care responsibilities and good general health.
Regular income (other than benefits or wages) increases out of work probabilities, perhaps by
blunting the incentive to work. A more surprising finding is the lower probability of being out of work
twelve months after their claim for benefit among those with a long-standing illness that does not
affect their work, relative to those without a long-standing illness. Area-level benefit stocks and flows
have no significant effect.
Table 5.6 Success in targeting treatment at different cut-offs for
treatment allocation using out-of-work probabilities twelve
months after their claim for benefit
Correctly Correctly Wrongly Wrongly
predicted treated denied treated
30% cut
M(2) 58 36 36 7
M(6) 61 37 34 5
50% cut
M(2) 63 29 23 14
M(6) 65 30 22 13
70% cut
M(2) 65 20 12 23
M(6) 67 21 11 22
Note: treatment allocation in validation sample. 30 per cent cut = OOW prediction at 30th percentile (so 70 per cent
treated); 50 per cent cut = OOW prediction at 50th percentile (so 50 per cent treated); 70 per cent cut = OOW predic-
tion at 70th percentile (so 30 per cent treated). Wrongly treated means false positive. Wrongly denied means false
negative. Predictions based on logit model.
Table 5.6 takes the logit Models (2) and (6) discussed above and identifies the percentages in the
validation sample who are correctly predicted (column 1), those who are correctly treated (column 2),
those who are wrongly treated (column 3), and those who are wrongly denied access to treatment
(column 4) at three different cut-off points for treatment. In contrast to the sick and disabled (Table 6),
the correct prediction rate rises as the target group for the treatment narrows, with the correct
prediction rate highest with a 70 per cent cut-off. Furthermore, and again, in contrast to the sick and
disabled, the correct prediction rate is not particularly sensitive to the cut-off point chosen. Thus,
whereas the correct prediction rate for the sick and disabled using Model (6) improves by 13
percentage points as one moves from a 70 per cent cut-off to a 30 per cent cut-off, the improvement
among JSA clients from a move in the other direction is only six percentage points. Comparing
absolute correct prediction rates for JSA clients and the sick and disabled, the sick and disabled models
outperform those for the JSA clients at the 30 per cent and 50 per cent cut-offs, but profiling is more
accurate for JSA clients than sick and disabled clients at the 70 per cent cut-off. The reason for these
differences is apparent when one compares the distribution of the probabilities of being out of work
at wave two for the sick and disabled and JSA validation samples (Figures 5.3 and 5.4). Figure 5.3
relates to the JSA client group, and shows the validation sample is fairly evenly spread across the
probability distribution, although there is some concentration towards the lower end of the
probability distribution. By contrast, the sick and disabled validation sample is heavily concentrated
in the top end of the probability distribution, with substantial bunching above the 90th percentile.
The distribution for the sick and disabled makes it more difficult to predict accurately with a 70 per
cent cut-off. These differences between the performance of the JSA client and sick and disabled
models are driven by differences in the underlying distribution of the outcome variable for the two
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client groups, and the models’ ability to identify correctly where clients within a particular client
group should be ranked according to their predicted probabilities.
A comparison of Tables 3.5 and 5.6 also reveals a lower wrong denial rate among JSA clients
compared with the sick and disabled, but a higher wrong treatment rate and lower correct treatment
rate, whatever the cut-off level.
The same information is presented in a different fashion in Table 5.7. Confirming the findings
discussed above, and in contrast to the sick and disabled (see Table 3.6), the first row shows the wrong
prediction rate falls as the treatment becomes more targeted. At the 30 per cent cut-off, the
percentage of all predictions that are wrong is 13 percentage points higher for JSA clients than the
sick and disabled but, at the 70 per cent cut-off, the percentage of all predictions that are wrong is
nine percentage points higher for the sick and disabled than JSA clients. Negative predictions are less
likely to be wrong in the case of the JSA, irrespective of the cut-off point (row 2), but a much higher
percentage of those predicted to need treatment actually find a job (row 3), reflecting the much
higher labour market activity rates among those out of work among JSA clients relative to sick and
disabled clients.
Figure 5.3 Distribution of JSA validation sample’s predicted
probabilities of being out of work twelve months after their
claim for benefit using logit Model (6)
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Figure 5.4 Distribution of sick and disabled validation sample’s
predicted probabilities of being out-of-work twelve months
after their claim for benefit using logit Model (6)
Table 5.7 Prediction rates at different cut-offs for treatment allocation
using out-of-work probabilities twelve months after their
claim for benefit
30% cut 50% cut 70% cut
Percentage all predictions wrong 39 35 33
Percentage all negative predictions wrong 17 27 32
Percentage all positive predictions wrong 48 42 34
Percentage in work wrongly treated 60 39 19
Percentage out-of-work correctly treated 86 70 49
Notes: prediction rates in validation sample based on M(6) results presented in Table 5.6
Using actual out-of-work status twelve months after their claim for benefit as its base, row 4 shows 60
per cent of those in work twelve months after their claim for benefit would have been wrongly treated
as a result of their profiling prediction where 70 per cent of the sample is treated. This falls to 19 per
cent where only 30 per cent of the sample are treated. Finally, row 5 shows 86 per cent of those who
actually went on to be out of work twelve months after their claim for benefit would have been
treated following profiling with a treatment aimed at 70 per cent of the sample. This falls to 49 per
cent in a smaller programme where only 30 per cent are treated. This final set of figures show an
accuracy rate that is better than that for the sick and disabled.
Having presented our basic results for this outcome we turn to our sensitivity tests. Results were as
follows:
• The inclusion of ward-level deprivation data made no difference to results.
• Re-estimating models excluding benefit area variables resulted in a one percentage point fall in
average differences in the logit parsimonious model, and no difference in the full model. Correct
prediction rates are virtually identical with and without area variables.
• Switching to an 80:20 split between the estimation and validation samples makes very little
difference to differences in out-of-work predictions across quintiles of the predicted probabilities
and the percentage of correct predictions.
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• Confining the sample to those respondents who said at the wave one interview that they had
made a claim for benefits (dropping 334 non-claimants) resulted in a one percentage point
improvement in average differences in the parsimonious and full models. Correct prediction
rates with a 30 per cent cut-off improved by two percentage points in the case of the parsimonious
model and by one percentage point with the full model. Correct prediction rates were one to
two percentage points lower for the claimant-only sample than the whole sample at the 70 per
cent cut-off. Overall, then, confining the JSA sample to those who said they had claimed by wave
one makes little difference to the performance of the profiling models.
• Running separate profiling models by gender, average differences indicate a better performance
for models profiling women (Table 5.8). However, correct prediction rates present a more
complicated picture of profiling accuracy by gender. With a 30 per cent cut-off, correct prediction
rates are roughly 10 percentage points lower for women than men but, with a 70 per cent cut-
off, correct prediction rates for women are similar to men with the full model and better with the
parsimonious model.
• Running separate profiling models by age, average differences were better for the older age
group (35+) for both the parsimonious and full models (Table 5.9). However, although correct
prediction rates are superior for the 35+ age group at the 70 per cent cut-off, correct prediction
rates are lower for the older age group with the parsimonious model and a 30 per cent cut-off.
Correct prediction rates are identical for the two age groups with a full model at the 70 per cent
cut-off.
Table 5.8 Diagnostics for out-of-work status twelve months after their
claim for benefit, by gender for JSA clients
Men Women
M(1) M(5) M(1) M(5)
Average difference .38 .39 .41 .47
Percentage correct predictions (30% cut-off) 61 63 50 52
Percentage correct predictions (70% cut-off) 63 67 68 66
Logits, with 70% estimation sample, 30% validation sample. Sample sizes: men, N=2130; women, N=1059
Table 5.9 Diagnostics for out-of-work status twelve months after their
claim for benefit, by age for JSA clients
<35 years 35+ years
M(1) M(5) M(1) M(5)
Average difference .36 .42 .38 .47
Percentage correct predictions (30% cut-off) 58 59 55 59
Percentage correct predictions (70% cut-off) 62 66 68 72
Logits, with 70% estimation sample, 30% validation sample: Sample sizes: those under 35, N=1687; those aged 35
and more, N=1502
The inferences we draw from the analysis of wave two out-of-work status for JSA clients are as
follows:
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• Profiling outperforms random allocation of the treatment.
• The ‘full’ model outperforms the other models.
• There is little to choose between functional forms but the logit and probit estimators perform
better than the OLS estimator.
• Profiling JSA clients with models devised for the sick and disabled produces poorer results than
profiling JSA clients with models devised specifically for them.
• Profiling models for the sick and disabled perform better than the JSA models using the average
difference criterion.
• In contrast to the sick and disabled, correct prediction rates rise as the target group for treatment
narrows. Again, in contrast to the sick and disabled, the correct prediction rate is not particularly
sensitive to the cut-off point chosen.
• Irrespective of the cut-off point, negative predictions are less likely to be wrong in the case of JSA
clients compared with the sick and disabled, but a higher percentage of those predicted to need
treatment actually find a job.
• Irrespective of the cut-off point, out-of-work correct treatment rates are higher for JSA clients
than they are for the sick and disabled.
• Sensitivity analyses made little difference to the results, except in the case of the split by gender
and age. How well a profiling instrument performs for any of the four sub-groups (men, women,
those aged under 35 years and those aged 35 or more) depends on the criterion used to measure
accuracy and the model specification.
5.3.2 Claiming out-of-work benefit twelve months after their claim for
benefit
Identical analyses were undertaken to predict the probability of claiming one or more out-of-work
benefits at the second wave interview. As shown in Table 5.2, around three-in-ten of wave two
respondents said they were in receipt of these out-of-work benefits. In fact, 39 JSA clients said they
were in receipt of out-of-work benefits and in paid work of 16 hours or more, so we tested the
sensitivity of results to the exclusion of this group.
Table 5.10 Comparison of proportions claiming out-of-work benefits
twelve months after their claim for benefit for JSA clients, by
quintiles of predicted out-of-work benefit status for logit,
probit and OLS
Logit Probit OLS
M(2) M(6) M(2) M(6) M(2) M(6)
Q5 0.55 0.63 0.56 0.63 0.56 0.64
Q4 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.36
Q3 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.26
Q2 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.16
Q1 0.12 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.06
Note: all models run on 70 per cent sample and results based on 30 per cent validation sample
If ranked by quintile according to their actual wave two status, the proportions of JSA clients in Q5
would be 1.0, the proportion in Q4 would be .6, and the proportion in Q3-Q1 would be zero. Table
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5.10 compares the proportion of JSA clients claiming out-of-work benefits twelve months after their
claim for benefit, ranked according to their predicted probability of benefit receipt using logit, probit
and OLS Models (2) and (6). Depending on the model, 55-64 per cent of the highest quintile actually
go on to claim out-of-work benefit, compared with 6-12 per cent of those in the lowest quintile of
predicted probabilities. All models perform better than random allocation, where the proportion
claiming in each quintile would fluctuate around .32. The full models do a better job at ranking
individuals according to their future benefit status. There is little to choose between the performance
of the different functional forms.
Table 5.11 compares the predictive performance of the logit, probit and OLS using Models (2), (4) and
(6). Comparing across functional forms, the average differences in predicted outcomes are very small.
In each case, the most parsimonious model, M(2), performs reasonably well; there are no gains
moving from M(2) to M(4), but the fullest model performs best. These average differences are similar
to those for the equivalent out-of-work labour market status models reported in Table 5.4.
Table 5.11 Differences in proportion predicted to receive out-of-work
benefits, by quintiles of the predicted probability
distribution, JSA clients
Logit Probit OLS
M(2) M(4) M(6) M(2) M(4) M(6) M(2) M(4) M(6)
T80%-B20% 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.39
T60%-B40% 0.34 0.34 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.38
T40%-B60% 0.37 0.38 0.43 0.37 0.37 0.42 0.34 0.35 0.40
T20%-B80% 0.43 0.44 0.50 0.42 0.43 0.48 0.39 0.39 0.44
Average dif. 0.36 0.36 0.41 0.36 0.36 0.40 0.35 0.36 0.40
Note: models with 24 area dummies; T=top, B=bottom; estimation sample=2232; validation sample = 956
Using the average difference criterion, Table 5.12 compares the performance of the parsimonious
and full models for JSA clients and the sick and disabled. The first row is taken from the last row of
Table 5.11. Row 2 shows profiling JSA clients with models designed for the sick and disabled reduces
performance marginally. Row 3 replicates the average differences from the sick and disabled models
presented in Table 3.11. Using parsimonious models, average differences are greater for the JSA
clients than they are for the sick and disabled, but average differences are a little larger for the sick and
disabled when using the full models.
Table 5.12 Comparison of average differences in predicted out-of-work
probabilities
Logit Probit OLS
M(2) M(6) M(2) M(6) M(2) M(6)
Average differences for preferred JSA client models .36 .41 .36 .40 .35 .40
Average differences for JSA clients with sick
and disabled model specification .34 .40 .34 .40 .34 .40
Average differences for sick and disabled .32 .43 .32 .43 .32 .43
Table C.3 presents Models (1) – (6) using the logit estimator to illustrate which variables in the models
have a significant impact predicting out-of-work benefit status twelve months after their claim for
benefit. Effects differ in a number of ways from those presented in Table C.2 for out-of-work labour
market status. Being female, being white, the age of the youngest child, regular income other than
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benefits and earnings, time spent unemployed in the two years pre-ONE, and experience working
part-time in the two years prior to ONE are no longer significant. Other effects are attenuated: for
instance, the negative effects of age are confined to being aged 20 – 24 years in Models (1) to (4).
Other factors are significant in estimating out-of-work benefit status that were not significant in
estimating out-of-work labour market status. These include the positive effects of numeracy
problems, renting privately, living in an institution, cohabitation, and the negative effects of illness
and education in the two years pre-ONE. So, as was the case with the sick and disabled, JSA clients’
determinants of benefit status differ somewhat from the determinants of labour market status.
Table 5.13 shows how good the profiling models are at targeting treatment on those who go on to
claim out-of-work benefits twelve months after their claim for benefit. The results are based on logit
Models (2) and (6) and are thus comparable to those presented for out-of-work labour market status
in Table 5.6. The correct prediction rates (column 1) for benefit receipt are better than those for labour
market status at the 70 per cent cut-off, but they are worse than the labour market status predictions
at the 30 per cent cut-off. Whatever the cut-off, wrong treatment rates are higher for the benefit
status than labour market status (column 3 in both tables) but wrong denial rates are lower (column
4 in both tables).
Table 5.13 Success in targeting treatment at different cut-offs for
treatment allocation using out-of-work benefit receipt
probabilities twelve months after their claim for benefit
Correctly Correctly Wrongly Wrongly
predicted treated denied treated
30% cut
M(2) 51 27 4 45
M(6) 54 28 3 44
50% cut
M(2) 62 23 8 31
M(6) 67 25 6 28
70% cut
M(2) 69 16 15 16
M(6) 73 18 13 15
Note: treatment allocation in validation sample. 30 per cent cut = OOW benefit receipt prediction at 30th percentile (so
70 per cent treated); 50 per cent cut = OOW benefit receipt prediction at 50th percentile (so 50 per cent treated); 70 per
cent cut = OOW benefit receipt prediction at 70th percentile (so 30 per cent treated). Wrongly treated means false
positive. Wrongly denied means false negative. Predictions based on logit model.
Correct prediction rates are sensitive to the cut-off point used, as they are for the sick and disabled.
However – as in the case of the out-of-work labour market status discussed above – the correct
prediction rate rises as the target group for the treatment narrows, with the correct prediction rate
highest with a 70 per cent cut-off. This contrasts with the sick and disabled (Table 3.12) where correct
prediction rates were highest with the 30 per cent cut-off. Comparing absolute correct prediction
rates for JSA clients and the sick and disabled, the sick and disabled models outperform those for the
JSA clients at the 30 per cent cut-off, but profiling is more accurate for JSA clients than sick and
disabled clients at the 70 per cent cut-off. A comparison of Tables 3.12 and 5.13 also reveals a lower
wrong denial rate among JSA clients compared with the sick and disabled, but a higher wrong
treatment rate and lower correct treatment rate, whatever the cut-off level. This last finding echoes
that for the analysis of labour market out-of-work status.
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Table 5.14 Prediction rates at different cut-offs for treatment allocation
using out-of-work benefit receipt probabilities twelve
months after their claim for benefit
30% cut 50% cut 70% cut
Percentage all predictions wrong 47 34 28
Percentage all negative predictions wrong 11 13 19
Percentage all positive predictions wrong 61 54 44
Percentage in work wrongly treated 64 41 20
Percentage out of work correctly treated 90 81 58
Notes: prediction rates in validation sample based on M(6) results presented in Table 5.13
Table 5.14 presents the information in Table 5.13 in a slightly different way. Row 1 shows the wrong
prediction rate falls as treatment becomes more targeted, the decline being more pronounced than
in the case of out-of-work labour market status (Table 5.7). The percentage of negative predictions
that are wrong is considerably lower than in the case of out-of-work labour market status (row 2 in
Tables 5.14 and 5.7), and only rises a little with more targeted treatment. However, the percentage
of positive predictions that are wrong (which falls with more targeted treatment) is higher than in the
case of out-of-work labour market status (row 3). The percentage in work who are wrongly treated
(row 4) is a little higher than in the case of out-of-work labour market status, whereas the percentage
out of work who are correctly treated is higher.
Sensitivity tests revealed the following:
• The exclusion of the 39 clients claiming out-of-work benefits and working 16 or more hours per
week made little difference to the predictive accuracy of the models as measured in average
differences and correct prediction rates.
• The addition of ward-level deprivation indices has no effect on the predictive accuracy of the
models.
• Models run on claimants only (that is, those saying they were in receipt of one or more out-of-
work benefits at wave one) performed a little better than the full sample models, raising average
differences by one percentage point with the parsimonious model and three percentage points
with the full model. Correct prediction rates also rose by one to two percentage points, except
for the full model at the 30 per cent cut-off where correct prediction rates were identical.
• Running the analysis on a random 80 per cent of the sample and validating it on a 20 per cent
random sample had little effect on the profiling diagnostics.
• Splitting the sample by age, profiling performs better for JSA clients aged 35+ relative to those
aged under 35. Average differences are three percentage points higher with the parsimonious
model, and six percentage points higher with the full model. With the 30 per cent cut-off,
correct prediction rates were two percentage points higher with the parsimonious model and
five percentage points higher with the full model. At the 70 per cent cut-off the differentials
were six and four percentage points respectively.
• Splitting the sample by gender, average differences are four percentage points higher for samples
run on women compared to men. However, although correct prediction rates are a little higher
for women at the 70 per cent cut-off, they are lower with a 30 per cent cut-off.
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We can infer the following from the analysis presented above:
• The predictive power of profiling models for out-of-work benefit status twelve months after
their claim for benefit was similar to that for out-of-work labour market status twelve months
after their claim for benefit: average differences were similar and, whereas correct prediction
rates were better for the out-of-work labour market status with a 30 per cent cut-off, they were
better for out-of-work benefit status at the 70 per cent cut-off.
• Determinants of benefit and out-of-work status differed in a number of respects, and the JSA
models predict better for the JSA clients than the sick and disabled models, confirming the need
to develop dedicated profiling tools for different client groups and across outcomes.
• Results were broadly similar when performing sensitivity tests, although there were differences
in performance when separate models were run by age and gender.
5.3.3 Time claiming out-of-work benefits after ONE
This section analyses the percentage of time JSA clients spent on out-of-work benefits between ONE
eligibility and 31 December 2002. All JSA clients became eligible for ONE between 27 May and 30
June 2000, so the percentage is calculated over a period of around two and a half years.
Table 5.15 Percentage of time spent claiming out-of-work benefits
between ONE eligibility and 31 December 2002, by
quintiles of predicted time claiming benefits OLS and tobit
OLS Tobit
Distribution in the data M(2) M(4) M(6) M(2) M(4) M(6)
Q5 .79 .42 .43 .43 .42 .43 .43
Q4 .40 .39 .37 .36 .38 .37 .36
Q3 .21 .31 .32 .32 .32 .33 .32
Q2 .09 .25 .23 .25 .24 .22 .25
Q1 .01 .19 .20 .21 .20 .21 .21
Note: all models run on 70 per cent sample (N=3,121) and results based on 30 per cent validation sample (N=1,337)
There is bunching at the bottom end of this continuous variable, with 431 of the 4,458 JSA clients
successfully matched to the benefit data spending none of their time since ONE eligibility on out-of-
work benefits. We test the sensitivity of our profiling on this outcome to the OLS and tobit functions,
the latter taking account of the bunching of observations at the lower bound of the dependent
variable.
Table 5.15 shows the percentage of time JSA clients spent claiming out-of-work benefits between
ONE eligibility and 31 December 2002. The overall mean time spent on out-of-work benefits in the
data is 30 per cent. If ranked according to the actual time spent claiming in the raw data, those in the
top quintile spent around four-fifths of their time claiming out-of-work benefits (column 1). This falls
by a half to 40 per cent in Q4, halves again to 21 per cent in Q3, and again to nine per cent in Q2. Those
in the lowest quintile spend virtually no time (one per cent) claiming.
Ranking clients according to their predicted percentage of time on out-of-work benefits since ONE
eligibility, the mean percentage of time on benefit among the highest quintile is 42 – 43 per cent
(depending on the model), compared with 20 – 21 per cent among those in the lowest quintile. This
2:1 ratio between the top and the bottom quintiles is similar to that found for the sick and disabled and
lone mothers (Tables 3.14 and 4.14 respectively). Where clients are randomly assigned to quintiles,
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the mean percentage of time on benefits fluctuates around 30 per cent, so profiling performs better
than random allocation of treatment. There is nothing to choose between the performance of the
OLS and tobit estimators in terms of their ability to rank the validation sample by their actual benefit
outcome. As in the case of the lone mothers, the full models perform no better than the middling and
parsimonious models in ranking JSA clients by their future benefit outcomes.
Table 5.16 compares the predictive performance of the OLS and tobit using Models (2), (4) and (6). It
presents differences in the average predicted time on out-of-work benefits between the top and the
bottom of the distribution of predicted percentage of time claiming.
Comparing the average differences in predicted outcomes across functional forms, the OLS estimator
outperforms the tobit estimator for all three models. The predictive power of the models is not driven
by ‘success’ in any particular part of the distribution. Comparing the average differences in predicted
outcomes across OLS Models (2), (4) and (6), the most parsimonious model performs reasonably well,
but there are small gains moving from (2) to (6).
Table 5.16 Differences in percentage of time spent claiming out-of-work
benefits between ONE eligibility and 31 December 2002, by
quintiles of predicted distribution
OLS Tobit
M(2) M(4) M(6) M(2) M(4) M(6)
T80%-B20% 16.2 16.4 17.7 14.2 14.2 15.3
T60%-B40% 15.8 15.9 17.1 14.3 14.3 15.2
T40%-B60% 16.1 16.4 17.3 14.9 15.2 16.0
T20%-B80% 17.3 18.1 19.1 16.4 17.1 18.1
Average difference 16.4 16.7 17.8 14.9 15.2 16.1
Note: all models run on 70 per cent sample (N=3,121) and results based on 30 per cent validation sample (N=1,337);
T=top; B=bottom
Table C.4 presents Models (1) – (6) using the OLS estimator to illustrate which variables in the models
are statistically significant. The bullet points below compare results with those for identical OLS
models (not shown) estimating the probability of being in receipt of out-of-work benefits twelve
months after their claim for benefit. The commentary focuses on results that differ from those
discussed in the analysis of wave two benefit receipt. It is clear that there are a number of differences
between the two models:
• Gender: being a woman had no effect on benefit receipt twelve months after their claim for
benefit, but it was associated with a lower percentage of time spent on out-of-work benefits
through to December 2002.
• Age: in Models (1) to (4), those aged 20 – 24 had lower probabilities of benefit receipt twelve
months after their claim for benefit than JSA clients aged under-20, whereas age was not significant
in estimating time spent on out-of-work benefits.
• Qualifications: degree-level qualifications reduced time on benefits in Models (1) and (2), but this
was the only qualifications effect. Yet qualifications at A-level or above were associated with
lower probabilities of claiming out-of-work benefits twelve months after their claim for benefit
across all models.
• Numeracy problems: numeracy problems had no significant effect on time spent claiming, but
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they raised the probability of receiving out-of-work benefits twelve months after their claim for
benefit in Models (1) to (4).
• Marital status: those who were married or cohabiting at wave one had a lower probability of
out-of-work benefit receipt twelve months after their claim for benefit, but their marital status
was not significant for time spent claiming out-of-work benefits.
• Housing tenure: renting from the local authority or a housing association was associated with
spending more time on out-of-work benefits in all models, whereas housing association renting
was not associated with benefit status twelve months after their claim for benefit. Conversely,
private renting and living in an institution were both associated with higher probabilities of
benefit receipt twelve months after their claim for benefit, whereas private renting only increased
percentage of time claiming in Model (4). ‘Other’ tenure status was associated with a higher
percentage of time on benefits, but not with wave two benefit status.
• Benefit claiming in the two years pre-ONE: receipt of both out-of-work and in-work benefits
over the pre-ONE period increased the time spent claiming out-of-work benefits but was not
associated with benefit status twelve months after their claim for benefit.
• Time in paid work pre-ONE: more time in full-time paid work in the two years pre-ONE reduced
the probability of benefit claiming twelve months after their claim for benefit, but it was not
associated with the percentage of time claiming through to December 2002.
• Pre-ONE job: lower occupational status was strongly associated with spending more time on out-
of-work benefits but, with the exception of having no job pre-ONE, occupational effects were
not significantly associated with benefit status twelve months after their claim for benefit.
• Health: illness in the two years pre-ONE lowered the probability of out-of-work benefit receipt
twelve months after their claim for benefit but was positively associated with percentage of time
claiming out-of-work benefits. The positive association between poor general health and benefit
claiming was more strongly associated with time spent claiming. Whereas having a long-standing
illness that did not affect work lowered benefit receipt probabilities twelve months after their
claim for benefit, it was not significant for time on benefits.
• Telephone: having a telephone lowered the probability of being on out-of-work benefits twelve
months after their claim for benefit but it wasn’t significant in estimating time on out-of-work
benefits.
• Work attitudes: although positive work attitudes lowered benefit probabilities twelve months
after their claim for benefit they were not significant in reducing time spent on benefits over the
longer term.
• ONE: time spent claiming was lower in the control for Basic ONE than it was in the Basic ONE
areas, whereas ONE status did not affect benefit status twelve months after their claim for
benefit.
Table 5.17 indicates the significance of variables, and the direction of effects, across all three
outcomes for JSA clients, summarising the models in Appendix C. Although the similarities are
notable there are clear differences – especially in the effects on wave two benefit status and the
percentage of time spent claiming over the two and a half years since ONE eligibility. These need to be
borne in mind in constructing profiling models.
Table 5.18 shows the accuracy of profiling based on the OLS profiling tool. Correct prediction rates
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(column 1) for the 30 per cent cut-off are much better than those for the wave two benefit status
models reported in Table 5.13. Correct prediction rates are not particularly sensitive to the cut-off
rate. Regardless of the cut-off, correct prediction rates are lower than in the case of the sick and
disabled: the difference is particularly marked at the 50 per cent cut-off, but at the 70 per cent cut-off
the differential is only one to two percentage points. There are two features of Table 5.18 which are
surprising in the light of the analyses presented to date. First, the wrong treatment and wrong denial
rates change very little with cut-offs and model specification. Second, the parsimonious models
actually outperform the full models by one to two percentage points.
Table 5.19 presents the information in Table 4.17 in a different way. JSA clients’ wrong prediction rate
fell with more targeted treatment when profiling with benefit status twelve months after their claim
for benefit (Table 5.14, row 1). This pattern is not apparent for time spent on out-of-work benefits
(row 1). In contrast to the findings for benefit status twelve months after their claim for benefit
presented in Table 5.14, the percentage of all negative predictions that are wrong falls with more
targeted treatment (row 2) and the percentage of all positive predictions that are wrong rises (row 3).
Row 4 uses as its base the clients whose actual time on benefits is below the rate entitling them to
treatment. In 59 per cent of these cases, their predicted time on benefit is higher than the 30 per cent
cut-off, resulting in unnecessary treatment. This figure falls progressively with more targeted
treatment, as in the case of the sick and disabled. Row 5 uses as its base the clients whose actual time
on benefits is above the rate entitling them to treatment. With a 30 per cent cut-off, three-quarters
of these clients are actually treated, but this falls to 43 per cent with a 70 per cent cut-off.
Table 5.17 Guide to significance of variables in JSA models
Percentage time
Without a job On OOW benefit claiming,
at wave 2 at wave 2 ONE-31/12/02
Age (ref: <20 yrs) - if 20-24 or 40-44 - if 20-24 yrs ns
Woman - ns -
White - ns ns
Qualifications (ref: none) - - - if degree
Numeracy problems ns + ns
Housing tenure + if private or
(ref: owner occupation) + if renting from local authority renter, + if renting or
local authority or if living in institution ‘other’ tenure
Marital status (ref: single) - married - married or cohabiting ns
Age of youngest child (ref: < 3 yrs) - 3-4 yrs ns ns
Benefit history in 2 yrs pre-ONE + if OOW benefit
or both OOW and
+ if OOW benefit + if OOW benefit in-work benefits
% time working 16+ hrs in
2 yrs pre-ONE - if >66% - if > 66% ns
% time working <16 hrs in
2 yrs pre-ONE - if >50% ns ns
Net wage in pre-ONE job
(ref: < £110 pw) - if £150-254 - if £185-254 + if £150-184
Social class in pre-ONE job
(ref: professional, intermediate) - if no job pre-ONE - if no job pre-ONE + if no job, unskilled, part-
skilled, skilled manual
Any unemployment in 2 yrs pre-ONE + ns ns
Any sickness in 2 yrs pre-ONE ns ns ns
Continued
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Table 5.17 Continued
Percentage time
Without a job On OOW benefit claiming,
at wave 2 at wave 2 ONE-31/12/02
Any illness in 2 yrs pre-ONE ns - +
Any education in 2 yrs pre-ONE ns - +
TTWA benefit stocks and flows ns - as unemployment rises + as % disability benefits rises
General health (ref: good) + if poor + if poor + if poor or fair
Long-standing illness (ref: none) - if says LSI does not - if says LSI does not ns
affect work affect work
Care responsibilities (ref: none) + if affects work + if affects work ns
Receives child support payments ns ns -
Telephone - - ns
Licence (ref: no licence,
no vehicle access) - if licence and access - if licence and access - if licence and access
Number of household workers
(ref: none) - if 2+ household workers - if one or more household workers ns
Other regular income except
benefits/wages (ref: none) + ns ns
Attitudes to working
(ref: very negative) - - ns
Notes: (1) +/- denote positive and negative significant effects at 95 per cent confidence level or above in at least one of the
parsimonious, middling or full models. ns denotes non-significance (2) Variables that are never significant are excluded
from this table (3) Area dummies and ONE pilot dummies were generally not significant (4) Full tables are in Appendix C
Table 5.18 Success in targeting treatment at different cut-offs for
treatment allocation using predicted percentage of time
claiming out-of-work benefits between ONE eligibility and
31 December 2002
Correctly Correctly Wrongly Wrongly
predicted treated denied treated
30% cut
M(2) 68 55 16 16
M(6) 66 54 17 17
50% cut
M(2) 63 32 19 19
M(6) 62 32 19 19
70% cut
M(2) 66 13 17 17
M(6) 65 13 17 17
Note: treatment allocation in validation sample. 30 per cent cut = time on OOW benefit prediction at 30th percentile (so
70 per cent treated); 50 per cent cut = time on OOW benefit prediction at 50th percentile (so 50 per cent treated); 70
per cent cut = time on OOW benefit prediction at 70th percentile (so 30 per cent treated). Wrongly treated means false
positive. Wrongly denied means false negative. Predictions based on OLS model.
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Table 5.19 Prediction rates at different cut-offs for treatment allocation
using predicted percentage of time on out-of-work benefits,
ONE eligibility – 31 December 2002
30% cut 50% cut 70% cut
Percentage all predictions wrong 34 38 35
Percentage all negative predictions wrong 59 39 24
Percentage all positive predictions wrong 24 37 57
Percentage those with time on benefits below cut-off
who are wrongly treated 59 39 24
Percentage those with time on benefits above cut-off
who are correctly treated 76 63 43
Notes: prediction rates in validation sample based on M(6) results presented in Table 57
We can draw the following inferences from the analysis presented above:
• Profiling outperforms random allocation of the treatment because the models are good at ranking
individuals according to the percentage of time they spend claiming out-of-work benefits.
• Whereas average differences in predicted outcomes indicate there are small gains to be made in
profiling with the ‘full’ model, correct prediction rates indicate there are no gains to more extensive
models, whichever of our three cut-off points is used to target treatment.
• The OLS estimator marginally outperforms the tobit estimator.
• Influences on early and later benefit outcomes differ.
• There are no unambiguous advantages to using percentage of time spent claiming rather than
wave two benefit status as the profiling variable: the relative performance of profiling on these
two outcomes using identical models differs with the cut-off point chosen to allocate treatment.
With a 30 per cent cut-off the correct prediction rate is higher when using percentage of time
spent claiming, but profiling based on wave two benefit status results in better profiling with a
70 per cent cut-off.
• With the exception of point 2, these findings reflect the conclusions drawn from the analysis of
the sick and disabled.
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6 Conclusions
• Profiling outperforms the random allocation of treatments but wrong denial and wrong treatment
rates are not trivial.
• Whether statistical profiling performs accurately enough for policy purposes is a subjective
judgement.
• It would be useful to compare the accuracy rates of statistical profiling with those achieved
through PA discretion and the application of deterministic rules.
• The accuracy of profiling turns on the distribution of the outcome variable, the proportion of the
client group eligible for treatment, and the variables available to predict the outcome.
• Profiling accuracy rates are at least as good, if not better, for the sick and disabled client group as
they are for lone mothers and JSA clients.
This study illustrates the performance of profiling in allocating treatment for three DWP client groups:
the sick and disabled, lone parents and JSA clients. It does so for three outcomes – being out of work
roughly a year after enquiring about a new claim, receiving out-of-work benefits roughly a year later,
and percentage of time on out-of-work benefits between ONE eligibility and 31 December 2002,
some 30 or so months later. In this concluding chapter we bring together the main results from the
study and draw out some practical implications.
6.1 Results
6.1.1 Profiling performs better than random allocation
This is a low hurdle to overcome and the wrong prediction rates are not trivial. Deadweight –
individuals identified as needing treatment who, in fact, go on to do well without treatment – is
particularly acute where treatment eligibility is wide (column 2 of Table 6.1). The denial of treatment
to those who, it turns out, need it, is a greater problem where a smaller percentage of the client group
are eligible for treatment (column 3). We do not know how accurate profiling is relative to caseworker
discretion or the application of deterministic rules. Nor can we tell from the exercise in this study
whether profiling in the field will result in higher or lower accuracy rates than those presented here.
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6.1.2 The accuracy of profiling
The accuracy of profiling turns on three factors:
• the distribution of the outcome variable;
• the proportion of the client group eligible for treatment;
• the variables available to predict the outcome variable.
Profiling is accurate when predicted probabilities of the outcome allow clients to be ranked according
to their actual subsequent labour market and benefit experiences. Where there is severe bunching in
the distribution of an outcome – for example, where only a small proportion of clients move off out-
of-work benefits in a given period – this can make profiling difficult because modelling usually
performs better where there is reasonable variance in the outcome. However, we find this is not
always the case: correct prediction rates are not necessarily higher just because we use the
percentage of time claiming rather than benefit status a year after ONE entry. For example, with a 70
per cent cut-off, the correct prediction rate for JSA clients is 73 per cent where the outcome is benefit
status and wave two, but only 65 per cent where it is the percentage of time claiming out-of-work
benefits (see the last column in Table 6.1).
The proportion of the client group eligible for treatment is also vital because it determines the ‘cut-off’
point for predicted probabilities above which clients will be prioritised for treatment. The relationship
between the distribution of predicted outcomes and the chosen ‘cut-off’ is a crucial determinant of
profiling accuracy. The final column in Table 6.1 shows that, in most cases, correct prediction rates are
lower where the eligible group is smaller (that is, where the 70 per cent cut-off is used rather than the
30 per cent cut-off). This is because, as eligibility for treatment is narrowed, the rise in the percentage
of clients wrongly denied treatment tends to outweigh the reduction in the percentage of clients
wrongly treated. However, this is not always so. In the case of JSA clients, correct prediction rates are
higher where eligibility is narrower because the drop in the percentage wrongly treated outweighs
the rise in the percentage wrongly denied treatment.
Comparisons of predictive accuracy using parsimonious and fuller models indicate that profiling with
a relatively small set of covariates can produce reasonable results. However, this can usually be
improved upon with a larger set of covariates. We find that, although a greater number of covariates
does not guarantee more accurate profiling – and, in some cases, secures no improvements at all – our
‘fuller’ models tend to perform better than the most parsimonious models. This is because they
contain important information on issues such as work attitudes, caring responsibilities, other
household workers and health indicators that prove to be important predictors of outcomes for our
three client groups. In our data, some of the variables such as work attitudes are actually collected
some time after making an approach to the Department about benefit claiming, so that they may be
a function of the claiming process itself. However, it is likely that, if such data were collected at the
outset, they would prove to be useful profiling variables.
Although there were many similarities, the influences on our three profiling outcomes differed
somewhat, suggesting different outcomes merit different profiling models.
Less important in determining the accuracy of profiling is the functional form of the estimator used.
Logit, probit and OLS estimators were tested for predictions of (0,1) outcomes, and OLS and tobit
models were estimated for the percentage of time spent claiming. Although there is little to choose
between them, the logit estimator performed at least as well as the others for binary outcomes, while
to OLS tended to outperform the tobit for continuous outcomes.
85
Table 6.1 Profiling accuracy across client groups and profiling
outcomes
Percentage Percentage Percentage
wrongly treated wrongly denied correctly predicted
Sick and disabled:
OOW W2:
30% cut-off 14 12 74
70% cut-off 2 39 58
OOW benefit W2:
30% cut-off 14 10 76
70% cut-off 3 38 59
Percentage time OOW benefit:
30% cut-off 12 12 76
70% cut-off 10 21 69
Lone mothers:
OOW W2:
30% cut-off 12 15 73
70% cut-off 3 46 51
OOW benefit W2:
30% cut-off 15 11 74
70% cut-off 4 40 56
Percentage time OOW benefit:
30% cut-off 15 15 70
70% cut-off 14 20 66
JSA clients:
OOW W2:
30% cut-off 34 5 61
70% cut-off 11 22 67
OOW benefit W2:
30% cut-off 44 3 54
70% cut-off 15 13 73
Percentage time OOW benefit:
30% cut-off 17 17 66
70% cut-off 17 17 65
Notes: (1) Table summarises Model (6) results presented in the main body of the paper (2) OOW W2 means out-of-work
labour market status at wave two survey interview; OOW benefit W2 means in receipt of one or more out-of-work
benefits at wave two survey interview; percentage time OOW benefit is the percentage of time claiming out-of-work
benefits between ONE eligibility and 31 December 2002. (3) Percentages are row percentages. Where they do not add
to 100 this is due to rounding.
6.1.3 Devising models for specific client groups
The accuracy of profiling differs across client groups for a number of reasons. One is the differences
in labour market and benefit claiming activity. JSA clients exhibit much greater attachment to the
labour market than the sick and disabled and lone mothers. So, for example, over the period between
ONE eligibility and the end of December 2002, JSA clients spent far less time claiming out-of-work
benefits than the other two client groups (Table 6.2).
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Table 6.2 Time spent claiming out-of-work benefits, ONE – 31
December 2002
Sick and Lone JSA
disabled mothers clients
Mean percentage time 70 67 30
Percentage spending all time 46 35 2
These differences in the distributions of outcomes can affect profiling accuracy, as discussed above.
But we also show that profiling is more accurate when models are devised specifically for the client
group, rather than using a profiling model devised for another client group. In some cases profiling
accuracy increases when separate profiling models are devised for sub-groups within a client group,
such as younger and older clients and men and women. But, in general, the gains from running
profiling on sub-groups are small.
6.2 Some practical implications and future research
The study presents conclusive evidence that profiling outperforms random allocation of treatment,
but wrong denial and wrong treatment rates are not trivial. However, it is difficult to judge whether
the prediction rates reported here are sufficiently accurate to merit profiling as a resource allocation
tool because we need to be able to compare success rates under profiling with those achieved
through Personal Adviser discretion or the application of deterministic rules. Success rates for these
alternative resource allocation mechanisms are not available. What we can say is that the data
available for profiling make a substantial difference to the performance of profiling models. Fuller
models performed better than parsimonious models, but how well fuller models perform depends on
what is in those models. Variables that proved highly predictive of outcomes included benefit and
work histories. These were only available to us in survey data form, and it is conceivable that
administrative information on these matters would be the basis for better profiling. There is clearly a
case for incorporating subjective information from clients. In our case, this was only available three to
four months after ONE eligibility. If collected at the outset, information on work attitudes, perceived
health status and care responsibilities may prove powerful indicators of what is likely to happen to
clients in future.
As well as the comparison with alternative allocation methods, a number of other issues remained
unresolved. Is statistical profiling a feasible option given the practical and ethical issues it raises? If so,
what is the best way to implement profiling (who should do the profiling, using what data, and to
what purpose)? How accurately could one predict benefit and labour market outcomes for new
claims with data currently available? What resources should be devoted to the collection of additional
information at the new claim interview to improve profiling?
In the longer term, if profiling is considered viable, further attention should be paid to:
• external validation of profiling models using a range of data sets;
• re-estimation of profiling models over real time and the business cycle;
• whether treatments have homogeneous or heterogeneous effects;
• the counterfactual: if profiling is introduced, will it lower average benefit durations or not? This
depends on the appropriateness of treatment for those selected on profiling, and the response
of the non-selected to non-treatment.
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Appendix A
Models for sick and disabled
clients
Table A.1 Guide to meaning of variable names used in the analyses for
the sick and disabled
The list of variables and abbreviations used in the models for the sick and disabled (the reference
categories are in bold).
Variable Abbreviation
Gender- female * fem
Age of respondent:
- 18-24 age1824
- 25-29 age2529
- 30-34 age3034
- 35-39 age3539
- 40-44 age4044
- 45-49 age4549
- 50-54 age5054
- 55-60 age5560
Marital status:
- single single
- married married
- cohabiting cohab
- widowed widowed
- divorced divorced
- separated separ
Continued
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Table A.1 Continued
Variable Abbreviation
Highest academic qualification obtained:
- None or no information noqual
- degree or equivalent degree
- above A level-below degree abovea
- A level or equivalent alev
- GCSE A-C level or equivalent gcseac
- GCSE D-E level or equivalnt gcsede
- Foreign or other foreign
Number of dependent children:
- one onedkid
- none nodkid
- two twodkid
- three or more thrpdkid
Ethnicity – white* white
Possesses telephone * phoner
Licence and car/cycle access:
- has no licence nolic
- has licence but no car/cycle access licnoveh
- has both licandv
Long-standing illness disability:
- does not have lsino
- yes but has no affect on ability to work lsinoaff
- yes and affects ability to work lsiaff
- no information lsidk
Mental disability* mentdis
General health perceived:
- not good ghnotg
- good ghgood
- fair ghfair
Numeracy problems* num
Literacy problems* litr
Housing tenure:
- owner-occupation ownocc
- LA sector rentla
- HA sector rentha
- PRS rentpriv
- other tenoth
- institutions tenin
Any time in last 2 years spent:*
- unemployed anyunemr
- temporary sick/disabled anyillr
- long-term sick/disabled anysickr
- in training anytrair
- in education anyeducr
- in other activity anyothr
Number of workers in household excluding respondent:
- none hhwker0
- one hhwker1
- two or more hhwker2p
Continued
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Table A.1 Continued
Variable Abbreviation
Social class in last job before entry date:
- professional or intermediate profint
- skilled non-manual worker skillnm
- skilled manual worker skillman
- partly skilled manual partskil
- unskilled manual unskill
- no job or Armed Forces nojarmed
Proportion of time working 1-15 hrs per week in 2 years pre – ONE:
- no time pr150
- up to half time pr15150
- over half time pr1550p
Proportion of time working 16+ hrs per week in 2 years pre – ONE:
- no time pr160
- up to 33% time pr16133
- 34%-66% time pr163466
- 67% to 99% time pr166799
- all of time pr16100
- No information pr16dk
In receipt of benefits in 2 yr pre-ONE:
- none nobben
- out of work benefits only oowbben
- in – work benefits only inwbben
- both oow and in work benefits bothbben
Net pay per week in pre-ONE job:
- <£100 pw npu100
- £100-£139 pw np100139
- £140-189 pw np140189
- £190-249 pw np190249
- £250+ pw np250p
- no job or no information npdk
24 benefit/model type areas
- benefit area 1 _Ibenarea_1
- benefit areas 2-24 _ibenarea_
6 benefit/model type area
- Basic/ONE basicone
- Basic/Control basiccon
- Call Centre/ONE callone
- Call Centre/Control callcon
- PVS/ONE pvsone
- PVS/Control pvscon
Care responsibilities
- yes and affects work careaff
- yes but doesn’t affect work carenaff
- no responsibility or no information nocare
Continued
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Table A.1 Continued
Variable Abbreviation
TTWA characteristics
The unemployment rate in 1999 uerate99
The change in the unemployment rate (comparing the rate in January to March 1999
with the rate in January to March 2000) uechange
The total number of claimants of Incapacity Benefit, Disability Living Allowance,
Severe Disablement Allowance, and Income Support claimed with a Disability Premium
expressed as a proportion of the total workforce disabpc
The change in the disability total as a percentage of the workforce, comparing February 2000
and May 2000 chansick
Lone parents claiming Income Support (without a Disability Premium) as a proportion of the total workforce lonepc
The change in this proportion between February 2000 and May 2000 chanlp
Attitude towards work
- very negative wavneg
- fairly negative wafneg
- middling wamid
- fairly positive wafpos
- very positive wavpos
Date of entry to ONE dssdate
* These dummy variables are equal to 1 if true and 0 otherwise
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Table A.2 Sick and disabled logistic regressions estimating whether
out of work at wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob
fem 0.258 0.270 0.158 0.161 0.200 0.208
(2.19)* (2.25)* (1.13) (1.13) (1.32) (1.34)
age2529 0.335 0.352 0.301 0.299 0.368 0.346
(1.32) (1.39) (1.13) (1.12) (1.20) (1.12)
age3034 0.078 0.117 0.097 0.127 -0.027 -0.045
(0.31) (0.47) (0.37) (0.48) (0.09) (0.15)
age3539 0.280 0.262 0.314 0.282 0.221 0.160
(1.11) (1.03) (1.15) (1.02) (0.72) (0.51)
age4044 0.369 0.376 0.398 0.394 0.329 0.304
(1.53) (1.51) (1.50) (1.44) (1.13) (1.01)
age4549 0.532 0.601 0.530 0.588 0.485 0.546
(2.18)* (2.37)* (1.92) (2.07)* (1.55) (1.71)
age5054 0.905 0.973 0.912 0.989 0.903 0.998
(3.70)** (3.89)** (3.20)** (3.39)** (2.81)** (3.03)**
age5560 0.883 0.927 0.930 0.986 0.966 1.030
(3.45)** (3.56)** (3.13)** (3.25)** (2.85)** (3.00)**
white -0.388 -0.441 -0.365 -0.426 -0.411 -0.522
(1.47) (1.59) (1.34) (1.49) (1.43) (1.72)
degree -0.238 -0.261 -0.227 -0.248 -0.163 -0.199
(1.00) (1.09) (0.89) (0.97) (0.66) (0.78)
abovea -0.672 -0.711 -0.615 -0.662 -0.437 -0.480
(3.58)** (3.67)** (3.15)** (3.30)** (2.10)* (2.26)*
alev -0.574 -0.617 -0.561 -0.612 -0.455 -0.497
(2.75)** (2.91)** (2.61)** (2.78)** (1.95) (2.12)*
gcseac -0.355 -0.353 -0.307 -0.306 -0.152 -0.140
(2.22)* (2.20)* (1.86) (1.84) (0.86) (0.79)
gcsede -0.503 -0.453 -0.537 -0.484 -0.380 -0.312
(2.36)* (2.13)* (2.49)* (2.25)* (1.64) (1.33)
foreign -0.372 -0.423 -0.358 -0.409 -0.338 -0.400
(1.62) (1.83) (1.53) (1.74) (1.33) (1.54)
num 0.748 0.760 0.672 0.690 0.352 0.363
(2.65)** (2.61)** (2.36)* (2.36)* (1.14) (1.14)
litr 0.365 0.430 0.359 0.429 0.266 0.364
(1.46) (1.67) (1.40) (1.61) (1.00) (1.33)
rentla 0.695 0.719 0.699 0.738 0.342 0.399
(4.42)** (4.54)** (4.21)** (4.42)** (1.86) (2.14)*
rentha 0.296 0.361 0.294 0.361 0.033 0.075
(1.27) (1.52) (1.21) (1.46) (0.12) (0.29)
rentpriv 0.840 0.904 0.868 0.938 0.657 0.747
(4.02)** (4.24)** (4.00)** (4.27)** (2.78)** (3.07)**
tenoth 0.575 0.663 0.435 0.529 0.760 0.911
(3.06)** (3.41)** (1.97)* (2.35)* (2.93)** (3.46)**
tenin 0.741 0.843 0.504 0.619 -0.052 0.015
(1.07) (1.13) (0.77) (0.89) (0.07) (0.02)
oowbben 0.117 0.100 0.059 0.041 -0.144 -0.179
(0.67) (0.58) (0.32) (0.23) (0.74) (0.93)
inwbben -0.498 -0.548 -0.546 -0.605 -0.730 -0.805
(2.64)** (2.86)** (2.74)** (3.00)** (3.25)** (3.55)**
bothbben 0.198 0.153 0.171 0.115 -0.264 -0.290
(0.72) (0.56) (0.59) (0.40) (0.81) (0.90)
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Table A.2 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob
disabpc -0.017 -0.091 -0.018 -0.104 -0.002 -0.115
(0.87) (2.09)* (0.90) (2.30)* (0.08) (2.41)*
chansick 0.182 0.732 0.191 0.771 -0.011 0.688
(0.58) (1.86) (0.60) (1.91) (0.03) (1.46)
lonepc 0.085 0.332 0.093 0.341 0.116 0.417
(0.73) (1.94) (0.80) (2.01)* (0.89) (2.22)*
chanlp 0.465 0.762 0.454 0.820 0.778 1.059
(0.96) (1.31) (0.92) (1.38) (1.43) (1.61)
uerate99 0.010 -0.094 0.008 -0.087 -0.025 -0.119
(0.21) (1.12) (0.15) (1.02) (0.44) (1.26)
uechange -0.269 -0.467 -0.300 -0.523 -0.000 -0.120
(1.11) (1.46) (1.23) (1.63) (0.00) (0.34)
basiccon 0.694 0.683 0.720
(3.29)** (3.19)** (2.98)**
callone 0.328 0.293 0.377
(1.69) (1.49) (1.80)
callcon 0.117 0.070 0.163
(0.59) (0.35) (0.77)
pvsone 0.166 0.179 0.206
(0.86) (0.91) (1.00)
pvscon 0.690 0.694 0.725
(3.30)** (3.25)** (3.12)**
pr16133 -0.906 -0.943 -0.692 -0.702 -0.417 -0.432
(3.01)** (3.12)** (2.27)* (2.29)* (1.23) (1.28)
pr163466 -1.563 -1.552 -1.393 -1.369 -1.046 -1.012
(5.95)** (5.89)** (5.11)** (5.00)** (3.49)** (3.37)**
pr166799 -2.055 -2.091 -1.905 -1.928 -1.666 -1.689
(8.43)** (8.64)** (7.28)** (7.52)** (5.73)** (5.96)**
pr16100 -2.550 -2.573 -2.595 -2.588 -2.461 -2.472
(9.84)** (10.02)** (7.95)** (8.02)** (6.91)** (7.08)**
pr16dk -1.914 -1.886 -1.993 -1.947 -1.874 -1.841
(7.44)** (7.35)** (6.09)** (5.96)** (5.37)** (5.32)**
pr15150 0.518 0.541 0.406 0.401 0.589 0.583
(1.17) (1.17) (0.92) (0.88) (1.25) (1.22)
pr1550p -2.289 -2.355 -2.308 -2.359 -2.349 -2.380
(6.19)** (6.39)** (5.76)** (5.92)** (5.58)** (5.63)**
anyunemr -0.389 -0.351 -0.511 -0.451 -0.534 -0.486
(2.16)* (1.96) (2.31)* (2.03)* (2.27)* (2.10)*
_Ibenarea_2 0.439 0.345 0.317
(0.93) (0.72) (0.64)
_Ibenarea_3 1.532 1.540 1.679
(2.37)* (2.32)* (2.32)*
_Ibenarea_4 0.044 -0.161 -0.328
(0.10) (0.36) (0.70)
_Ibenarea_5 0.442 0.291 0.400
(0.90) (0.59) (0.76)
_Ibenarea_6 0.656 0.506 0.413
(1.31) (0.99) (0.78)
_Ibenarea_7 1.582 1.554 1.957
(2.59)** (2.47)* (2.87)**
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Table A.2 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob
_Ibenarea_8 0.754 0.653 0.633
(1.72) (1.45) (1.35)
_Ibenarea_9 0.265 0.142 0.045
(0.57) (0.30) (0.09)
_Ibenarea_10 1.449 1.476 1.669
(2.21)* (2.21)* (2.30)*
_Ibenarea_11 1.006 0.916 0.760
(2.22)* (2.00)* (1.61)
_Ibenarea_12 0.723 0.718 0.997
(1.35) (1.31) (1.75)
_Ibenarea_13 0.295 0.147 -0.193
(0.62) (0.31) (0.38)
_Ibenarea_14 0.663 0.533 0.664
(1.29) (1.02) (1.16)
_Ibenarea_15 2.506 2.442 2.711
(4.20)** (4.07)** (4.07)**
_Ibenarea_16 1.280 1.235 1.267
(2.72)** (2.57)* (2.53)*
_Ibenarea_17 0.153 -0.034 -0.008
(0.31) (0.07) (0.01)
_Ibenarea_18 0.628 0.476 0.570
(1.35) (1.01) (1.15)
_Ibenarea_19 0.715 0.593 0.484
(1.45) (1.19) (0.95)
_Ibenarea_20 0.583 0.425 0.603
(1.21) (0.86) (1.18)
_Ibenarea_21 1.047 0.954 0.869
(2.21)* (2.00)* (1.75)
_Ibenarea_22 1.337 1.369 1.446
(2.35)* (2.34)* (2.35)*
_Ibenarea_23 1.918 1.830 2.126
(3.39)** (3.18)** (3.42)**
_Ibenarea_24 1.565 1.446 1.749
(2.76)** (2.50)* (2.64)**
married -0.183 -0.199 0.030 0.003
(0.92) (0.98) (0.13) (0.01)
cohab -0.412 -0.433 -0.261 -0.285
(1.65) (1.69) (0.92) (1.00)
widowed -0.745 -0.860 -0.875 -0.979
(1.66) (1.98)* (2.01)* (2.25)*
divorced -0.325 -0.331 -0.519 -0.548
(1.45) (1.45) (2.20)* (2.25)*
separ 0.149 0.141 -0.047 -0.050
(0.49) (0.46) (0.14) (0.15)
nodkid -0.207 -0.248 -0.392 -0.473
(1.09) (1.29) (1.95) (2.29)*
twodkid -0.455 -0.469 -0.490 -0.537
(2.07)* (2.11)* (2.09)* (2.23)*
thrpdkid -0.270 -0.264 -0.106 -0.108
(0.91) (0.90) (0.32) (0.33)
anyillr -0.089 -0.085 -0.317 -0.336
(0.44) (0.41) (1.44) (1.51)
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Table A.2 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob
anysickr 0.056 0.111 -0.404 -0.338
(0.16) (0.33) (1.12) (0.94)
anytrair 0.313 0.249 0.499 0.475
(0.66) (0.53) (0.99) (0.96)
anyeducr -0.601 -0.624 -0.501 -0.556
(1.61) (1.61) (1.30) (1.42)
anyothr -0.526 -0.510 -0.527 -0.533
(1.98)* (1.88) (1.82) (1.80)
np100139 -0.295 -0.322 -0.489 -0.517
(1.46) (1.58) (2.17)* (2.26)*
np140189 -0.167 -0.188 -0.250 -0.255
(0.84) (0.94) (1.15) (1.16)
np190249 -0.214 -0.223 -0.271 -0.281
(0.97) (0.99) (1.11) (1.14)
np250p -0.257 -0.287 -0.225 -0.246
(1.21) (1.34) (0.98) (1.04)
npdk -0.182 -0.223 -0.279 -0.307
(0.63) (0.76) (0.88) (0.96)
skillnm 0.079 0.101 0.096 0.084
(0.40) (0.50) (0.46) (0.39)
skillman -0.104 -0.110 -0.031 -0.046
(0.58) (0.60) (0.16) (0.23)
partskil 0.086 0.072 0.150 0.118
(0.47) (0.39) (0.74) (0.56)
unskill -0.192 -0.245 -0.179 -0.253
(0.75) (0.94) (0.64) (0.87)
nojarmed 0.475 0.510 0.652 0.654
(1.47) (1.56) (1.86) (1.86)
dssdate -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.96) (0.92) (0.22) (0.36)
ghfair -0.714 -0.733
(4.61)** (4.69)**
ghgood -0.558 -0.586
(2.90)** (2.94)**
lsinoaff -0.252 -0.199
(1.11) (0.86)
lsiaff 0.927 0.974
(5.85)** (5.99)**
lsidk 0.824 0.761
(0.70) (0.69)
mentdis 0.307 0.339
(1.82) (1.99)*
carenaff -0.598 -0.676
(2.30)* (2.55)*
nocare -0.315 -0.312
(1.34) (1.30)
phoner -0.556 -0.484
(1.25) (1.09)
licnoveh -0.151 -0.224
(0.64) (0.95)
licandv -0.721 -0.731
(4.59)** (4.52)**
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Table A.2 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob wv2nojob
hhwker1 -0.675 -0.685
(4.35)** (4.45)**
hhwker2p -0.816 -0.875
(3.87)** (4.12)**
wafneg -0.266 -0.296
(1.31) (1.44)
wamid 0.081 0.104
(0.42) (0.52)
wafpos -0.190 -0.217
(1.04) (1.17)
wavpos -0.477 -0.519
(2.68)** (2.85)**
Constant 1.784 1.678 34.304 32.901 -3.365 -7.940
(3.41)** (2.30)* (1.03) (1.00) (0.10) (0.23)
Observations 2134 2134 2134 2134 2134 2134
Table A.3 Logit estimates for out-of-work benefit receipt twelve
months after their claim for benefit, sick and disabled clients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr
fem -0.020 -0.033 -0.179 -0.203 -0.184 -0.205
(0.18) (0.29) (1.34) (1.49) (1.28) (1.39)
age2529 0.348 0.354 0.276 0.278 0.210 0.197
(1.48) (1.48) (1.09) (1.09) (0.73) (0.68)
age3034 0.140 0.150 0.055 0.061 -0.254 -0.251
(0.59) (0.63) (0.22) (0.24) (0.86) (0.85)
age3539 0.360 0.366 0.243 0.254 -0.055 -0.046
(1.58) (1.60) (0.95) (0.98) (0.19) (0.16)
age4044 0.526 0.539 0.368 0.387 0.197 0.217
(2.25)* (2.30)* (1.44) (1.51) (0.69) (0.75)
age4549 0.793 0.849 0.620 0.680 0.413 0.466
(3.42)** (3.63)** (2.30)* (2.49)* (1.38) (1.54)
age5054 0.853 0.892 0.687 0.735 0.421 0.470
(3.77)** (3.93)** (2.54)* (2.68)** (1.39) (1.53)
age5560 0.850 0.878 0.712 0.758 0.492 0.552
(3.57)** (3.65)** (2.50)* (2.63)** (1.50) (1.65)
white -0.330 -0.353 -0.337 -0.376 -0.384 -0.444
(1.26) (1.27) (1.27) (1.33) (1.34) (1.44)
degree -0.318 -0.312 -0.276 -0.270 -0.201 -0.211
(1.41) (1.38) (1.14) (1.11) (0.79) (0.83)
abovea -0.704 -0.723 -0.667 -0.681 -0.555 -0.549
(4.01)** (4.07)** (3.59)** (3.62)** (2.81)** (2.73)**
alev -0.373 -0.406 -0.322 -0.358 -0.228 -0.262
(1.90) (2.04)* (1.57) (1.73) (0.99) (1.12)
gcseac -0.189 -0.198 -0.160 -0.165 -0.104 -0.092
(1.27) (1.32) (1.03) (1.06) (0.62) (0.55)
gcsede -0.190 -0.193 -0.260 -0.268 -0.199 -0.180
(0.94) (0.95) (1.28) (1.31) (0.95) (0.86)
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Table A.3 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr
foreign -0.582 -0.601 -0.627 -0.650 -0.639 -0.654
(2.92)** (3.00)** (3.03)** (3.11)** (2.82)** (2.84)**
num 0.630 0.610 0.624 0.610 0.445 0.423
(2.72)** (2.58)* (2.67)** (2.55)* (1.73) (1.62)
litr 0.073 0.115 0.011 0.054 -0.162 -0.109
(0.36) (0.56) (0.05) (0.26) (0.69) (0.45)
rentla 0.647 0.638 0.519 0.506 0.095 0.081
(4.49)** (4.39)** (3.32)** (3.20)** (0.54) (0.46)
rentha 1.122 1.136 1.015 1.019 0.678 0.682
(4.69)** (4.78)** (4.10)** (4.14)** (2.54)* (2.54)*
rentpriv 1.142 1.194 1.074 1.121 0.736 0.786
(5.15)** (5.34)** (4.59)** (4.79)** (3.04)** (3.22)**
tenoth 0.572 0.641 0.212 0.272 0.239 0.305
(3.14)** (3.45)** (0.99) (1.25) (0.97) (1.22)
tenin 0.855 0.840 0.522 0.506 -0.000 0.010
(1.58) (1.53) (0.90) (0.85) (0.00) (0.01)
oowbben 0.466 0.439 0.360 0.329 0.285 0.249
(3.04)** (2.85)** (2.25)* (2.03)* (1.66) (1.43)
inwbben -0.113 -0.084 -0.122 -0.090 -0.203 -0.164
(0.63) (0.46) (0.65) (0.47) (1.03) (0.83)
bothbben 0.399 0.375 0.286 0.264 -0.055 -0.076
(1.63) (1.54) (1.12) (1.03) (0.20) (0.27)
disabpc -0.018 -0.088 -0.014 -0.090 -0.005 -0.092
(0.98) (2.13)* (0.75) (2.16)* (0.22) (2.00)*
chansick 0.408 0.568 0.361 0.536 0.151 0.344
(1.35) (1.68) (1.18) (1.57) (0.44) (0.88)
lonepc 0.215 0.545 0.170 0.508 0.190 0.579
(1.86) (3.38)** (1.43) (3.07)** (1.47) (3.20)**
chanlp -0.666 -0.117 -0.779 -0.199 -0.400 0.194
(1.45) (0.22) (1.65) (0.37) (0.76) (0.30)
uerate99 -0.014 -0.101 -0.002 -0.089 -0.040 -0.156
(0.29) (1.25) (0.04) (1.09) (0.74) (1.75)
uechange 0.125 -0.034 0.147 -0.023 0.300 0.147
(0.54) (0.12) (0.62) (0.08) (1.14) (0.44)
basiccon -0.011 -0.040 -0.081
(0.06) (0.20) (0.37)
callone 0.333 0.303 0.402
(1.74) (1.55) (1.92)
callcon -0.051 -0.052 0.037
(0.26) (0.26) (0.17)
pvsone 0.111 0.109 0.102
(0.60) (0.58) (0.51)
pvscon 0.772 0.780 0.834
(3.84)** (3.82)** (3.85)**
pr16133 -0.736 -0.747 -0.579 -0.586 -0.298 -0.315
(3.09)** (3.09)** (2.30)* (2.29)* (1.10) (1.15)
pr163466 -1.245 -1.267 -1.145 -1.170 -0.856 -0.877
(5.84)** (5.89)** (5.01)** (5.07)** (3.34)** (3.35)**
pr166799 -1.071 -1.090 -1.107 -1.130 -0.888 -0.925
(5.58)** (5.62)** (5.19)** (5.27)** (3.83)** (3.94)**
pr16100 -1.156 -1.211 -1.665 -1.729 -1.411 -1.491
(5.56)** (5.75)** (6.00)** (6.22)** (4.78)** (5.00)**
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Table A.3 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr
pr16dk -1.283 -1.310 -1.800 -1.837 -1.662 -1.717
(5.93)** (5.93)** (6.34)** (6.43)** (5.47)** (5.59)**
pr15150 0.765 0.771 0.555 0.551 0.568 0.562
(2.15)* (2.11)* (1.50) (1.45) (1.41) (1.37)
pr1550p -1.556 -1.577 -1.972 -1.996 -1.950 -1.992
(4.69)** (4.74)** (5.37)** (5.40)** (5.16)** (5.26)**
anyunemr -0.364 -0.354 -0.689 -0.679 -0.663 -0.664
(2.33)* (2.26)* (3.50)** (3.40)** (3.14)** (3.13)**
_Ibenarea_2 0.888 0.846 0.914
(1.93) (1.83) (1.81)
_Ibenarea_3 1.493 1.482 1.578
(2.43)* (2.38)* (2.21)*
_Ibenarea_4 0.307 0.259 0.096
(0.67) (0.53) (0.19)
_Ibenarea_5 1.033 1.007 1.034
(2.15)* (2.05)* (1.97)*
_Ibenarea_6 0.934 0.776 0.853
(1.90) (1.58) (1.57)
_Ibenarea_7 1.402 1.398 1.548
(2.38)* (2.36)* (2.37)*
_Ibenarea_8 0.968 0.894 1.020
(2.23)* (1.99)* (2.12)*
_Ibenarea_9 0.716 0.660 0.652
(1.59) (1.43) (1.25)
_Ibenarea_10 1.466 1.521 1.564
(2.40)* (2.46)* (2.24)*
_Ibenarea_11 0.916 0.834 0.710
(2.10)* (1.85) (1.47)
_Ibenarea_12 1.058 1.053 1.277
(2.05)* (2.00)* (2.18)*
_Ibenarea_13 0.370 0.218 -0.043
(0.83) (0.47) (0.09)
_Ibenarea_14 0.517 0.477 0.334
(1.06) (0.95) (0.60)
_Ibenarea_15 1.263 1.266 1.441
(2.41)* (2.36)* (2.32)*
_Ibenarea_16 0.654 0.581 0.581
(1.42) (1.23) (1.15)
_Ibenarea_17 0.376 0.226 0.209
(0.79) (0.46) (0.39)
_Ibenarea_18 0.257 0.206 0.274
(0.55) (0.43) (0.55)
_Ibenarea_19 1.270 1.281 1.315
(2.68)** (2.60)** (2.50)*
_Ibenarea_20 0.432 0.389 0.620
(0.91) (0.80) (1.19)
_Ibenarea_21 1.339 1.312 1.200
(2.86)** (2.76)** (2.40)*
_Ibenarea_22 1.830 1.861 1.985
(3.33)** (3.35)** (3.29)**
_Ibenarea_23 1.886 1.830 2.043
(3.57)** (3.38)** (3.46)**
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Table A.3 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr
_Ibenarea_24 1.707 1.742 2.048
(3.11)** (3.04)** (3.26)**
married -0.471 -0.500 -0.261 -0.304
(2.41)* (2.52)* (1.15) (1.33)
cohab -0.830 -0.850 -0.764 -0.776
(3.42)** (3.45)** (2.80)** (2.82)**
widowed -0.213 -0.264 -0.186 -0.225
(0.48) (0.58) (0.38) (0.44)
divorced -0.180 -0.175 -0.286 -0.288
(0.79) (0.76) (1.18) (1.17)
separ 0.160 0.151 -0.033 -0.018
(0.55) (0.51) (0.11) (0.06)
nodkid -0.349 -0.390 -0.522 -0.587
(1.91) (2.10)* (2.74)** (3.00)**
twodkid -0.688 -0.729 -0.734 -0.801
(3.20)** (3.38)** (3.20)** (3.44)**
thrpdkid -0.350 -0.381 -0.220 -0.255
(1.31) (1.41) (0.75) (0.87)
anyillr -0.271 -0.277 -0.418 -0.422
(1.51) (1.52) (2.12)* (2.11)*
anysickr -0.218 -0.193 -0.557 -0.532
(0.80) (0.70) (1.87) (1.77)
anytrair -0.260 -0.304 -0.260 -0.303
(0.67) (0.77) (0.60) (0.68)
anyeducr -1.048 -1.058 -1.184 -1.192
(3.56)** (3.54)** (3.62)** (3.59)**
anyothr -1.176 -1.198 -1.243 -1.283
(4.64)** (4.68)** (4.43)** (4.52)**
np100139 -0.094 -0.083 -0.202 -0.183
(0.49) (0.43) (0.98) (0.88)
np140189 -0.087 -0.083 -0.014 -0.008
(0.47) (0.45) (0.07) (0.04)
np190249 -0.029 -0.056 0.041 0.007
(0.14) (0.26) (0.18) (0.03)
np250p -0.305 -0.307 -0.166 -0.162
(1.54) (1.54) (0.77) (0.75)
npdk -0.130 -0.134 -0.009 -0.030
(0.50) (0.51) (0.03) (0.11)
skillnm -0.210 -0.183 -0.192 -0.164
(1.03) (0.89) (0.90) (0.76)
skillman -0.151 -0.143 -0.073 -0.061
(0.83) (0.78) (0.36) (0.31)
partskil -0.244 -0.240 -0.264 -0.257
(1.31) (1.28) (1.29) (1.25)
unskill -0.068 -0.056 0.013 0.026
(0.28) (0.23) (0.05) (0.09)
nojarmed 0.191 0.184 0.190 0.182
(0.64) (0.61) (0.59) (0.57)
dssdate -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(1.00) (1.03) (0.78) (0.73)
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Table A.3 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr wv2oowbr
ghfair -0.740 -0.746
(5.00)** (5.00)**
ghgood -0.644 -0.646
(3.56)** (3.53)**
lsinoaff -0.241 -0.215
(1.13) (0.99)
lsiaff 0.740 0.765
(4.95)** (5.03)**
lsidk -0.897 -0.649
(0.83) (0.61)
mentdis 0.336 0.350
(2.09)* (2.17)*
carenaff -0.935 -0.978
(3.42)** (3.54)**
nocare -0.965 -0.983
(3.80)** (3.84)**
phoner -0.008 0.071
(0.02) (0.20)
licnoveh -0.558 -0.570
(2.61)** (2.65)**
licandv -0.862 -0.867
(5.71)** (5.60)**
hhwker1 -0.636 -0.646
(4.35)** (4.39)**
hhwker2p -0.748 -0.792
(3.52)** (3.72)**
wafneg 0.134 0.130
(0.69) (0.67)
wamid 0.085 0.075
(0.46) (0.40)
wafpos -0.146 -0.144
(0.85) (0.84)
wavpos -0.289 -0.281
(1.74) (1.68)
Constant 0.512 -0.158 37.210 34.997 37.714 32.251
(1.11) (0.24) (1.06) (1.08) (0.87) (0.82)
Observations 2128 2128 2128 2128 2128 2128
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Table A.4 OLS estimates of percentage of time on benefit,
ONE eligibility-31/12/02
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pcben1 pcben2 pcben3 Pcben4 pcben5 pcben6
fem 0.861 0.870 -2.009 -2.080 -2.069 -2.241
(0.70) (0.70) (1.45) (1.51) (1.55) (1.67)
age2529 0.446 0.439 0.687 0.643 -1.199 -1.171
(0.18) (0.18) (0.28) (0.26) (0.50) (0.49)
age3034 1.122 0.921 2.049 1.843 -1.081 -1.169
(0.46) (0.37) (0.80) (0.72) (0.44) (0.48)
age3539 2.796 2.540 3.606 3.390 -0.813 -0.931
(1.16) (1.05) (1.42) (1.33) (0.34) (0.38)
age4044 7.350 7.095 7.336 7.087 3.260 2.965
(2.97)** (2.85)** (2.79)** (2.69)** (1.31) (1.18)
age4549 10.609 10.451 9.500 9.373 4.794 4.710
(4.33)** (4.24)** (3.56)** (3.49)** (1.88) (1.83)
age5054 13.564 13.421 12.235 12.140 8.221 8.089
(5.70)** (5.62)** (4.55)** (4.49)** (3.18)** (3.12)**
age5560 15.154 15.081 13.943 13.919 10.342 10.244
(6.26)** (6.20)** (5.00)** (4.95)** (3.87)** (3.80)**
white -2.138 -1.910 -2.228 -2.251 -1.008 -1.186
(1.01) (0.87) (1.05) (1.03) (0.51) (0.57)
degree -4.864 -4.942 -4.436 -4.436 -5.554 -5.622
(1.76) (1.79) (1.55) (1.56) (2.08)* (2.12)*
abovea -6.231 -6.213 -5.259 -5.212 -3.824 -3.712
(3.02)** (3.02)** (2.53)* (2.51)* (1.95) (1.89)
alev -5.473 -5.419 -5.651 -5.545 -3.915 -3.745
(2.57)* (2.54)* (2.66)** (2.60)** (2.00)* (1.90)
gcseac -4.261 -3.908 -4.171 -3.820 -3.149 -2.811
(2.56)* (2.33)* (2.49)* (2.27)* (2.03)* (1.80)
gcsede -4.522 -4.407 -4.438 -4.340 -2.511 -2.424
(2.05)* (1.99)* (2.06)* (2.01)* (1.23) (1.18)
foreign -3.077 -2.833 -3.519 -3.250 -4.356 -4.104
(1.39) (1.28) (1.58) (1.46) (2.02)* (1.92)
num 6.300 6.450 5.675 5.817 4.044 4.141
(3.22)** (3.29)** (2.96)** (3.03)** (2.20)* (2.25)*
litr 3.158 3.129 2.286 2.299 1.465 1.475
(1.74) (1.72) (1.28) (1.28) (0.83) (0.84)
rentla 15.604 15.503 13.962 13.833 9.463 9.312
(9.65)** (9.54)** (8.43)** (8.30)** (5.92)** (5.79)**
rentha 18.570 18.831 16.377 16.519 11.151 11.144
(8.47)** (8.55)** (7.21)** (7.23)** (5.14)** (5.11)**
rentpriv 18.638 18.475 16.149 15.985 10.773 10.481
(9.33)** (9.24)** (7.88)** (7.80)** (5.57)** (5.42)**
tenoth 9.986 9.875 3.958 3.872 5.579 5.375
(4.94)** (4.88)** (1.79) (1.74) (2.56)* (2.46)*
tenin 19.814 19.764 13.101 13.185 9.099 8.794
(5.02)** (4.88)** (3.26)** (3.20)** (2.42)* (2.31)*
oowbben 10.933 10.984 8.478 8.524 6.616 6.669
(6.40)** (6.43)** (4.84)** (4.86)** (4.07)** (4.09)**
inwbben 1.180 1.326 0.821 0.952 -0.863 -0.884
(0.44) (0.49) (0.31) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36)
bothbben 9.540 9.547 8.542 8.554 4.405 4.461
(3.30)** (3.30)** (2.96)** (2.96)** (1.62) (1.63)
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Table A.4 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pcben1 pcben2 pcben3 Pcben4 pcben5 pcben6
disabpc -0.123 -0.284 -0.180 -0.410 0.075 -0.025
(0.60) (0.62) (0.88) (0.91) (0.40) (0.06)
chansick 1.165 4.382 1.831 5.000 1.058 4.312
(0.35) (1.25) (0.56) (1.42) (0.35) (1.33)
lonepc 2.300 1.992 2.259 2.166 1.509 1.559
(1.84) (1.12) (1.80) (1.22) (1.28) (0.95)
chanlp 0.117 1.712 1.458 3.541 1.196 1.505
(0.02) (0.27) (0.26) (0.57) (0.23) (0.26)
uerate99 0.256 0.154 0.373 0.312 0.132 -0.278
(0.50) (0.18) (0.73) (0.36) (0.28) (0.36)
uechange -3.577 -2.619 -3.422 -2.678 -3.175 -1.901
(1.40) (0.83) (1.34) (0.85) (1.36) (0.66)
basiccon 5.284 5.247 5.481
(2.60)** (2.63)** (2.91)**
callone 6.192 6.073 6.835
(2.95)** (2.95)** (3.55)**
callcon 1.457 1.315 2.670
(0.67) (0.61) (1.33)
pvsone 2.653 2.318 2.630
(1.24) (1.11) (1.34)
pvscon 5.676 6.011 5.402
(2.64)** (2.84)** (2.71)**
pr16133 -10.680 -10.563 -6.702 -6.654 -2.507 -2.562
(4.82)** (4.76)** (3.00)** (2.97)** (1.19) (1.21)
pr163466 -13.239 -13.028 -9.047 -8.879 -4.608 -4.377
(6.15)** (6.08)** (4.09)** (4.02)** (2.24)* (2.13)*
pr166799 -14.501 -14.597 -9.750 -9.925 -4.990 -5.105
(7.25)** (7.33)** (4.60)** (4.69)** (2.48)* (2.53)*
pr16100 -16.813 -16.745 -10.936 -10.938 -6.097 -6.011
(7.73)** (7.70)** (4.02)** (4.04)** (2.41)* (2.38)*
pr16dk -15.130 -14.929 -10.069 -9.950 -8.815 -8.794
(7.12)** (7.01)** (3.78)** (3.74)** (3.53)** (3.52)**
pr15150 -3.728 -3.698 -2.724 -2.796 -0.550 -0.516
(0.87) (0.86) (0.63) (0.65) (0.14) (0.13)
pr1550p -17.427 -17.104 -14.684 -14.601 -9.311 -8.849
(3.87)** (3.82)** (3.20)** (3.20)** (2.29)* (2.17)*
anyunemr -5.053 -4.891 -1.898 -1.760 -1.211 -1.101
(3.47)** (3.33)** (1.02) (0.95) (0.70) (0.63)
_Ibenarea_10 5.219 4.548 4.816
(0.84) (0.74) (0.86)
_Ibenarea_11 3.853 2.486 1.305
(0.88) (0.58) (0.33)
_Ibenarea_12 1.923 1.540 3.194
(0.34) (0.28) (0.62)
_Ibenarea_13 5.706 4.528 5.491
(1.30) (1.05) (1.34)
_Ibenarea_14 -1.671 -1.304 -0.127
(0.31) (0.25) (0.03)
_Ibenarea_15 10.927 10.141 11.077
(2.01)* (1.88) (2.23)*
_Ibenarea_16 5.439 4.117 3.104
(1.23) (0.95) (0.77)
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Table A.4 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pcben1 pcben2 pcben3 Pcben4 pcben5 pcben6
_Ibenarea_17 1.501 0.442 -0.727
(0.30) (0.09) (0.16)
_Ibenarea_18 -0.613 -1.829 1.097
(0.13) (0.40) (0.26)
_Ibenarea_19 -1.587 -2.064 -0.800
(0.32) (0.42) (0.18)
_Ibenarea_20 4.468 2.855 6.230
(0.95) (0.61) (1.43)
_Ibenarea_21 6.342 5.322 4.852
(1.36) (1.15) (1.13)
_Ibenarea_22 7.420 7.811 5.711
(1.32) (1.42) (1.12)
_Ibenarea_23 5.526 4.752 5.237
(1.02) (0.89) (1.05)
_Ibenarea_24 5.957 5.235 6.218
(1.31) (1.16) (1.48)
_Ibenarea_2 0.254 -0.604 0.137
(0.05) (0.12) (0.03)
_Ibenarea_3 2.059 1.453 0.465
(0.32) (0.23) (0.08)
_Ibenarea_4 0.592 -1.393 -0.769
(0.14) (0.33) (0.19)
_Ibenarea_5 0.670 -0.118 1.082
(0.14) (0.02) (0.24)
_Ibenarea_6 6.311 5.070 5.255
(1.27) (1.04) (1.15)
_Ibenarea_7 12.572 11.534 11.688
(2.16)* (2.03)* (2.30)*
_Ibenarea_8 5.534 4.745 5.880
(1.26) (1.10) (1.45)
_Ibenarea_9 0.048 -1.528 -0.658
(0.01) (0.32) (0.15)
anyeducr -7.207 -7.279 -6.182 -6.189
(2.28)* (2.31)* (2.14)* (2.15)*
anyillr 0.010 0.018 -3.688 -3.617
(0.01) (0.01) (2.10)* (2.07)*
anyothr -2.166 -2.087 -3.366 -3.293
(0.84) (0.81) (1.36) (1.34)
anysickr 10.867 10.754 6.540 6.375
(5.28)** (5.23)** (3.31)** (3.21)**
anytrair -3.109 -3.291 -2.430 -2.609
(0.84) (0.88) (0.67) (0.71)
dssdate -0.057 -0.056 -0.050 -0.047
(2.25)* (2.12)* (2.15)* (2.02)*
np100139 -3.809 -3.964 -4.976 -4.974
(1.84) (1.93) (2.60)** (2.61)**
np140189 -5.609 -5.709 -5.325 -5.335
(2.66)** (2.71)** (2.74)** (2.75)**
np190249 -5.928 -6.113 -5.202 -5.385
(2.49)* (2.56)* (2.35)* (2.43)*
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Table A.4 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pcben1 pcben2 pcben3 Pcben4 pcben5 pcben6
np250p -6.866 -7.157 -5.577 -5.842
(3.03)** (3.15)** (2.66)** (2.78)**
npdk -3.818 -3.945 -4.225 -4.244
(1.54) (1.60) (1.84) (1.86)
skillman -1.024 -1.096 0.633 0.613
(0.47) (0.50) (0.31) (0.30)
skillnm 0.840 0.627 2.173 1.991
(0.35) (0.26) (0.98) (0.90)
partskil -0.227 -0.300 1.158 1.002
(0.10) (0.14) (0.56) (0.48)
unskill -3.775 -3.778 -1.689 -1.660
(1.38) (1.38) (0.66) (0.64)
nojarmed 4.391 4.036 6.272 5.817
(1.52) (1.39) (2.32)* (2.15)*
nodkid 0.912 0.753 -1.062 -1.173
(0.47) (0.39) (0.59) (0.65)
twodkid -4.571 -4.775 -4.515 -4.679
(1.80) (1.89) (1.95) (2.02)*
thrpdkid -2.311 -2.314 -2.151 -2.039
(0.82) (0.82) (0.81) (0.77)
married -7.418 -7.480 -4.394 -4.561
(3.80)** (3.83)** (2.25)* (2.33)*
cohab -7.460 -7.409 -6.295 -6.328
(2.92)** (2.88)** (2.62)** (2.61)**
divorced -3.427 -3.382 -3.986 -3.913
(1.69) (1.66) (2.07)* (2.03)*
separ 1.261 1.297 1.265 1.459
(0.54) (0.55) (0.58) (0.67)
widowed -0.350 -0.544 1.443 1.273
(0.09) (0.14) (0.39) (0.35)
carenaff -9.095 -9.044
(4.05)** (4.04)**
nocare -5.245 -5.262
(2.69)** (2.70)**
ghfair -9.133 -9.223
(6.34)** (6.39)**
ghgood -16.810 -16.888
(8.82)** (8.78)**
hhwker1 -6.096 -5.998
(4.22)** (4.15)**
hhwker2p -9.652 -9.713
(4.47)** (4.51)**
licandv -5.236 -5.341
(3.91)** (3.95)**
licnoveh 2.659 2.276
(1.55) (1.32)
lsiaff 12.330 12.326
(7.67)** (7.65)**
lsidk 4.146 4.513
(0.40) (0.44)
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Table A.4 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pcben1 pcben2 pcben3 Pcben4 pcben5 pcben6
lsinoaff 6.709 6.902
(3.35)** (3.43)**
mentdis 6.138 6.224
(4.93)** (4.99)**
phoner -0.616 -0.696
(0.41) (0.47)
wafneg -2.451 -2.543
(1.49) (1.55)
wafpos -4.484 -4.564
(2.94)** (2.99)**
wamid -0.544 -0.578
(0.33) (0.35)
wavpos -2.585 -2.746
(1.54) (1.63)
Constant 50.337 53.598 907.331 891.911 799.439 767.891
(11.01)** (8.24)** (2.40)* (2.28)* (2.35)* (2.23)*
Observations 3242 3242 3242 3242 3242 3242
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.34 0.34
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Appendix B
Models for lone parents
Table B.1 Guide to meaning of variable names used in the analyses for
lone parents
The list of variables and abbreviations used in the models for female lone parents (the reference
categories are in bold).
Variable Abbreviation
Age of respondent:
- 18-19 age1819
- 20-24 age2024
- 25-29 age259
- 30-34 age304
- 35-39 age359
- 40-44 age405
- 45-49 age459
- 50 and more ageove50
Marital status:
- single single
- married married
- cohabiting cohab
- widowed widowed
- divorced divorced
- separated separ
Highest academic qualification obtained:
- None or no information noqual
- degree or equivalent degree
- above A level-below degree abovea
- A level or equivalent alev
- GCSE A-C level or equivalent gcseac
- GCSE D-E level or equivalnt gcsede
- Foreign or other foreign
Vocational education* voceduc
Continued
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Table B.1 Continued
Variable Abbreviation
Number of dependent children:
- one onekid
- none nokid
- two twokid
- three threekid
- four or more fourkid
Ethnicity – white* white
Age of youngest dependent child:
- under 3 years old yngu3
- 3 or 4 y.o. yng34
- aged 5-10 yng510
- aged 11-15 yng1115
- aged 16-18 yng1618
Possesses telephone* phoner
Licence and car access:
- has no licence nolic
- has licence but no car access licnoveh
- has both licandv
Long-standing illness disability:
- does not have lsino
- yes but has no affect on ability to work lsinoaff
- yes and affects ability to work lsiaff
Mental disability* mentdis
General health perceived:
- good ghgood
- fair ghfair
- not good ghnotg
Numeracy problems* num
Literacy problems* litr
Housing tenure:
- owner-occupation ownocc
- LA sector rentla
- HA sector rentha
- PRS rentpriv
- other tenoth
Ever worked before* evwkber
Any time in last 2 years spent*:
- unemployed anyunemr
- temporary sick/disabled** anyillr
- long-term sick/disabled** anysickr
- temporary or long-term sick/disabled** anysikil
- in training anytrair
- in education anyeducr
- in other activity anyothr
Number of workers in household excluding respondent:
- none hhwker0
- one hhwker1
- two or more hhwker2p
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Table B.1 Continued
Variable Abbreviation
Social class in last job before entry date:
- professional or intermediate profint
- skilled non-manual worker skillnm
- skilled manual worker skillman
- partly skilled manual partskil
- unskilled manual unskill
- no job or Armed Forces nojarmed
Proportion of time working 1-15 hrs per week in 2 years pre ONE:
- no time pr150
- up to half time pr15150
- over half time pr1550p
Proportion of time working 16+ hrs per week in 2 years pre ONE:
- no time pr160
- up to 33% time pr16133
- 34%-66% time pr163466
- 67% to 99% time pr166799
- all of time pr16100
- No information pr16dk
In receipt of benefits in 2 yr pre-ONE:
- none nobben
- out of work benefits only oowbben
- in work benefits only inwbben
- both oow and in work benefits bothbben
Net pay per week in pre-ONE job:
- <£60 pw npu60lp
- £60-£84 pw np6084lp
- £85-119 pw np119lp
- £120-159 pw np159lp
- £160+ pw np160plp
- no job or no information npdklp
24 benefit/model type areas
- benefit area 1 _Ibenarea_1
- benefit areas 2-24 _ibenarea_
6 benefit/model type area
- Basic/ONE basicone
- Basic/Control basiccon
- Call Centre/ONE callone
- Call Centre/Control callcon
- PVS/ONE pvsone
- PVS/Control pvscon
Care responsibilities
- no responsibility or no information nocare
- yes but doesn’t affect work carenaff
- yes and affects work careaff
Who lives with:
- partner and/or children livparch
- parents livparen
- others livother
- alone livalone
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Table B.1 Continued
Variable Abbreviation
TTWA characteristics
The unemployment rate in 1999 uerate99
The change in the unemployment rate (comparing the rate in January to March 1999 with the
rate in January to March 2000) uechange
The total number of claimants of Incapacity Benefit, Disability Living Allowance,
Severe Disablement Allowance, and Income Support claimed with a Disability Premium
expressed as a proportion of the total workforce disabpc
The change in the disability total as a percentage of the workforce, comparing February 2000
and May 2000 chansick
Lone parents claiming Income Support (without a Disability Premium) as a proportion of the total workforce lonepc
The change in this proportion between February 2000 and May 2000 chanlp
Receives regular income other than earnings/benefits:*
- child support chsupp
- other othincm
- private pension privpen
Attitude towards work
- very negative wavneglp
- fairly negative wafneglp
- middling wamidlp
- fairly positive wafposlp
- very positive wavposlp
* These dummy variables are equal to 1 if true and 0 otherwise.
**Variable anysikil is used when we construct models predicting employment outcomes; variables anysickr and anyillr are
used when we construct models predicting benefit outcomes.
Table B.2 Logit estimates for out-of-work status twelve months after
their claim for benefit, lone mothers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
degree -1.319 -1.382 -1.214 -1.231 -1.083 -1.091
(5.55)** (5.76)** (4.42)** (4.43)** (3.78)** (3.79)**
abovea -0.507 -0.513 -0.316 -0.309 -0.209 -0.194
(2.59)** (2.62)** (1.29) (1.25) (0.81) (0.75)
alev -0.679 -0.706 -0.491 -0.498 -0.461 -0.455
(3.87)** (4.00)** (2.20)* (2.21)* (1.94) (1.90)
gcseac -0.408 -0.396 -0.209 -0.196 -0.180 -0.164
(2.72)** (2.60)** (1.18) (1.09) (0.97) (0.88)
gcsede -0.322 -0.307 -0.146 -0.131 -0.139 -0.120
(1.77) (1.66) (0.74) (0.66) (0.66) (0.56)
foreign -0.130 -0.182 -0.139 -0.154 -0.043 -0.048
(0.52) (0.72) (0.54) (0.59) (0.16) (0.18)
married -0.476 -0.448 -0.586 -0.526 -0.371 -0.312
(1.91) (1.78) (2.31)* (2.03)* (1.31) (1.08)
cohab -0.283 -0.248 -0.253 -0.228 -0.024 -0.005
(1.02) (0.89) (0.89) (0.81) (0.07) (0.02)
widowed 0.837 0.905 0.766 0.810 0.877 0.926
(1.83) (1.89) (1.64) (1.66) (1.78) (1.84)
divorced -0.070 -0.088 -0.100 -0.127 -0.052 -0.077
(0.48) (0.60) (0.65) (0.82) (0.32) (0.48)
separ -0.211 -0.244 -0.310 -0.324 -0.303 -0.314
(1.51) (1.72) (2.08)* (2.14)* (1.96) (1.99)*
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Table B.2 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
nokid -0.254 -0.255 -0.268 -0.285 -0.198 -0.179
(0.92) (0.93) (0.90) (0.95) (0.40) (0.35)
twokid 0.148 0.166 0.163 0.186 0.150 0.169
(1.19) (1.31) (1.26) (1.42) (1.12) (1.25)
threekid 0.284 0.249 0.315 0.303 0.239 0.231
(1.61) (1.38) (1.67) (1.57) (1.21) (1.15)
fourkid 0.321 0.319 0.351 0.364 0.153 0.155
(1.36) (1.36) (1.42) (1.47) (0.57) (0.58)
rentla 0.505 0.549 0.601 0.643 0.437 0.481
(3.46)** (3.65)** (3.85)** (4.02)** (2.64)** (2.85)**
rentha 0.414 0.450 0.508 0.535 0.377 0.399
(2.50)* (2.63)** (2.91)** (2.98)** (2.03)* (2.11)*
rentpriv 0.663 0.696 0.727 0.765 0.661 0.691
(3.81)** (3.89)** (3.97)** (4.11)** (3.47)** (3.60)**
tenoth 0.273 0.293 0.363 0.391 0.458 0.473
(1.20) (1.26) (1.57) (1.65) (1.65) (1.68)
yng34 -0.300 -0.283 -0.290 -0.269 -0.231 -0.220
(1.76) (1.64) (1.65) (1.51) (1.28) (1.21)
yng510 -0.753 -0.755 -0.757 -0.751 -0.778 -0.779
(5.64)** (5.54)** (4.69)** (4.60)** (4.72)** (4.66)**
yng1115 -0.967 -1.008 -1.003 -1.020 -1.065 -1.086
(5.48)** (5.59)** (4.57)** (4.63)** (4.73)** (4.79)**
yng1618 -0.484 -0.472 -0.655 -0.661 -0.782 -0.783
(1.12) (1.05) (1.44) (1.43) (1.80) (1.75)
pr16133 -0.114 -0.084 0.081 0.112 0.161 0.192
(0.61) (0.45) (0.40) (0.55) (0.75) (0.89)
pr163466 -0.297 -0.254 -0.106 -0.052 -0.035 0.012
(1.58) (1.32) (0.52) (0.25) (0.16) (0.06)
pr166799 -0.772 -0.781 -0.654 -0.642 -0.553 -0.533
(4.42)** (4.43)** (3.35)** (3.26)** (2.75)** (2.60)**
pr16100 -0.847 -0.824 -0.655 -0.607 -0.586 -0.539
(4.83)** (4.60)** (3.03)** (2.77)** (2.59)** (2.34)*
pr16dk -0.770 -0.766 -0.793 -0.765 -0.698 -0.686
(3.98)** (3.85)** (3.84)** (3.62)** (3.22)** (3.12)**
pr15150 -0.679 -0.707 -0.520 -0.554 -0.516 -0.548
(3.31)** (3.44)** (2.29)* (2.44)* (2.17)* (2.30)*
pr1550p -1.657 -1.654 -1.409 -1.407 -1.401 -1.403
(7.71)** (7.58)** (5.96)** (5.86)** (5.66)** (5.56)**
evwkber -0.807 -0.789 -0.066 -0.060 -0.533 -0.540
(4.16)** (4.02)** (0.10) (0.09) (0.78) (0.79)
anysikil 0.197 0.183 0.034 0.025 -0.272 -0.269
(0.87) (0.79) (0.14) (0.11) (1.09) (1.07)
anyunemr -0.057 -0.050 -0.088 -0.100 -0.087 -0.094
(0.35) (0.30) (0.51) (0.58) (0.49) (0.52)
anytrair -0.989 -1.012 -1.022 -1.065 -1.028 -1.076
(2.69)** (2.73)** (2.59)** (2.74)** (2.64)** (2.80)**
anyeducr 0.064 0.069 0.113 0.127 0.049 0.058
(0.34) (0.36) (0.57) (0.63) (0.22) (0.26)
anyothr -0.378 -0.409 -0.418 -0.439 -0.341 -0.357
(1.40) (1.55) (1.49) (1.59) (1.25) (1.32)
basiccon 0.136 0.229 0.189
(0.77) (1.21) (0.95)
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Table B.2 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
callone -0.169 -0.069 -0.058
(0.96) (0.36) (0.29)
callcon -0.035 0.059 0.091
(0.20) (0.31) (0.46)
pvsone -0.111 0.023 0.006
(0.65) (0.12) (0.03)
pvscon 0.278 0.370 0.367
(1.50) (1.76) (1.68)
_Ibenarea_2 0.036 0.130 0.027
(0.10) (0.31) (0.06)
_Ibenarea_3 0.253 0.378 0.415
(0.76) (0.70) (0.74)
_Ibenarea_4 1.054 0.908 0.714
(2.94)** (2.35)* (1.79)
_Ibenarea_5 0.022 0.139 0.088
(0.06) (0.34) (0.21)
_Ibenarea_6 0.054 0.131 0.058
(0.16) (0.33) (0.14)
_Ibenarea_7 0.082 0.179 0.134
(0.23) (0.37) (0.26)
_Ibenarea_8 0.471 0.471 0.434
(1.42) (1.23) (1.08)
_Ibenarea_9 0.172 0.242 0.148
(0.55) (0.64) (0.37)
_Ibenarea_10 0.093 0.155 0.182
(0.26) (0.30) (0.35)
_Ibenarea_11 0.085 0.145 0.085
(0.28) (0.41) (0.23)
_Ibenarea_12 0.637 0.740 0.654
(1.86) (1.57) (1.34)
_Ibenarea_13 0.844 0.835 0.765
(2.67)** (2.48)* (2.14)*
_Ibenarea_14 0.329 0.437 0.376
(0.89) (1.03) (0.85)
_Ibenarea_15 0.158 0.206 0.139
(0.46) (0.46) (0.29)
_Ibenarea_16 0.393 0.493 0.284
(1.08) (1.18) (0.66)
_Ibenarea_17 0.252 0.398 0.448
(0.77) (1.01) (1.08)
_Ibenarea_18 0.279 0.287 0.185
(0.84) (0.77) (0.48)
_Ibenarea_19 -0.024 0.052 0.042
(0.08) (0.13) (0.10)
_Ibenarea_20 0.708 0.682 0.604
(2.17)* (1.68) (1.42)
_Ibenarea_21 0.626 0.746 0.732
(1.77) (1.80) (1.73)
_Ibenarea_22 1.113 1.332 1.197
(2.83)** (2.51)* (2.16)*
_Ibenarea_23 0.482 0.472 0.295
(1.39) (1.02) (0.61)
_Ibenarea_24 0.364 0.315 0.381
(1.04) (0.77) (0.90)
Continued
Appendices – Models for lone parents
111
Table B.2 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age2024 -0.080 -0.114 -0.013 -0.023
(0.23) (0.32) (0.04) (0.06)
age259 0.181 0.145 0.289 0.274
(0.51) (0.40) (0.78) (0.74)
age304 0.094 0.037 0.264 0.231
(0.25) (0.10) (0.68) (0.60)
age359 0.251 0.205 0.439 0.418
(0.65) (0.53) (1.10) (1.04)
age405 0.087 0.044 0.110 0.090
(0.22) (0.11) (0.26) (0.21)
age459 0.278 0.263 0.260 0.257
(0.60) (0.56) (0.52) (0.51)
ageove50 1.052 0.978 0.904 0.841
(1.90) (1.74) (1.53) (1.38)
white -0.242 -0.094 -0.102 0.022
(1.08) (0.40) (0.42) (0.09)
num 0.316 0.312 0.235 0.225
(1.43) (1.40) (1.04) (0.99)
litr 0.494 0.476 0.370 0.356
(1.83) (1.75) (1.29) (1.22)
voceduc -0.123 -0.122 -0.126 -0.135
(0.88) (0.86) (0.87) (0.92)
oowbben 0.269 0.310 0.188 0.223
(1.80) (2.06)* (1.22) (1.45)
inwbben -0.214 -0.204 -0.203 -0.198
(1.30) (1.22) (1.19) (1.15)
bothbben -0.201 -0.155 -0.295 -0.252
(1.07) (0.81) (1.50) (1.25)
disabpc -0.007 -0.015 -0.012 -0.022
(0.35) (0.36) (0.58) (0.52)
chansick 0.220 0.043 0.153 -0.001
(0.71) (0.12) (0.47) (0.00)
lonepc 0.074 0.036 0.097 0.071
(0.58) (0.23) (0.70) (0.42)
chanlp 0.002 0.106 0.045 0.244
(0.00) (0.19) (0.08) (0.40)
uerate99 0.013 0.043 -0.003 0.025
(0.26) (0.54) (0.06) (0.30)
uechange -0.193 0.035 -0.246 -0.047
(0.76) (0.11) (0.90) (0.14)
np6084lp 0.142 0.120 0.107 0.084
(0.84) (0.71) (0.61) (0.47)
np119lp 0.029 0.019 -0.025 -0.036
(0.16) (0.10) (0.13) (0.18)
np159lp 0.326 0.285 0.331 0.294
(1.67) (1.45) (1.66) (1.46)
np160plp 0.215 0.177 0.117 0.084
(1.03) (0.84) (0.54) (0.39)
npdklp 0.289 0.305 0.187 0.195
(1.03) (1.09) (0.61) (0.65)
skillnm -0.060 -0.062 -0.076 -0.074
(0.31) (0.31) (0.37) (0.35)
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Table B.2 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
skillman -0.079 -0.072 -0.156 -0.140
(0.33) (0.29) (0.62) (0.55)
partskil 0.075 0.091 0.020 0.043
(0.38) (0.46) (0.09) (0.21)
unskill -0.139 -0.133 -0.246 -0.231
(0.58) (0.54) (0.95) (0.88)
nojarmed 0.388 0.386 -0.120 -0.118
(0.61) (0.61) (0.19) (0.19)
carenaff -0.037 -0.058
(0.26) (0.41)
careaff 0.307 0.322
(1.42) (1.49)
chsupp 0.026 0.030
(0.17) (0.20)
privpen 0.565 0.703
(0.59) (0.72)
othincm 1.088 1.103
(2.98)** (2.96)**
hhwker1 -0.503 -0.487
(2.35)* (2.24)*
hhwker2p -0.218 -0.196
(0.61) (0.56)
livparen -0.326 -0.248
(0.25) (0.19)
livother 1.050 0.956
(0.81) (0.73)
livalone -0.331 -0.392
(0.58) (0.67)
ghfair 0.019 0.015
(0.14) (0.11)
ghnotg 0.269 0.292
(1.41) (1.54)
lsinoaff -0.254 -0.236
(1.35) (1.26)
lsiaff 0.608 0.588
(2.81)** (2.72)**
mentdis 0.006 -0.012
(0.02) (0.05)
phoner -0.727 -0.737
(2.63)** (2.69)**
licnoveh -0.012 -0.026
(0.07) (0.14)
licandv -0.458 -0.450
(3.63)** (3.50)**
wafneglp -0.035 -0.051
(0.19) (0.27)
wamidlp -0.371 -0.370
(1.93) (1.90)
wafposlp -0.624 -0.650
(3.56)** (3.67)**
wavposlp -0.921 -0.924
(5.05)** (5.04)**
Constant 2.543 2.161 1.157 0.842 2.761 2.514
(8.71)** (6.16)** (1.25) (0.85) (2.78)** (2.38)*
Observations 2333 2333 2333 2333 2333 2333
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Table B.3 Logit estimates for out-of-work benefit receipt twelve
months after their claim for benefit, lone mothers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
degree -0.626 -0.713 -0.437 -0.459 -0.464 -0.466
(2.86)** (3.19)** (1.71) (1.77) (1.73) (1.70)
abovea -0.728 -0.732 -0.495 -0.484 -0.414 -0.425
(3.91)** (3.93)** (2.11)* (2.04)* (1.67) (1.69)
alev -0.758 -0.809 -0.548 -0.588 -0.509 -0.552
(4.59)** (4.78)** (2.61)** (2.75)** (2.32)* (2.47)*
gcseac -0.318 -0.313 -0.107 -0.112 -0.066 -0.074
(2.23)* (2.16)* (0.63) (0.65) (0.37) (0.41)
gcsede -0.414 -0.430 -0.273 -0.287 -0.233 -0.251
(2.31)* (2.34)* (1.42) (1.46) (1.15) (1.21)
foreign -0.276 -0.354 -0.245 -0.288 -0.178 -0.216
(1.16) (1.46) (0.97) (1.13) (0.69) (0.83)
married -1.372 -1.402 -1.545 -1.537 -1.082 -1.068
(5.65)** (5.69)** (6.15)** (6.04)** (3.84)** (3.68)**
cohab -1.202 -1.200 -1.253 -1.248 -0.949 -0.956
(4.71)** (4.52)** (4.85)** (4.73)** (3.00)** (3.01)**
widowed 1.328 1.363 1.142 1.207 1.215 1.295
(2.41)* (2.35)* (2.02)* (2.03)* (2.04)* (2.14)*
divorced -0.066 -0.072 -0.122 -0.147 -0.115 -0.147
(0.47) (0.50) (0.80) (0.95) (0.72) (0.89)
separ -0.084 -0.113 -0.192 -0.209 -0.242 -0.260
(0.62) (0.82) (1.34) (1.41) (1.58) (1.64)
nokid -0.622 -0.588 -0.639 -0.631 -0.600 -0.555
(2.64)** (2.47)* (2.55)* (2.47)* (1.38) (1.26)
twokid -0.104 -0.106 -0.082 -0.081 -0.155 -0.151
(0.86) (0.87) (0.65) (0.64) (1.17) (1.13)
threekid 0.177 0.182 0.203 0.224 0.043 0.074
(1.07) (1.07) (1.16) (1.25) (0.24) (0.39)
fourkid 0.321 0.299 0.312 0.310 0.073 0.065
(1.38) (1.30) (1.30) (1.30) (0.29) (0.25)
rentla 0.538 0.544 0.665 0.656 0.404 0.390
(3.74)** (3.71)** (4.31)** (4.19)** (2.47)* (2.35)*
rentha 0.579 0.636 0.711 0.745 0.464 0.491
(3.52)** (3.78)** (4.14)** (4.22)** (2.56)* (2.64)**
rentpriv 0.552 0.578 0.650 0.680 0.420 0.450
(3.35)** (3.43)** (3.77)** (3.87)** (2.33)* (2.45)*
tenoth 0.482 0.496 0.565 0.569 0.708 0.695
(2.12)* (2.14)* (2.45)* (2.43)* (2.37)* (2.29)*
yng34 -0.579 -0.547 -0.566 -0.549 -0.487 -0.473
(3.77)** (3.51)** (3.61)** (3.42)** (2.93)** (2.79)**
yng510 -0.529 -0.533 -0.517 -0.525 -0.550 -0.552
(4.18)** (4.12)** (3.58)** (3.55)** (3.70)** (3.60)**
yng1115 -0.643 -0.703 -0.712 -0.754 -0.858 -0.910
(3.64)** (3.88)** (3.47)** (3.59)** (3.98)** (4.14)**
yng1618 -0.429 -0.435 -0.538 -0.564 -0.898 -0.920
(0.93) (0.95) (1.06) (1.11) (1.87) (1.92)
pr16133 0.086 0.070 0.197 0.184 0.273 0.258
(0.49) (0.39) (1.00) (0.92) (1.33) (1.25)
pr163466 -0.280 -0.245 -0.118 -0.070 0.004 0.051
(1.57) (1.35) (0.60) (0.35) (0.02) (0.23)
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Table B.3 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pr166799 -0.586 -0.636 -0.498 -0.538 -0.346 -0.387
(3.35)** (3.53)** (2.55)* (2.72)** (1.73) (1.88)
pr16100 -0.569 -0.565 -0.440 -0.440 -0.335 -0.352
(3.27)** (3.15)** (2.06)* (2.01)* (1.44) (1.49)
pr16dk -0.747 -0.742 -0.808 -0.799 -0.748 -0.762
(3.95)** (3.86)** (4.12)** (3.97)** (3.52)** (3.52)**
pr15150 -0.117 -0.134 -0.193 -0.230 -0.260 -0.298
(0.54) (0.62) (0.84) (0.99) (1.06) (1.21)
pr1550p -0.344 -0.265 -0.348 -0.318 -0.245 -0.223
(1.54) (1.18) (1.38) (1.26) (0.90) (0.82)
evwkber -0.552 -0.488 0.751 0.631 0.531 0.429
(3.39)** (2.97)** (1.01) (0.89) (0.70) (0.60)
anyillr 0.256 0.234 0.151 0.142 -0.294 -0.308
(0.95) (0.85) (0.53) (0.50) (1.00) (1.03)
anyunemr 0.051 0.090 0.099 0.109 0.010 0.027
(0.33) (0.57) (0.58) (0.64) (0.06) (0.15)
anysickr 2.421 2.357 2.199 2.122 1.471 1.355
(2.15)* (2.11)* (1.95) (1.86) (1.34) (1.22)
anytrair -1.013 -0.988 -1.104 -1.107 -1.112 -1.119
(2.64)** (2.51)* (2.77)** (2.71)** (2.72)** (2.65)**
anyeducr -1.355 -1.397 -1.438 -1.500 -1.077 -1.146
(7.96)** (7.93)** (7.70)** (7.82)** (5.30)** (5.52)**
anyothr -0.120 -0.147 -0.179 -0.193 -0.042 -0.058
(0.51) (0.63) (0.73) (0.78) (0.18) (0.24)
basiccon 0.046 0.178 0.162
(0.26) (0.96) (0.83)
callone -0.145 0.023 0.129
(0.82) (0.12) (0.64)
callcon -0.197 -0.058 0.040
(1.16) (0.31) (0.19)
pvsone -0.111 0.124 0.142
(0.66) (0.67) (0.73)
pvscon 0.119 0.289 0.366
(0.68) (1.45) (1.75)
_Ibenarea_2 -0.254 -0.065 -0.211
(0.67) (0.15) (0.47)
_Ibenarea_3 -0.048 -0.017 0.137
(0.14) (0.03) (0.25)
_Ibenarea_4 0.987 0.984 0.709
(2.90)** (2.65)** (1.79)
_Ibenarea_5 -0.404 -0.114 -0.085
(1.16) (0.28) (0.19)
_Ibenarea_6 0.386 0.776 0.818
(1.11) (1.99)* (1.93)
_Ibenarea_7 -0.120 -0.140 -0.033
(0.35) (0.29) (0.06)
_Ibenarea_8 0.210 0.340 0.357
(0.63) (0.91) (0.90)
_Ibenarea_9 -0.092 0.155 0.063
(0.29) (0.42) (0.16)
_Ibenarea_10 -0.261 0.013 -0.005
(0.76) (0.03) (0.01)
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Table B.3 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
_Ibenarea_11 0.285 0.532 0.528
(0.93) (1.53) (1.47)
_Ibenarea_12 0.314 0.498 0.552
(0.94) (1.11) (1.16)
_Ibenarea_13 0.584 0.746 0.601
(1.83) (2.21)* (1.69)
_Ibenarea_14 -0.006 0.269 0.240
(0.02) (0.65) (0.55)
_Ibenarea_15 -0.046 0.241 0.176
(0.14) (0.56) (0.36)
_Ibenarea_16 0.269 0.396 0.300
(0.76) (0.99) (0.71)
_Ibenarea_17 0.041 0.464 0.546
(0.13) (1.22) (1.37)
_Ibenarea_18 -0.330 0.000 -0.055
(1.00) (0.00) (0.15)
_Ibenarea_19 0.117 0.397 0.444
(0.35) (1.02) (1.05)
_Ibenarea_20 0.166 -0.070 -0.124
(0.53) (0.18) (0.30)
_Ibenarea_21 0.059 0.261 0.278
(0.19) (0.69) (0.71)
_Ibenarea_22 1.335 1.544 1.763
(3.51)** (3.06)** (3.34)**
_Ibenarea_23 0.076 0.009 -0.005
(0.23) (0.02) (0.01)
_Ibenarea_24 0.183 0.170 0.167
(0.53) (0.43) (0.41)
age2024 -0.616 -0.710 -0.416 -0.508
(1.74) (1.97)* (1.16) (1.41)
age259 -0.418 -0.488 -0.108 -0.179
(1.16) (1.33) (0.29) (0.48)
age304 -0.407 -0.485 -0.056 -0.147
(1.10) (1.30) (0.15) (0.39)
age359 -0.320 -0.380 0.083 0.023
(0.84) (0.98) (0.21) (0.06)
age405 -0.343 -0.464 0.060 -0.078
(0.85) (1.13) (0.14) (0.19)
age459 -0.237 -0.339 0.127 0.021
(0.52) (0.73) (0.27) (0.04)
ageove50 0.412 0.328 0.788 0.714
(0.73) (0.57) (1.27) (1.16)
white -0.270 -0.073 -0.055 0.107
(1.37) (0.35) (0.26) (0.48)
num 0.245 0.235 0.194 0.189
(1.16) (1.08) (0.87) (0.83)
litr 0.406 0.423 0.349 0.365
(1.64) (1.68) (1.30) (1.33)
voceduc -0.071 -0.072 -0.063 -0.065
(0.53) (0.53) (0.45) (0.45)
oowbben 0.061 0.077 0.054 0.062
(0.44) (0.55) (0.37) (0.41)
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Table B.3 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
inwbben -0.169 -0.156 -0.170 -0.168
(1.04) (0.94) (1.00) (0.97)
bothbben -0.185 -0.175 -0.227 -0.222
(0.98) (0.91) (1.16) (1.10)
disabpc -0.017 0.002 -0.028 -0.026
(0.88) (0.06) (1.43) (0.64)
chansick 0.484 0.280 0.493 0.283
(1.64) (0.83) (1.57) (0.79)
lonepc 0.159 0.083 0.204 0.146
(1.33) (0.55) (1.57) (0.90)
chanlp -0.112 0.138 -0.003 0.399
(0.22) (0.25) (0.01) (0.70)
uerate99 -0.016 0.017 -0.038 0.012
(0.32) (0.22) (0.77) (0.14)
uechange -0.336 -0.493 -0.328 -0.474
(1.37) (1.63) (1.29) (1.52)
np6084lp -0.212 -0.260 -0.277 -0.326
(1.26) (1.53) (1.55) (1.83)
np119lp -0.299 -0.354 -0.322 -0.380
(1.61) (1.88) (1.63) (1.90)
np159lp -0.294 -0.380 -0.317 -0.396
(1.47) (1.89) (1.52) (1.87)
np160plp -0.074 -0.128 -0.074 -0.117
(0.36) (0.61) (0.34) (0.54)
npdklp -0.091 -0.146 -0.235 -0.292
(0.32) (0.50) (0.80) (0.97)
skillnm 0.124 0.095 0.108 0.075
(0.66) (0.50) (0.53) (0.37)
skillman 0.092 0.065 -0.049 -0.064
(0.40) (0.27) (0.20) (0.25)
partskil 0.272 0.288 0.169 0.185
(1.43) (1.50) (0.81) (0.88)
unskill 0.007 -0.008 -0.094 -0.112
(0.03) (0.03) (0.36) (0.43)
nojarmed 1.253 1.108 0.971 0.844
(1.78) (1.66) (1.33) (1.25)
carenaff 0.013 0.019
(0.09) (0.13)
careaff 0.464 0.521
(2.12)* (2.32)*
chsupp -0.283 -0.285
(1.85) (1.85)
privpen 0.214 0.265
(0.19) (0.22)
othincm -1.581 -1.630
(4.94)** (4.87)**
hhwker1 -1.246 -1.250
(6.18)** (6.10)**
hhwker2p -0.389 -0.384
(1.02) (0.98)
livparen -0.816 -0.611
(0.60) (0.48)
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Table B.3 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
livother -0.095 -0.092
(0.11) (0.11)
livalone -0.252 -0.297
(0.49) (0.57)
ghfair 0.141 0.143
(1.12) (1.11)
ghnotg 0.394 0.428
(2.13)* (2.34)*
lsinoaff -0.271 -0.242
(1.44) (1.27)
lsiaff 0.557 0.551
(2.76)** (2.72)**
mentdis -0.043 -0.075
(0.18) (0.30)
phoner -0.444 -0.493
(1.62) (1.78)
licnoveh -0.111 -0.120
(0.62) (0.66)
licandv -0.420 -0.401
(3.38)** (3.16)**
wafneglp -0.021 -0.054
(0.12) (0.32)
wamidlp -0.125 -0.113
(0.69) (0.62)
wafposlp -0.101 -0.099
(0.60) (0.58)
wavposlp -0.936 -0.933
(5.34)** (5.30)**
Constant 2.067 1.828 0.703 0.385 1.576 1.432
(7.48)** (5.28)** (0.73) (0.39) (1.52) (1.34)
Observations 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331
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Table B.4 OLS estimates of percentage of time lone mothers spend on
out-of-work benefits, DSSDATE-31/12/02, OLS
pcben1 pcben2 pcben3 pcben4 pcben5 pcben6
degree -17.619 -18.372 -12.147 -12.412 -10.154 -10.162
(6.45)** (6.74)** (3.93)** (4.03)** (3.43)** (3.44)**
abovea -8.058 -7.633 -3.521 -3.419 -2.914 -2.667
(3.44)** (3.29)** (1.24) (1.21) (1.08) (0.99)
alev -10.000 -9.865 -6.051 -6.184 -5.377 -5.331
(5.05)** (4.96)** (2.47)* (2.52)* (2.32)* (2.29)*
gcseac -6.073 -5.861 -2.581 -2.550 -1.818 -1.644
(3.96)** (3.81)** (1.44) (1.42) (1.05) (0.95)
gcsede -5.916 -6.054 -4.178 -4.503 -3.701 -3.821
(2.94)** (3.00)** (2.00)* (2.16)* (1.84) (1.90)
foreign -5.543 -5.706 -3.722 -3.911 -1.825 -1.783
(1.97)* (2.04)* (1.28) (1.35) (0.67) (0.66)
married -31.983 -32.244 -32.316 -32.026 -28.299 -28.146
(10.77)** (10.89)** (10.98)** (10.86)** (9.33)** (9.29)**
cohab -29.608 -29.906 -30.267 -30.380 -26.439 -26.745
(9.67)** (9.72)** (9.96)** (9.97)** (8.23)** (8.33)**
widowed 25.048 24.392 23.795 23.726 23.595 23.542
(9.23)** (8.74)** (7.91)** (7.61)** (7.47)** (7.27)**
divorced -2.332 -2.750 -2.628 -2.909 -2.534 -2.777
(1.40) (1.64) (1.49) (1.65) (1.49) (1.64)
separ 0.004 -0.357 0.188 0.033 -0.685 -0.824
(0.00) (0.23) (0.12) (0.02) (0.44) (0.53)
nokid -1.414 -0.331 -1.489 -0.846 -2.141 -1.598
(0.51) (0.12) (0.50) (0.29) (0.73) (0.55)
twokid 0.354 0.530 0.826 1.018 -0.218 -0.062
(0.25) (0.37) (0.56) (0.69) (0.15) (0.04)
threekid 0.644 0.911 1.360 1.738 -0.475 -0.078
(0.33) (0.47) (0.68) (0.87) (0.25) (0.04)
fourkid 2.488 2.474 3.000 3.136 -0.307 -0.110
(1.02) (1.01) (1.18) (1.24) (0.12) (0.04)
rentla 6.380 6.357 6.226 5.868 2.967 2.506
(3.41)** (3.36)** (3.25)** (3.04)** (1.61) (1.35)
rentha 7.074 7.174 7.233 6.857 3.909 3.570
(3.36)** (3.40)** (3.39)** (3.20)** (1.90) (1.73)
rentpriv 8.388 8.090 8.107 7.621 6.095 5.555
(4.03)** (3.87)** (3.84)** (3.59)** (3.00)** (2.73)**
tenoth 0.184 -0.433 -0.434 -1.032 -0.940 -1.767
(0.07) (0.16) (0.16) (0.38) (0.31) (0.59)
yng34 -7.300 -6.989 -6.751 -6.641 -6.273 -6.143
(4.27)** (4.10)** (3.84)** (3.79)** (3.70)** (3.64)**
yng0510 -7.692 -7.430 -7.335 -7.198 -8.442 -8.353
(5.29)** (5.10)** (4.46)** (4.39)** (5.35)** (5.30)**
yng1115 -9.847 -9.429 -9.603 -9.318 -11.613 -11.279
(4.60)** (4.40)** (3.91)** (3.80)** (4.89)** (4.76)**
yng1618 -0.546 0.660 -4.851 -3.992 -9.595 -8.845
(0.12) (0.15) (0.94) (0.77) (2.02)* (1.86)
pr16133 1.300 1.454 1.965 2.108 2.929 2.984
(0.69) (0.77) (0.95) (1.03) (1.49) (1.53)
pr163466 -2.017 -1.756 -0.647 -0.531 1.656 1.701
(0.95) (0.82) (0.29) (0.24) (0.75) (0.77)
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Table B.4 Continued
pcben1 pcben2 pcben3 pcben4 pcben5 pcben6
pr166799 -5.566 -5.588 -3.529 -3.206 -2.009 -1.772
(2.56)* (2.57)* (1.50) (1.36) (0.90) (0.79)
pr16100 -6.257 -5.865 -2.193 -1.678 -0.479 -0.054
(2.99)** (2.80)** (0.88) (0.67) (0.20) (0.02)
pr16dk -11.471 -11.130 -11.318 -10.723 -9.508 -9.061
(4.85)** (4.70)** (4.67)** (4.39)** (4.06)** (3.87)**
pr15150 -0.503 -0.215 -1.863 -1.963 -1.024 -1.013
(0.19) (0.08) (0.69) (0.73) (0.40) (0.40)
pr1550p -5.429 -5.039 -5.592 -5.535 -3.007 -2.909
(1.89) (1.77) (1.88) (1.87) (1.09) (1.06)
evwkber -6.776 -6.385 -6.841 -7.647 -8.521 -9.281
(4.22)** (3.99)** (1.14) (1.28) (1.60) (1.75)
basiccon -0.487 0.281 0.132
(0.24) (0.14) (0.07)
callone -1.501 -0.195 0.466
(0.75) (0.09) (0.23)
callcon -1.272 -1.143 -0.282
(0.65) (0.56) (0.14)
pvsone -3.535 -2.021 -1.842
(1.78) (0.95) (0.91)
pvscon 2.813 3.963 4.955
(1.45) (1.86) (2.39)*
anyillr 4.157 4.073 3.907 3.838 -0.571 -0.663
(1.49) (1.46) (1.40) (1.37) (0.21) (0.24)
anyunemr -0.083 0.163 -0.425 -0.388 -0.197 -0.207
(0.05) (0.09) (0.24) (0.22) (0.11) (0.12)
anysickr 14.167 14.417 13.880 14.322 5.674 6.174
(4.16)** (4.26)** (3.89)** (4.00)** (1.45) (1.57)
anytrair -9.925 -8.984 -9.594 -9.553 -10.430 -10.389
(2.10)* (1.90) (1.95) (1.97)* (2.25)* (2.28)*
anyeducr -19.709 -18.846 -19.677 -19.249 -16.178 -15.929
(9.14)** (8.74)** (8.89)** (8.71)** (7.17)** (7.07)**
anyothr -0.962 -1.164 -0.949 -1.256 -0.380 -0.673
(0.32) (0.39) (0.32) (0.43) (0.13) (0.24)
age2024 -6.444 -6.764 -4.971 -5.298
(2.27)* (2.39)* (1.77) (1.88)
age259 -6.581 -7.064 -4.521 -4.891
(2.21)* (2.37)* (1.52) (1.64)
age304 -6.252 -6.473 -4.107 -4.149
(1.98)* (2.06)* (1.30) (1.31)
age359 -5.533 -5.956 -2.746 -2.991
(1.66) (1.79) (0.83) (0.90)
age405 -5.199 -5.856 -3.084 -3.638
(1.39) (1.58) (0.84) (0.99)
age459 -7.508 -8.339 -5.487 -6.228
(1.62) (1.80) (1.22) (1.38)
ageove50 6.770 6.423 7.427 6.940
(1.17) (1.11) (1.33) (1.23)
white -1.763 -0.057 0.867 2.469
(0.82) (0.03) (0.42) (1.13)
num 6.517 6.280 3.527 3.297
(3.12)** (2.98)** (1.68) (1.56)
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Table B.4 Continued
pcben1 pcben2 pcben3 pcben4 pcben5 pcben6
litr 0.530 0.550 -0.838 -0.725
(0.23) (0.24) (0.36) (0.31)
voceduc -1.903 -1.654 -1.485 -1.272
(1.19) (1.04) (0.97) (0.84)
oowbben 2.754 2.812 2.080 2.159
(1.83) (1.88) (1.41) (1.47)
inwbben -1.456 -1.340 -1.620 -1.554
(0.72) (0.67) (0.86) (0.83)
bothbben 1.981 2.191 0.374 0.514
(0.94) (1.05) (0.19) (0.26)
disabpc -0.272 0.571 -0.448 0.374
(1.27) (1.29) (2.17)* (0.89)
chansick 8.359 6.262 6.774 4.856
(2.49)* (1.61) (2.11)* (1.29)
lonepc 1.086 -1.838 1.672 -1.147
(0.80) (1.07) (1.27) (0.69)
chanlp -0.908 -3.815 -2.485 -4.705
(0.17) (0.64) (0.50) (0.82)
uerate99 -0.011 0.447 -0.298 -0.074
(0.02) (0.51) (0.57) (0.09)
uechange -3.333 -6.477 -2.440 -5.862
(1.18) (1.86) (0.90) (1.75)
np6084lp -4.585 -4.998 -4.341 -4.743
(2.30)* (2.53)* (2.30)* (2.53)*
np119lp -4.027 -4.391 -3.970 -4.239
(1.84) (2.01)* (1.92) (2.05)*
np159lp -3.866 -4.209 -3.181 -3.367
(1.75) (1.90) (1.52) (1.60)
np160plp -6.581 -7.297 -6.502 -7.103
(2.87)** (3.18)** (3.02)** (3.27)**
npdklp -3.623 -4.225 -4.602 -5.166
(1.12) (1.31) (1.53) (1.72)
skillnm 1.811 2.021 1.957 2.169
(0.77) (0.85) (0.88) (0.97)
skillman 1.738 2.009 0.938 1.155
(0.61) (0.71) (0.35) (0.43)
partskil 5.557 5.790 4.638 4.837
(2.35)* (2.44)* (2.09)* (2.17)*
unskill 2.583 2.986 1.841 2.114
(0.88) (1.02) (0.66) (0.76)
nojarmed 1.921 1.477 0.116 -0.398
(0.33) (0.25) (0.02) (0.08)
carenaff 2.170 2.248
(1.46) (1.52)
careaff 16.678 16.708
(9.14)** (9.17)**
chsupp -5.055 -5.240
(3.01)** (3.15)**
privpen 3.129 3.098
(0.46) (0.44)
othincm -3.956 -3.544
(1.28) (1.18)
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Table B.4 Continued
pcben1 pcben2 pcben3 pcben4 pcben5 pcben6
hhwker1 -11.081 -11.000
(5.02)** (4.98)**
hhwker2p -1.601 -1.137
(0.41) (0.29)
ghfair 3.649 3.447
(2.78)** (2.63)**
ghnotg 8.839 8.907
(4.87)** (4.87)**
lsinoaff -1.540 -1.409
(0.74) (0.68)
lsiaff 5.679 5.927
(3.29)** (3.41)**
mentdis 0.772 0.397
(0.36) (0.19)
phoner -0.247 -0.564
(0.14) (0.32)
licnoveh 1.591 1.214
(0.90) (0.68)
licandv -5.417 -5.648
(4.03)** (4.16)**
wafneglp 1.230 0.989
(0.77) (0.62)
wamidlp -1.935 -2.157
(1.14) (1.27)
wafposlp -0.796 -0.886
(0.49) (0.54)
wavposlp -8.806 -8.841
(4.66)** (4.67)**
_Ibenarea_2 -5.610 -6.791 -7.713
(1.37) (1.45) (1.71)
_Ibenarea_3 -5.852 -13.117 -13.298
(1.37) (2.10)* (2.27)*
_Ibenarea_4 4.631 4.878 2.945
(1.25) (1.23) (0.76)
_Ibenarea_5 -3.650 -4.973 -5.281
(0.86) (0.99) (1.11)
_Ibenarea_6 -0.134 2.031 1.600
(0.04) (0.48) (0.39)
_Ibenarea_7 -5.576 -9.689 -10.322
(1.38) (1.67) (1.85)
_Ibenarea_8 -3.091 -4.359 -4.590
(0.85) (1.07) (1.16)
_Ibenarea_9 -5.073 -6.063 -6.997
(1.41) (1.45) (1.74)
_Ibenarea_10 -3.970 -5.346 -5.124
(0.88) (0.88) (0.88)
_Ibenarea_11 -3.629 -4.372 -5.130
(1.03) (1.09) (1.34)
_Ibenarea_12 -6.917 -11.360 -11.768
(1.67) (2.08)* (2.25)*
_Ibenarea_13 2.328 3.187 1.226
(0.65) (0.84) (0.33)
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Table B.4 Continued
pcben1 pcben2 pcben3 pcben4 pcben5 pcben6
_Ibenarea_14 -2.117 -1.563 -2.910
(0.51) (0.33) (0.64)
_Ibenarea_15 -8.572 -9.204 -8.589
(2.06)* (1.82) (1.75)
_Ibenarea_16 -1.549 -4.015 -4.968
(0.41) (0.92) (1.21)
_Ibenarea_17 -5.515 -4.014 -3.966
(1.46) (0.90) (0.92)
_Ibenarea_18 -5.303 -3.211 -5.099
(1.43) (0.78) (1.30)
_Ibenarea_19 0.924 -0.674 -0.400
(0.25) (0.15) (0.09)
_Ibenarea_20 -0.662 -6.316 -5.075
(0.18) (1.47) (1.22)
_Ibenarea_21 -1.495 -2.636 -3.730
(0.40) (0.60) (0.86)
_Ibenarea_22 4.609 0.707 1.078
(1.29) (0.14) (0.22)
_Ibenarea_23 -0.202 -6.166 -6.213
(0.05) (1.22) (1.29)
_Ibenarea_24 4.419 1.136 3.805
(1.13) (0.26) (0.91)
Constant 85.674 86.260 86.952 86.973 88.706 90.970
(29.70)** (23.73)** (10.57)** (9.31)** (11.20)** (10.17)**
Observations 2979 2979 2979 2979 2979 2979
R-squared 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.29 0.30
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Appendix C
Models for JSA clients
Table C.1 Guide to meaning of variable names used in the analyses for
JSA clients
The list of variables and abbreviations used in the models for JSA clients (the reference categories are
in bold).
Variable Abbreviation
Gender – female* fem
Age of respondent:
- 17-19 age1719
- 20-24 age2024
- 25-29 age259
- 30-34 age304
- 35-39 age359
- 40-44 age405
- 45-49 age459
- 50-54 age5054
- 55-60 age5560
Ethnicity - white* white
Marital status:
- single single
- married married
- cohabiting cohab
- widowed widowed
- divorced divorced
- separated separ
Age of youngest dependent child:
- under 3 years old yngu3
- 3 or 4 y.o. yng34
- aged 5-10 yng510
- aged 11-18 yng1118
- no children yngnokid
Continued
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Table C.1 Continued
Variable Abbreviation
Highest academic qualification obtained:
- None or no information noqual
- degree or equivalent degree
- above A level-below degree abovea
- A level or equivalent alev
- GCSE A-C level or equivalent gcseac
- GCSE D-E level or equivalnt gcsede
- Foreign or other foreign
Numeracy problems* num
Literacy problems* litr
Housing tenure:
- owner-occupation ownocc
- LA sector rentla
- HA sector rentha
- PRS rentpriv
- other tenoth
- insitutions tenin
In receipt of benefits in 2 yr pre-ONE:
- none nobben
- out of work benefits only oowbben
- in work benefits only inwbben
- both oow and in work benefits bothbben
Proportion of time working 16+ hrs per week in 2 years pre – ONE:
- no time pr160
- up to 33% time pr16133
- 34%-66% time pr163466
- 67% to 99% time pr166799
- all of time pr16100
- No information pr16dk
Proportion of time working 1-15 hrs per week in 2 years pre – ONE:
- no time pr150
- up to half time pr15150
- over half time pr1550p
Ever worked before* evwkber
Any time in last 2 years spent*:
- unemployed anyunemr
- temporary sick/disabled** anyillr
- long-term sick/disabled** anysickr
- in training anytrair
- in education anyeducr
- in other activity anyothr
Net pay per week in pre-ONE job:
- <£110 pw npu110
- £110-£149 pw np110149
- £150-184 pw np150184
- £185-254 pw np185254
- £255+ pw np255p
- no job or no information npdk
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Table C.1 Continued
Variable Abbreviation
Social class in last job before entry date:
- professional or intermediate profint
- skilled non-manual worker skillnm
- skilled manual worker skillman
- partly skilled manual partskil
- unskilled manual unskill
- no job or Armed Forces nojarmed
Care responsibilities
- no responsibility or no information nocare
- yes but doesn’t affect work carenaff
- yes and affects work careaff
Receives regular income other than earnings/benefits:*
- child support chsupp
- other othincm
- private pension privpen
Number of workers in household excluding respondent:
- none hhwker0
- one hhwker1
- two or more hhwker2p
General health perceived:
- good ghgood
- fair ghfair
- not good ghnotg
Long-standing illness disability:
- does not have lsino
- yes but has no affect on ability to work lsinoaff
- yes and affects ability to work lsiaff
Mental disability* mentdis
Possesses telephone* phoner
Driving licence and vehicle access:
- has no licence nolic
- has licence but no vehicle access licnoveh
- has both licandv
Attitude towards work
- very negative wavneglp
- fairly negative wafneglp
- middling wamidlp
- fairly positive wafposlp
- very positive wavposlp
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Table C.1 Continued
Variable Abbreviation
TTWA characteristics
The unemployment rate in 1999 uerate99
The change in the unemployment rate (comparing the rate in January to March 1999 with the
rate in January to March 2000) uechange
The total number of claimants of Incapacity Benefit, Disability Living Allowance,
Severe Disablement Allowance, and Income Support claimed with a Disability Premium
expressed as a proportion of the total workforce disabpc
The change in the disability total as a percentage of the workforce, comparing February 2000 and May 2000chansick
Lone parents claiming Income Support (without a Disability Premium) as a proportion of the total workforce lonepc
The change in this proportion between February 2000 and May 2000 chanlp
24 benefit/model type areas
- benefit area 1 _Ibenarea_1
- benefit areas 2-24 _ibenarea_
6 benefit/model type area
- Basic/ONE basicone
- Basic/Control basiccon
- Call Centre/ONE callone
- Call Centre/Control callcon
- PVS/ONE pvsone
- PVS/Control pvscon
* These dummy variables are equal to 1 if true and 0 otherwise.
** Variable anysikil is used when we construct models predicting employment outcomes; variables anysickr and anyillr
are used when we construct models predicting benefit outcomes.
Table C.2 Logit estimates for out-of-work status twelve months after
their claim for benefit, JSA clients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
fem -0.247 -0.233 -0.249 -0.234 -0.308 -0.280
(1.95) (1.82) (1.97)* (1.83) (2.35)* (2.12)*
age2024 -0.672 -0.654 -0.661 -0.655 -0.621 -0.618
(3.55)** (3.38)** (3.47)** (3.36)** (3.11)** (3.02)**
age2529 -0.411 -0.415 -0.399 -0.425 -0.378 -0.395
(1.80) (1.79) (1.71) (1.79) (1.51) (1.53)
age3034 -0.304 -0.259 -0.294 -0.280 -0.151 -0.161
(1.28) (1.08) (1.20) (1.12) (0.58) (0.60)
age3539 -0.222 -0.184 -0.218 -0.206 -0.119 -0.118
(0.91) (0.74) (0.86) (0.80) (0.44) (0.42)
age4044 -0.614 -0.611 -0.604 -0.622 -0.644 -0.671
(2.36)* (2.28)* (2.26)* (2.26)* (2.27)* (2.30)*
age4549 -0.256 -0.230 -0.242 -0.244 -0.280 -0.301
(0.94) (0.82) (0.87) (0.85) (0.94) (0.98)
age5054 -0.317 -0.267 -0.303 -0.278 -0.352 -0.352
(1.17) (0.96) (1.09) (0.98) (1.16) (1.13)
age5560 0.119 0.184 0.129 0.166 0.042 0.025
(0.42) (0.62) (0.44) (0.55) (0.13) (0.08)
white -0.613 -0.550 -0.619 -0.548 -0.622 -0.563
(3.07)** (2.55)* (3.12)** (2.54)* (2.98)** (2.50)*
degree -0.960 -1.002 -0.968 -0.981 -0.845 -0.857
(4.79)** (4.83)** (4.64)** (4.58)** (3.77)** (3.76)**
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Table C.2 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
abovea -0.368 -0.381 -0.364 -0.363 -0.282 -0.289
(2.02)* (2.06)* (1.98)* (1.93) (1.46) (1.48)
alev -0.521 -0.502 -0.513 -0.480 -0.493 -0.476
(2.97)** (2.78)** (2.91)** (2.64)** (2.61)** (2.44)*
gcseac -0.377 -0.364 -0.368 -0.346 -0.263 -0.254
(2.46)* (2.33)* (2.40)* (2.20)* (1.62) (1.53)
gcsede -0.326 -0.301 -0.330 -0.301 -0.331 -0.280
(1.69) (1.57) (1.71) (1.57) (1.67) (1.41)
foreign -0.317 -0.262 -0.318 -0.262 -0.347 -0.298
(1.33) (1.09) (1.34) (1.09) (1.34) (1.15)
num 0.236 0.253 0.244 0.258 0.124 0.128
(1.16) (1.23) (1.20) (1.26) (0.56) (0.58)
litr 0.187 0.196 0.187 0.198 0.222 0.232
(1.01) (1.03) (1.01) (1.04) (1.14) (1.17)
rentla 0.544 0.535 0.554 0.545 0.349 0.331
(3.13)** (3.05)** (3.17)** (3.10)** (1.85) (1.75)
rentha -0.070 0.005 -0.067 0.007 -0.122 -0.144
(0.29) (0.02) (0.28) (0.03) (0.49) (0.57)
rentpriv 0.184 0.293 0.184 0.296 0.117 0.165
(0.90) (1.43) (0.90) (1.43) (0.53) (0.75)
tenoth 0.013 0.060 0.013 0.063 0.219 0.224
(0.07) (0.31) (0.07) (0.33) (1.05) (1.06)
tenin 0.648 0.907 0.674 0.926 0.772 0.944
(1.11) (1.54) (1.14) (1.55) (1.45) (1.73)
yng34 -0.772 -0.788 -0.770 -0.791 -0.751 -0.762
(1.89) (1.99)* (1.88) (1.98)* (1.82) (1.90)
yng510 -0.292 -0.355 -0.282 -0.343 -0.156 -0.220
(1.00) (1.21) (0.97) (1.17) (0.51) (0.72)
yng1118 -0.552 -0.537 -0.545 -0.528 -0.308 -0.319
(1.75) (1.69) (1.73) (1.66) (0.93) (0.95)
yngnokid -0.338 -0.377 -0.343 -0.381 -0.258 -0.302
(1.41) (1.57) (1.43) (1.58) (1.01) (1.18)
oowbben 0.450 0.430 0.438 0.407 0.405 0.382
(3.24)** (3.03)** (3.03)** (2.77)** (2.75)** (2.56)*
inwbben -0.172 -0.238 -0.171 -0.234 -0.276 -0.348
(0.66) (0.90) (0.65) (0.88) (0.97) (1.19)
bothbben -0.198 -0.149 -0.214 -0.172 -0.283 -0.254
(0.73) (0.54) (0.77) (0.61) (0.99) (0.88)
pr16133 -0.281 -0.330 -0.294 -0.342 -0.205 -0.233
(1.33) (1.54) (1.39) (1.59) (0.89) (1.01)
pr163466 -0.365 -0.341 -0.367 -0.346 -0.124 -0.133
(1.75) (1.59) (1.74) (1.60) (0.57) (0.60)
pr166799 -0.738 -0.720 -0.727 -0.731 -0.420 -0.453
(3.91)** (3.72)** (3.67)** (3.61)** (2.01)* (2.15)*
pr16100 -0.759 -0.767 -0.666 -0.696 -0.382 -0.430
(3.59)** (3.60)** (2.71)** (2.81)** (1.51) (1.69)
pr16dk -0.684 -0.654 -0.586 -0.576 -0.339 -0.366
(3.32)** (3.12)** (2.40)* (2.33)* (1.35) (1.44)
pr15150 -0.467 -0.435 -0.453 -0.432 -0.588 -0.604
(1.45) (1.30) (1.39) (1.27) (1.56) (1.51)
pr1550p -0.904 -0.873 -0.843 -0.836 -0.776 -0.776
(2.06)* (1.99)* (1.87) (1.86) (1.57) (1.64)
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Table C.2 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
evwkber 0.025 0.026 0.028 0.017 -0.037 -0.024
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.09) (0.06)
anyunemr 0.294 0.282 0.369 0.360 0.343 0.333
(1.92) (1.84) (2.18)* (2.12)* (1.98)* (1.91)
np110149 -0.065 -0.011 -0.064 -0.017 -0.015 0.011
(0.36) (0.06) (0.35) (0.09) (0.08) (0.05)
np150184 -0.520 -0.429 -0.522 -0.436 -0.426 -0.375
(2.79)** (2.27)* (2.78)** (2.29)* (2.18)* (1.89)
np185254 -0.422 -0.341 -0.425 -0.349 -0.287 -0.233
(2.18)* (1.75) (2.19)* (1.79) (1.41) (1.13)
np255p -0.382 -0.244 -0.383 -0.254 -0.202 -0.100
(1.83) (1.15) (1.83) (1.19) (0.92) (0.45)
npdk 0.205 0.281 0.213 0.279 0.268 0.306
(0.64) (0.89) (0.67) (0.88) (0.80) (0.91)
married -0.588 -0.591 -0.587 -0.587 -0.372 -0.372
(3.14)** (3.14)** (3.13)** (3.12)** (1.77) (1.79)
cohab -0.076 -0.054 -0.074 -0.055 0.074 0.081
(0.38) (0.27) (0.37) (0.28) (0.35) (0.38)
widowed -0.521 -0.569 -0.522 -0.571 -0.270 -0.367
(0.87) (1.02) (0.87) (1.02) (0.42) (0.63)
divorced 0.010 0.029 0.011 0.027 0.046 0.021
(0.04) (0.13) (0.05) (0.12) (0.20) (0.09)
separ 0.084 0.010 0.084 0.002 0.067 0.009
(0.32) (0.04) (0.31) (0.01) (0.25) (0.03)
skillnm -0.243 -0.280 -0.248 -0.285 -0.296 -0.334
(1.25) (1.44) (1.28) (1.46) (1.47) (1.65)
skillman -0.099 -0.166 -0.108 -0.172 -0.255 -0.283
(0.52) (0.86) (0.57) (0.89) (1.26) (1.40)
partskil 0.067 0.035 0.063 0.032 -0.050 -0.072
(0.35) (0.19) (0.33) (0.17) (0.26) (0.36)
unskill 0.137 0.140 0.135 0.138 -0.081 -0.066
(0.56) (0.56) (0.55) (0.55) (0.31) (0.25)
nojarmed -0.571 -0.659 -0.584 -0.676 -0.726 -0.779
(1.99)* (2.24)* (2.04)* (2.29)* (2.45)* (2.56)*
anyillr 0.171 0.161 -0.014 -0.044
(0.72) (0.67) (0.06) (0.18)
anysickr 0.312 0.356 -0.403 -0.354
(0.66) (0.76) (0.73) (0.66)
anytrair -0.103 -0.151 -0.169 -0.194
(0.47) (0.69) (0.70) (0.80)
anyeducr 0.105 0.036 0.216 0.167
(0.54) (0.18) (1.07) (0.82)
anyothr 0.091 0.153 0.061 0.105
(0.47) (0.79) (0.31) (0.54)
disabpc -0.010 -0.047
(0.48) (1.06)
chansick -0.258 -0.077
(0.82) (0.21)
lonepc 0.020 0.123
(0.16) (0.75)
chanlp 0.584 0.699
(1.16) (1.22)
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Table C.2 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
uerate99 0.073 0.009
(1.46) (0.11)
uechange -0.250 -0.376
(1.03) (1.18)
carenaff -0.026 -0.006
(0.20) (0.04)
careaff 0.800 0.855
(2.59)** (2.75)**
chsupp -0.074 -0.135
(0.14) (0.25)
privpen 0.229 0.217
(0.81) (0.76)
othincm 0.563 0.558
(2.72)** (2.59)**
hhwker1 -0.049 -0.059
(0.34) (0.41)
hhwker2p -0.566 -0.587
(3.27)** (3.31)**
ghfair 0.016 0.039
(0.12) (0.30)
ghnotg 0.711 0.709
(3.69)** (3.68)**
lsinoaff -0.512 -0.491
(2.46)* (2.34)*
lsiaff 0.337 0.325
(1.95) (1.88)
mentdis -0.187 -0.183
(0.74) (0.72)
phoner -1.060 -1.081
(4.16)** (4.24)**
licnoveh -0.213 -0.200
(1.18) (1.09)
licandv -0.689 -0.681
(5.03)** (4.88)**
wafneg -0.113 -0.090
(0.74) (0.58)
wamid -0.443 -0.470
(2.70)** (2.85)**
wafpos -0.416 -0.427
(2.40)* (2.45)*
wavpos -0.646 -0.654
(3.93)** (3.87)**
basiccon -0.120 -0.122 -0.039
(0.67) (0.68) (0.20)
callone 0.062 0.069 0.186
(0.34) (0.38) (0.94)
callcon 0.037 0.049 0.081
(0.21) (0.27) (0.40)
pvsone -0.054 -0.048 0.077
(0.31) (0.28) (0.40)
pvscon -0.025 -0.019 -0.037
(0.15) (0.11) (0.19)
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Table C.2 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
_Ibenarea_2 -0.153 -0.147 0.126
(0.36) (0.34) (0.24)
_Ibenarea_3 0.388 0.387 0.922
(0.98) (0.97) (1.46)
_Ibenarea_4 0.649 0.643 0.552
(1.42) (1.40) (1.09)
_Ibenarea_5 0.411 0.422 0.763
(0.95) (0.97) (1.50)
_Ibenarea_6 -0.086 -0.081 0.127
(0.20) (0.18) (0.25)
_Ibenarea_7 0.603 0.609 0.985
(1.40) (1.41) (1.69)
_Ibenarea_8 0.286 0.295 0.466
(0.72) (0.73) (0.96)
_Ibenarea_9 -0.158 -0.155 0.166
(0.40) (0.39) (0.34)
_Ibenarea_10 0.096 0.104 0.682
(0.23) (0.25) (1.13)
_Ibenarea_11 0.397 0.397 0.589
(1.01) (1.00) (1.25)
_Ibenarea_12 0.360 0.366 0.811
(0.89) (0.90) (1.50)
_Ibenarea_13 -0.177 -0.187 -0.088
(0.42) (0.44) (0.19)
_Ibenarea_14 -0.367 -0.385 -0.219
(0.78) (0.81) (0.39)
_Ibenarea_15 0.731 0.740 1.155
(1.77) (1.78) (2.15)*
_Ibenarea_16 0.068 0.071 0.358
(0.17) (0.17) (0.73)
_Ibenarea_17 0.329 0.336 0.611
(0.71) (0.72) (1.11)
_Ibenarea_18 0.119 0.141 0.457
(0.26) (0.31) (0.85)
_Ibenarea_19 0.079 0.088 0.344
(0.19) (0.22) (0.68)
_Ibenarea_20 0.456 0.463 0.461
(1.19) (1.19) (0.92)
_Ibenarea_21 -0.126 -0.146 0.080
(0.31) (0.36) (0.16)
_Ibenarea_22 0.007 0.002 0.409
(0.02) (0.00) (0.71)
_Ibenarea_23 0.301 0.320 0.549
(0.75) (0.80) (0.99)
_Ibenarea_24 0.638 0.668 0.814
(1.53) (1.60) (1.64)
Constant 1.927 1.584 1.827 1.525 2.611 2.525
(3.19)** (2.34)* (2.91)** (2.17)* (3.60)** (2.97)**
Observations 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232
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Table C.3 Logit estimates for out-of-work benefit receipt twelve
months after their claim for benefit, JSA clients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
fem -0.222 -0.209 -0.200 -0.184 -0.220 -0.202
(1.62) (1.51) (1.45) (1.33) (1.52) (1.40)
age2024 -0.417 -0.397 -0.457 -0.446 -0.382 -0.389
(2.10)* (1.98)* (2.27)* (2.19)* (1.77) (1.79)
age2529 -0.072 -0.049 -0.144 -0.138 -0.077 -0.083
(0.30) (0.20) (0.58) (0.55) (0.29) (0.31)
age3034 0.292 0.340 0.210 0.241 0.403 0.395
(1.16) (1.34) (0.81) (0.92) (1.47) (1.43)
age3539 0.257 0.277 0.188 0.189 0.445 0.410
(0.95) (1.02) (0.68) (0.68) (1.51) (1.38)
age4044 -0.188 -0.171 -0.266 -0.271 -0.182 -0.234
(0.65) (0.58) (0.90) (0.90) (0.58) (0.73)
age4549 0.413 0.436 0.332 0.334 0.423 0.394
(1.37) (1.42) (1.09) (1.07) (1.27) (1.16)
age5054 0.374 0.435 0.274 0.322 0.356 0.374
(1.24) (1.43) (0.89) (1.03) (1.05) (1.09)
age5560 0.397 0.437 0.326 0.349 0.339 0.311
(1.22) (1.31) (0.99) (1.04) (0.95) (0.86)
white -0.136 0.002 -0.113 0.020 -0.059 0.073
(0.66) (0.01) (0.54) (0.09) (0.27) (0.32)
degree -1.566 -1.590 -1.456 -1.462 -1.258 -1.253
(6.22)** (6.18)** (5.62)** (5.53)** (4.53)** (4.43)**
abovea -0.702 -0.701 -0.665 -0.656 -0.576 -0.560
(3.42)** (3.38)** (3.17)** (3.10)** (2.63)** (2.54)*
alev -0.518 -0.491 -0.486 -0.448 -0.378 -0.332
(2.72)** (2.53)* (2.53)* (2.29)* (1.87) (1.61)
gcseac -0.264 -0.271 -0.242 -0.244 -0.103 -0.118
(1.61) (1.63) (1.46) (1.45) (0.59) (0.67)
gcsede -0.187 -0.148 -0.149 -0.104 -0.080 -0.027
(0.91) (0.72) (0.72) (0.50) (0.36) (0.12)
foreign -0.201 -0.207 -0.181 -0.182 -0.103 -0.106
(0.85) (0.86) (0.75) (0.74) (0.40) (0.41)
num 0.436 0.452 0.424 0.446 0.279 0.288
(2.00)* (2.05)* (1.93) (2.01)* (1.16) (1.21)
litr 0.031 0.053 0.042 0.066 0.106 0.106
(0.15) (0.25) (0.20) (0.32) (0.49) (0.49)
rentla 1.105 1.120 1.099 1.113 0.792 0.800
(5.75)** (5.79)** (5.71)** (5.74)** (3.94)** (3.96)**
rentha 0.418 0.521 0.402 0.505 0.242 0.270
(1.60) (1.95) (1.54) (1.88) (0.88) (0.97)
rentpriv 0.673 0.784 0.679 0.796 0.537 0.584
(3.04)** (3.44)** (3.06)** (3.50)** (2.29)* (2.43)*
tenoth 0.330 0.375 0.323 0.370 0.479 0.498
(1.53) (1.70) (1.50) (1.68) (2.08)* (2.12)*
tenin 1.706 1.851 1.632 1.777 1.521 1.588
(2.59)** (2.77)** (2.50)* (2.69)** (2.63)** (2.65)**
yng34 -0.435 -0.452 -0.455 -0.472 -0.296 -0.323
(1.02) (1.07) (1.06) (1.11) (0.71) (0.79)
yng510 -0.366 -0.369 -0.385 -0.381 -0.192 -0.188
(1.16) (1.14) (1.21) (1.17) (0.57) (0.55)
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Table C.3 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
yng1118 -0.436 -0.409 -0.473 -0.439 -0.184 -0.182
(1.30) (1.20) (1.40) (1.28) (0.52) (0.51)
yngnokid -0.383 -0.399 -0.378 -0.396 -0.197 -0.223
(1.43) (1.48) (1.42) (1.48) (0.71) (0.80)
oowbben 0.733 0.707 0.716 0.678 0.629 0.590
(4.87)** (4.64)** (4.57)** (4.29)** (3.84)** (3.58)**
inwbben -0.316 -0.297 -0.312 -0.297 -0.408 -0.440
(1.06) (1.00) (1.04) (1.00) (1.24) (1.35)
bothbben 0.492 0.508 0.485 0.494 0.380 0.397
(1.73) (1.76) (1.69) (1.70) (1.29) (1.34)
pr16133 -0.392 -0.408 -0.357 -0.373 -0.312 -0.336
(1.72) (1.76) (1.56) (1.60) (1.29) (1.36)
pr163466 -0.294 -0.266 -0.291 -0.265 -0.039 -0.046
(1.31) (1.16) (1.28) (1.14) (0.17) (0.19)
pr166799 -0.694 -0.683 -0.745 -0.749 -0.420 -0.462
(3.28)** (3.14)** (3.33)** (3.26)** (1.78) (1.93)
pr16100 -0.568 -0.593 -0.775 -0.819 -0.437 -0.506
(2.37)* (2.45)* (2.81)** (2.94)** (1.53) (1.76)
pr16dk -0.793 -0.784 -0.996 -1.002 -0.748 -0.782
(3.40)** (3.28)** (3.67)** (3.60)** (2.64)** (2.72)**
pr15150 -0.240 -0.261 -0.290 -0.312 -0.358 -0.428
(0.75) (0.80) (0.92) (0.96) (1.00) (1.15)
pr1550p -0.083 -0.095 -0.257 -0.285 -0.229 -0.310
(0.16) (0.18) (0.49) (0.53) (0.40) (0.54)
evwkber -0.125 -0.146 -0.137 -0.147 -0.206 -0.217
(0.27) (0.31) (0.29) (0.31) (0.40) (0.43)
anyunemr -0.076 -0.076 -0.192 -0.194 -0.180 -0.177
(0.46) (0.45) (1.07) (1.07) (0.97) (0.96)
np110149 -0.221 -0.207 -0.244 -0.234 -0.248 -0.251
(1.18) (1.09) (1.30) (1.22) (1.27) (1.26)
np150184 -0.275 -0.240 -0.288 -0.253 -0.221 -0.224
(1.41) (1.20) (1.46) (1.26) (1.09) (1.09)
np185254 -0.467 -0.432 -0.469 -0.435 -0.353 -0.353
(2.32)* (2.14)* (2.33)* (2.16)* (1.65) (1.64)
np255p -0.416 -0.362 -0.421 -0.365 -0.286 -0.258
(1.83) (1.56) (1.85) (1.57) (1.15) (1.03)
npdk 0.320 0.365 0.297 0.343 0.229 0.247
(0.89) (1.01) (0.82) (0.94) (0.60) (0.65)
married -0.902 -0.911 -0.906 -0.918 -0.592 -0.565
(4.27)** (4.23)** (4.32)** (4.29)** (2.50)* (2.36)*
cohab -0.528 -0.541 -0.547 -0.562 -0.314 -0.329
(2.40)* (2.45)* (2.48)* (2.53)* (1.32) (1.38)
widowed 0.480 0.660 0.479 0.656 0.829 0.961
(0.67) (0.94) (0.67) (0.94) (1.10) (1.32)
divorced 0.155 0.196 0.136 0.173 0.159 0.175
(0.65) (0.81) (0.57) (0.71) (0.63) (0.68)
separ 0.007 -0.046 -0.008 -0.068 0.029 -0.032
(0.02) (0.15) (0.03) (0.22) (0.10) (0.11)
skillnm -0.142 -0.147 -0.127 -0.126 -0.195 -0.176
(0.62) (0.63) (0.56) (0.54) (0.82) (0.73)
skillman 0.050 0.020 0.076 0.047 -0.053 -0.028
(0.23) (0.09) (0.34) (0.21) (0.23) (0.12)
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Table C.3 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
partskil 0.180 0.174 0.203 0.198 0.099 0.133
(0.82) (0.78) (0.92) (0.89) (0.43) (0.57)
unskill 0.212 0.183 0.240 0.212 0.035 0.064
(0.80) (0.67) (0.90) (0.78) (0.12) (0.23)
nojarmed -0.633 -0.695 -0.592 -0.652 -0.699 -0.729
(1.96)* (2.13)* (1.82) (1.99)* (2.01)* (2.06)*
anyillr -0.408 -0.397 -0.642 -0.625
(1.65) (1.61) (2.56)* (2.50)*
anysickr 0.209 0.175 -0.373 -0.390
(0.39) (0.30) (0.56) (0.57)
anytrair 0.135 0.105 0.055 0.025
(0.63) (0.48) (0.24) (0.10)
anyeducr -0.388 -0.445 -0.244 -0.289
(1.94) (2.20)* (1.14) (1.33)
anyothr -0.083 -0.050 -0.091 -0.060
(0.39) (0.23) (0.42) (0.28)
disabpc 0.004 0.030
(0.17) (0.64)
chansick 0.444 0.568
(1.29) (1.48)
lonepc 0.138 0.121
(1.01) (0.67)
chanlp 0.950 0.731
(1.81) (1.20)
uerate99 0.013 -0.011
(0.24) (0.13)
uechange -0.396 -0.711
(1.46) (1.98)*
carenaff 0.279 0.273
(1.96) (1.89)
careaff 0.886 0.854
(2.94)** (2.81)**
chsupp -0.757 -0.829
(1.21) (1.28)
privpen 0.084 0.073
(0.24) (0.21)
othincm -0.109 -0.164
(0.41) (0.62)
hhwker1 -0.397 -0.413
(2.51)* (2.57)*
hhwker2p -0.692 -0.693
(3.74)** (3.71)**
ghfair 0.213 0.209
(1.55) (1.50)
ghnotg 0.843 0.829
(4.19)** (4.08)**
lsinoaff -0.513 -0.490
(2.26)* (2.12)*
lsiaff 0.167 0.174
(0.92) (0.94)
mentdis 0.000 -0.005
(0.00) (0.02)
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Table C.3 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
phoner -0.801 -0.853
(3.48)** (3.72)**
licnoveh -0.316 -0.317
(1.64) (1.62)
licandv -0.672 -0.672
(4.53)** (4.46)**
wafneg -0.089 -0.095
(0.54) (0.58)
wamid -0.230 -0.237
(1.30) (1.33)
wafpos -0.430 -0.457
(2.30)* (2.43)*
wavpos -0.638 -0.642
(3.49)** (3.44)**
basiccon 0.011 0.007 0.124
(0.05) (0.04) (0.58)
callone 0.234 0.221 0.355
(1.17) (1.10) (1.63)
callcon 0.329 0.300 0.377
(1.67) (1.51) (1.73)
pvsone -0.111 -0.122 0.049
(0.57) (0.63) (0.23)
pvscon -0.020 -0.040 -0.093
(0.10) (0.21) (0.43)
_Ibenarea_2 -0.351 -0.339 0.108
(0.79) (0.76) (0.20)
_Ibenarea_3 -0.326 -0.279 -0.482
(0.78) (0.68) (0.74)
_Ibenarea_4 0.408 0.417 0.482
(0.83) (0.84) (0.94)
_Ibenarea_5 0.135 0.142 0.491
(0.30) (0.32) (0.96)
_Ibenarea_6 -0.287 -0.273 0.277
(0.61) (0.58) (0.52)
_Ibenarea_7 0.284 0.298 0.312
(0.65) (0.68) (0.53)
_Ibenarea_8 0.249 0.249 0.405
(0.62) (0.62) (0.85)
_Ibenarea_9 -0.796 -0.800 -0.375
(1.92) (1.96) (0.77)
_Ibenarea_10 0.016 0.048 0.239
(0.04) (0.11) (0.39)
_Ibenarea_11 -0.253 -0.254 0.059
(0.62) (0.63) (0.12)
_Ibenarea_12 0.194 0.219 0.348
(0.45) (0.51) (0.60)
_Ibenarea_13 -0.053 -0.058 0.345
(0.12) (0.13) (0.74)
_Ibenarea_14 -0.350 -0.362 -0.031
(0.70) (0.73) (0.05)
_Ibenarea_15 -0.051 0.029 0.465
(0.12) (0.07) (0.86)
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Table C.3 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
_Ibenarea_16 -0.075 -0.069 -0.099
(0.19) (0.17) (0.20)
_Ibenarea_17 0.114 0.089 0.732
(0.22) (0.17) (1.29)
_Ibenarea_18 0.036 -0.010 0.490
(0.08) (0.02) (0.95)
_Ibenarea_19 0.148 0.175 0.504
(0.35) (0.42) (1.00)
_Ibenarea_20 0.374 0.367 0.129
(0.95) (0.94) (0.26)
_Ibenarea_21 -0.739 -0.741 -0.454
(1.68) (1.69) (0.89)
_Ibenarea_22 -0.046 -0.040 -0.064
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
_Ibenarea_23 -0.035 -0.043 -0.345
(0.08) (0.10) (0.61)
_Ibenarea_24 0.215 0.225 0.205
(0.52) (0.54) (0.42)
Constant 0.381 0.328 0.626 0.576 0.661 0.394
(0.56) (0.44) (0.89) (0.75) (0.82) (0.43)
Observations 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232
Table C.4 OLS estimates of percentage of time JSA clients spend on
out-of-work benefits, DSSDTE-31/12/02
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
fem -2.654 -2.486 -2.666 -2.497 -2.845 -2.837
(2.22)* (2.07)* (2.22)* (2.08)* (2.34)* (2.32)*
age2024 -2.115 -1.896 -2.703 -2.611 -2.096 -2.212
(1.13) (1.01) (1.43) (1.38) (1.10) (1.16)
age2529 0.240 0.597 -0.960 -0.789 -0.176 -0.078
(0.10) (0.26) (0.41) (0.34) (0.07) (0.03)
age3034 1.085 1.364 -0.230 -0.179 0.575 0.508
(0.44) (0.56) (0.09) (0.07) (0.23) (0.20)
age3539 -0.882 -0.671 -2.495 -2.482 -1.773 -1.920
(0.33) (0.25) (0.92) (0.92) (0.65) (0.70)
age4044 -0.774 -0.522 -2.205 -2.156 -1.431 -1.668
(0.30) (0.20) (0.84) (0.82) (0.54) (0.62)
age4549 3.936 4.013 2.653 2.517 3.477 3.096
(1.34) (1.36) (0.89) (0.84) (1.15) (1.02)
age5054 -0.319 0.106 -1.557 -1.312 -0.786 -1.102
(0.11) (0.04) (0.52) (0.43) (0.25) (0.35)
age5560 2.272 2.811 0.710 1.072 1.646 1.458
(0.73) (0.90) (0.23) (0.34) (0.50) (0.44)
white -0.163 -1.454 -0.108 -1.394 -0.384 -0.852
(0.09) (0.77) (0.06) (0.74) (0.21) (0.45)
degree -3.669 -3.904 -2.257 -2.284 -0.060 -0.192
(1.96)* (2.10)* (1.14) (1.17) (0.03) (0.10)
abovea -0.475 -1.068 0.278 -0.238 1.176 0.817
(0.24) (0.54) (0.14) (0.12) (0.59) (0.41)
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Table C.4 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
alev 0.282 -0.078 1.142 0.877 2.154 1.933
(0.16) (0.04) (0.63) (0.48) (1.17) (1.05)
gcseac -1.695 -1.435 -1.185 -0.848 -0.509 -0.363
(1.04) (0.88) (0.72) (0.52) (0.31) (0.22)
gcsede 2.816 2.545 3.085 2.880 3.279 2.980
(1.34) (1.22) (1.47) (1.38) (1.59) (1.45)
foreign -0.295 -0.073 -0.020 0.259 0.808 0.893
(0.13) (0.03) (0.01) (0.12) (0.37) (0.41)
num 2.959 3.365 3.113 3.547 2.626 2.800
(1.30) (1.50) (1.38) (1.60) (1.17) (1.25)
litr 1.994 2.122 2.203 2.365 1.897 1.911
(1.06) (1.13) (1.17) (1.26) (1.01) (1.02)
rentla 8.842 8.641 8.917 8.696 8.088 7.750
(4.90)** (4.76)** (4.98)** (4.84)** (4.47)** (4.25)**
rentha 5.527 5.930 5.635 6.079 5.965 5.532
(2.08)* (2.23)* (2.12)* (2.29)* (2.26)* (2.10)*
rentpriv 3.160 3.719 3.266 3.857 3.393 3.254
(1.67) (1.94) (1.73) (2.02)* (1.77) (1.69)
tenoth 3.606 3.668 3.765 3.843 4.435 3.910
(1.93) (1.95) (2.02)* (2.05)* (2.29)* (2.02)*
tenin 7.807 8.498 7.705 8.310 8.144 7.639
(1.65) (1.79) (1.61) (1.74) (1.72) (1.61)
yng34 -2.092 -2.960 -2.041 -2.952 -3.158 -3.568
(0.62) (0.88) (0.61) (0.88) (0.96) (1.08)
yng510 0.699 0.480 0.887 0.636 0.988 0.655
(0.24) (0.16) (0.30) (0.22) (0.34) (0.23)
yng1118 1.514 1.610 2.016 2.156 2.818 3.011
(0.48) (0.51) (0.65) (0.69) (0.90) (0.96)
yngnokid 4.357 3.789 4.776 4.205 4.516 4.254
(1.82) (1.58) (1.99)* (1.75) (1.87) (1.77)
oowbben 10.542 10.218 9.670 9.262 8.932 8.835
(7.80)** (7.55)** (6.90)** (6.59)** (6.33)** (6.23)**
inwbben -1.392 -1.435 -1.140 -1.230 -1.318 -1.386
(0.62) (0.63) (0.51) (0.54) (0.57) (0.60)
bothbben 7.805 7.523 7.083 6.760 7.136 6.847
(3.00)** (2.88)** (2.67)** (2.54)* (2.70)** (2.58)**
pr16133 1.460 1.408 0.957 0.890 1.042 1.001
(0.66) (0.64) (0.44) (0.40) (0.48) (0.46)
pr163466 1.540 1.600 0.753 0.744 1.354 1.172
(0.73) (0.76) (0.36) (0.35) (0.64) (0.56)
pr166799 -1.711 -1.612 -3.159 -3.204 -2.184 -2.372
(0.85) (0.80) (1.53) (1.56) (1.06) (1.16)
pr16100 0.481 0.930 -0.559 -0.367 0.014 0.167
(0.23) (0.44) (0.23) (0.15) (0.01) (0.07)
pr16dk -0.797 -0.412 -1.716 -1.581 -1.610 -1.582
(0.37) (0.19) (0.69) (0.64) (0.65) (0.64)
pr15150 -0.546 0.064 -0.812 -0.221 -1.406 -1.341
(0.16) (0.02) (0.24) (0.07) (0.43) (0.40)
pr1550p 8.530 8.794 7.472 7.462 8.348 8.417
(1.60) (1.65) (1.39) (1.39) (1.57) (1.58)
evwkber 0.482 0.750 -0.161 0.048 0.242 0.437
(0.12) (0.19) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.11)
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Table C.4 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
anyunemr 1.773 2.021 2.414 2.586 2.196 2.319
(1.14) (1.29) (1.40) (1.49) (1.29) (1.34)
np110149 3.066 3.102 2.926 2.933 2.795 2.819
(1.75) (1.77) (1.68) (1.68) (1.61) (1.62)
np150184 3.678 4.096 3.336 3.743 3.630 3.706
(2.02)* (2.25)* (1.85) (2.08)* (2.03)* (2.06)*
np185254 0.695 1.129 0.546 0.966 1.169 1.237
(0.37) (0.60) (0.29) (0.52) (0.62) (0.66)
np255p 3.150 3.530 2.797 3.131 3.817 3.731
(1.50) (1.67) (1.34) (1.49) (1.82) (1.75)
npdk 0.097 0.412 -0.206 0.056 -0.112 -0.101
(0.03) (0.13) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
married -1.168 -1.715 -0.932 -1.491 -0.365 -0.970
(0.60) (0.88) (0.48) (0.76) (0.17) (0.46)
cohab 1.637 1.687 1.727 1.774 1.859 1.807
(0.78) (0.81) (0.82) (0.85) (0.87) (0.85)
widowed 1.799 0.916 1.931 0.998 2.026 1.357
(0.34) (0.17) (0.36) (0.19) (0.38) (0.25)
divorced 2.002 1.995 1.868 1.824 2.423 2.250
(0.84) (0.85) (0.79) (0.78) (1.04) (0.97)
separ 1.505 1.432 1.147 0.991 1.042 1.212
(0.55) (0.51) (0.42) (0.36) (0.38) (0.43)
skillnm 3.315 3.215 3.298 3.200 3.115 3.074
(1.81) (1.75) (1.80) (1.76) (1.71) (1.68)
skillman 3.798 3.204 3.804 3.217 2.945 2.941
(2.11)* (1.76) (2.10)* (1.76) (1.62) (1.61)
partskil 4.447 3.981 4.451 3.977 3.563 3.585
(2.41)* (2.16)* (2.41)* (2.16)* (1.94) (1.94)
unskill 6.686 6.359 6.555 6.214 5.275 5.352
(2.81)** (2.68)** (2.77)** (2.63)** (2.22)* (2.25)*
nojarmed 6.024 5.431 5.617 4.987 5.143 5.040
(2.36)* (2.13)* (2.19)* (1.94) (1.98)* (1.95)
anyillr 7.268 7.191 5.947 5.885
(2.80)** (2.79)** (2.27)* (2.25)*
anysickr -7.224 -7.434 -8.181 -8.113
(1.30) (1.29) (1.40) (1.36)
anytrair -4.433 -4.730 -4.909 -5.078
(1.91) (2.03)* (2.12)* (2.20)*
anyeducr -3.090 -3.702 -3.029 -3.259
(1.62) (1.96)* (1.60) (1.72)
anyothr 0.825 1.053 0.880 0.830
(0.42) (0.53) (0.45) (0.42)
disabpc 0.445 0.027
(2.17)* (0.06)
chansick -2.128 -3.632
(0.68) (1.01)
lonepc -0.379 1.543
(0.32) (1.01)
chanlp -3.760 -0.534
(0.83) (0.11)
uerate99 0.154 -0.657
(0.33) (0.88)
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Table C.4 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
uechange -2.591 -1.147
(1.08) (0.38)
carenaff 0.877 1.331
(0.67) (1.02)
careaff 4.098 4.399
(1.31) (1.41)
chsupp -10.646 -10.743
(3.31)** (3.43)**
privpen 0.427 0.335
(0.13) (0.10)
othincm -1.907 -1.614
(0.98) (0.83)
hhwker1 -0.225 -0.086
(0.17) (0.06)
hhwker2p -1.784 -1.601
(1.16) (1.04)
ghfair 4.023 4.131
(3.05)** (3.13)**
ghnotg 5.077 5.205
(2.59)** (2.68)**
lsinoaff 0.980 0.717
(0.51) (0.37)
lsiaff -0.940 -0.846
(0.52) (0.47)
mentdis -2.552 -2.864
(1.02) (1.14)
phoner -2.181 -2.259
(1.20) (1.24)
licnoveh -2.404 -2.269
(1.44) (1.36)
licandv -3.009 -2.895
(2.34)* (2.23)*
wafneg -2.090 -1.955
(1.45) (1.37)
wamid -1.679 -1.832
(1.05) (1.15)
wafpos -1.721 -1.794
(1.05) (1.09)
wavpos -1.761 -1.872
(1.10) (1.18)
basiccon -3.476 -3.637 -2.059
(2.01)* (2.10)* (1.17)
callone -1.138 -1.285 0.106
(0.63) (0.71) (0.06)
callcon -2.289 -2.352 -0.760
(1.27) (1.31) (0.41)
pvsone -1.716 -1.770 -0.955
(0.98) (1.01) (0.54)
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Table C.4 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
_Ibenarea_2 -5.191 -5.212 -3.344
(1.45) (1.47) (0.83)
_Ibenarea_3 9.357 9.427 10.389
(2.54)* (2.58)** (1.81)
_Ibenarea_4 -1.268 -1.063 -0.383
(0.33) (0.28) (0.10)
_Ibenarea_5 0.278 0.116 2.884
(0.07) (0.03) (0.68)
_Ibenarea_6 -2.083 -2.007 -0.318
(0.57) (0.55) (0.08)
_Ibenarea_7 3.170 3.353 2.495
(0.79) (0.85) (0.46)
_Ibenarea_8 0.415 0.069 1.138
(0.12) (0.02) (0.30)
_Ibenarea_9 -0.683 -0.617 1.624
(0.19) (0.18) (0.42)
_Ibenarea_10 -1.545 -1.390 0.028
(0.42) (0.38) (0.01)
_Ibenarea_11 -0.592 -0.783 0.705
(0.17) (0.23) (0.19)
_Ibenarea_12 2.854 2.941 4.187
(0.73) (0.76) (0.87)
_Ibenarea_13 -4.594 -4.764 -3.002
(1.36) (1.42) (0.88)
_Ibenarea_14 -3.115 -3.673 -2.067
(0.80) (0.96) (0.50)
_Ibenarea_15 -0.219 0.224 2.990
(0.06) (0.06) (0.68)
_Ibenarea_16 -0.759 -1.036 -0.665
(0.22) (0.30) (0.16)
_Ibenarea_17 -2.025 -2.608 -1.221
(0.49) (0.64) (0.27)
_Ibenarea_18 -3.539 -3.454 -1.915
(0.93) (0.92) (0.47)
_Ibenarea_19 0.813 0.825 4.106
(0.23) (0.23) (1.00)
_Ibenarea_20 0.145 0.357 2.033
(0.04) (0.11) (0.51)
_Ibenarea_21 2.754 2.175 4.067
(0.76) (0.60) (1.01)
_Ibenarea_22 1.428 1.054 2.191
(0.39) (0.29) (0.43)
_Ibenarea_23 7.286 7.717 9.729
(1.95) (2.08)* (1.95)
_Ibenarea_24 2.694 2.991 4.479
(0.72) (0.81) (1.10)
Constant 12.975 12.683 15.095 15.210 11.176 13.297
(2.12)* (1.94) (2.39)* (2.28)* (1.64) (1.73)
Observations 3121 3121 3121 3121 3121 3121
R-squared 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13
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